Joachim Keppler - A New Perspective on the Functioning of the Brain and the Mechanisms Behind Conscious Processes

Joachim Keppler offers a new hypothesis on the mechanisms behind conscious processes and discusses the new perspectives his hypothesis opens up for consciousness research. In particular, his theory (which is based on stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a promising theoretical framework that provides a deeper understanding of quantum systems and reveals the origin of quantum phenomena) offers "the possibility of elucidating the relationship between brain and consciousness, of specifying the connection between consciousness and information, and of answering the question of what distinguishes conscious processes from unconscious processes."

I'm not sure I get all of his model, but it's interesting stuff.

Full Citation: 

Keppler J. (2013). A new perspective on the functioning of the brain and the mechanisms behind conscious processes. Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 4:242. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00242

A new perspective on the functioning of the brain and the mechanisms behind conscious processes

Joachim Keppler*
DIWISS, Roth, Germany

Abstract

An essential prerequisite for the development of a theory of consciousness is the clarification of the fundamental mechanisms underlying conscious processes. In this article I present an approach that sheds new light on these mechanisms. This approach builds on stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a promising theoretical framework that provides a deeper understanding of quantum systems and reveals the origin of quantum phenomena. I outline the most important concepts and findings of SED and interpret the neurophysiological body of evidence in the context of these findings, indicating that the functioning of the brain rests upon exactly the same principles that are characteristic for quantum systems. On this basis, I construct a new hypothesis on the mechanisms behind conscious processes and discuss the new perspectives this hypothesis opens up for consciousness research. In particular, it offers the possibility of elucidating the relationship between brain and consciousness, of specifying the connection between consciousness and information, and of answering the question of what distinguishes conscious processes from unconscious processes.

Introduction

Although the neurosciences have made considerable advances in the last two decades, the core problem of how brain processes cause consciousness is still outstanding. Since the fundamental mechanisms of the physical world are described on the basis of quantum field theories, the question arises whether quantum physics is also relevant for the understanding of consciousness. As far as this question is concerned, the scientific community is divided by a gulf separating those who regard the properties of quantum systems as essential ingredients of a theory of consciousness (Beck and Eccles, 1992; Stapp, 1993; Hameroff and Penrose, 1996) from those who cast doubt on a deeper connection between quantum physics and consciousness and, hence, contest the necessity of quantum approaches to consciousness (Tegmark, 2000; Koch and Hepp, 2006; Baars and Edelman, 2012; Seth, 2012).

Where does the disparity of opinions come from? On closer inspection, it becomes obvious that the discrepancy originates mainly from the unsatisfactory overall situation of quantum theory. Although the formalism of quantum physics is highly developed and all the predictions are perfectly confirmed, the explanatory approaches to quantum phenomena leave many questions unresolved. This is the cause for a whole lot of misinterpretations and misunderstandings regarding the nature of quantum systems and the conditions under which they can develop.

In order to bridge the divide and appreciate the real value of quantum physics for consciousness research, we need more transparency about the processes that take place in the quantum world. A small circle of physicists accepted this challenge and strived after concepts that eliminate the explanatory gaps of quantum theory. The most developed approach is stochastic electrodynamics (SED), which has achieved significant progress over the years. Instead of purely describing quantum phenomena, as the established formalism of quantum physics does, SED provides a look behind the scenes of quantum systems, thereby disclosing the fundamental principles underlying matter, explaining the origin of quantum phenomena and unraveling the mysteries of quantum physics.

This article is grounded on the assumption that SED is the proper foundation for the understanding of quantum systems. I outline the central insights of SED and interpret the neurophysiological body of evidence in the context of these insights. On this basis, I construct a new hypothesis on the functioning of the brain and the mechanisms behind conscious processes. Finally, I discuss the new perspectives this hypothesis opens up for consciousness research.

Fundamental Mechanisms Underlying Quantum Systems

The foundations of SED were established in the 1960's and 1970's (Marshall, 1963, 1965; Boyer, 1969, 1975) with the goal to derive the laws of quantum physics from first principles. Since then, the framework of SED has been continuously advanced, most notably by important theoretical works (De la Peña and Cetto, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2006) and insightful numerical simulations (Cole and Zou, 2003, 2004a,b). Through the recent developments many of the initial problems could be resolved, now enabling the derivation of the full formalism of quantum mechanics and quantum electrodynamics from SED (De la Peña and Cetto, 2001).

SED is based on the conception that the vacuum is imbued with a real, all-pervasive stochastic radiation field, called zero-point field (ZPF), which may be viewed as an ocean of energy that permeates the whole universe, making the vacuum in reality a plenum. The undisturbed ZPF exhibits several symmetries, namely homogeneity, isotropy, Lorentz invariance, and scale invariance, and can be described as a sum of plane electromagnetic waves with random phase and a characteristic power spectrum. In this form, the ZPF constitutes a background of permanent activity that is present even at absolute zero.

According to SED, the components of every physical system interact permanently and unavoidably with the ZPF, thus acquiring a stochastic motion and behaving as stochastic oscillators. As long as a system is sufficiently shielded against thermal noise and the ZPF is the dominating driving force, the energy exchange between the system components and the ZPF can reach equilibrium states where the average power absorbed by the system compensates exactly the average radiated power. These balance situations are identical with the stationary states predicted by quantum theory (De la Peña and Cetto, 2001, 2006). Hence, any dynamical system in balance with the ZPF displays quantum behavior. Upon reaching equilibrium, such a system falls into a stable attractor (De la Peña and Cetto, 1995).

Since matter and ZPF exert a mutual influence, the presence of matter also affects the dynamics of the ZPF. In the case of a nonlinear system in equilibrium, the interaction between the system components and the ZPF leads to a modification of the ZPF. As soon as a stable attractor is reached, the frequency components involved in the maintenance of the equilibrium can become highly correlated (De la Peña and Cetto, 2001), resulting in a de-randomization and partial organization of the local field (De la Peña et al., 2009). This means that the formation of an attractor imprints a system-specific information state on the ZPF. In this way, all the components of the system are effectively coupled through the ZPF, giving rise to collective cooperation and long-range coherence (De la Peña and Cetto, 2001). Hence, the key insight from SED is that the properties of quantum systems are emergent phenomena that can be traced back to the resonant interaction between the system components and the ZPF. So, let us register: A quantum system functions as a resonant stochastic oscillator that selectively filters its specific resonance frequencies out of the ZPF spectrum. As soon as a quantum system reaches a stable attractor, the system components display long-range coherence, which is mediated by the information-bearing, partially organized ZPF.

Given these universal mechanisms, it is quite obvious that there is no clear separation between the microcosm and the macrocosm. Independent of the system size, it is always the resonant coupling of the system components to specific frequencies of the ZPF spectrum that enables pattern formation and leads to quantum behavior. On small length scales pattern formation is facilitated by the higher frequencies of the ZPF spectrum, for larger and larger systems the lower frequencies get more and more important. Thus, it is to be expected that under appropriate conditions, primarily neutralization of disruptive thermal effects, quantum phenomena can arise in many macroscopic systems, particularly in biological systems (Lloyd, 2011).

Fundamental Mechanisms in the Brain

In order to judge whether or not the brain is a quantum system, we have a look at the body of evidence resulting from the analysis of neural activity patterns. A common strategy behind these research activities, which have been continuously improved and methodologically refined over the years (Aru et al., 2012), consists in distilling the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC).

To begin with, it is widely accepted that consciousness is associated with long-range coherence in the brain, particularly with synchronized activity in the gamma frequency band (Crick and Koch, 1990; Desmedt and Tomberg, 1994; Engel and Singer, 2001; Melloni et al., 2007). In more detail, new results suggest that “discrete moments of perceptual experience are implemented by transient gamma-band synchronization of relevant cortical regions, and that disintegration and reintegration of these assemblies is time-locked to ongoing theta oscillations” (Doesburg et al., 2009). Moreover, it was found that gamma synchrony shows up not only during attention to an external stimulus, but also in altered states of consciousness, such as meditation (Lutz et al., 2004) and REM sleep (Llinás and Ribary, 1993; Montgomery et al., 2008).

As for the characteristics of the gamma oscillations, a time-frequency analysis of the local field potentials (LFP) revealed that “the source of gamma-band peaks is of stochastic nature” (Burns et al., 2010) and that “gamma activity is indistinguishable from filtered noise” (Burns et al., 2011). Hence, gamma activity cannot be understood on the basis of deterministic network models. Rather, noise seems to play an essential role in the generation of gamma synchrony, so that in a realistic model the brain should be “viewed as a resonant stochastic oscillator” (Burns et al., 2010). Furthermore, also experiments investigating stochastic resonance (SR) within and between brain areas imply that “SR-mediated neural synchronization is a general mechanism of brain functioning” (Ward et al., 2006) and that “noise could play a fundamental role in biological information processing” (Kitajo et al., 2007).

The analysis of EEG and MEG background activity showed that spontaneous oscillations in the brain exhibit 1/f power-law scaling behavior, indicating that the brain operates in a scale-free state of self-organized criticality (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2003). Such scaling behavior was also verified for the LFP in humans (Milstein et al., 2009). It is quite revealing that the origin of this behavior can be explained as a quantum phenomenon involving the ZPF (Cavalleri and Bosi, 2007).

I would like to complete the compilation of evidence with the findings of Walter Freeman. His studies in animals showed that conditioned stimuli are associated with macroscopic patterns of amplitude modulation of a carrier wave in the gamma and beta frequency range, which represent attractors in an attractor landscape (Freeman, 1991, 2005). The results further suggest that these attractors are the NCC, since the corresponding activity patterns are “not fixed representations of the stimuli,” but rather are “correlated with the actions and inferred perceptions of the animals” (Freeman, 2007). It was discovered that “vast collections of neurons shift abruptly and simultaneously” between different attractors (Freeman, 1991), resembling “cinematographic frames” whose “rapid and efficient formation and dissolution” can only be understood on the basis of many-body quantum theory (Freeman and Vitiello, 2006). From this perspective, the brain can be regarded as a complex system that operates near a critical point of a phase transition. While displaying spontaneous activity and irregular dynamics in the disordered phase, an appropriate stimulus can transfer the brain to the ordered phase that exhibits long-range correlations and stable attractors. These features cannot be explained without recourse to quantum dynamics (Freeman and Vitiello, 2006).

Taken as a whole, the currently available body of evidence and the entirety of observations suggest that the brain has all the characteristics of a macroscopic quantum system. This becomes particularly obvious when we interpret the neurophysiological findings in the context of SED and the consequent organizing principles summarized in the previous section. Accordingly, the brain can be viewed as a resonant stochastic oscillator driven by the ZPF, which acts as a ubiquitous noise source causing the spontaneous background activity in the disordered phase of the brain. A suitable sensory input induces a transition to the ordered phase and prompts a cell assembly of the brain to fall into an attractor. As soon as a stationary state is reached, the assembly enters the quantum regime, displays long-range coherence and imprints a specific information state on the local ZPF. In the regular perceptual process such phase transitions are repeated with frequencies in the theta range. A better understanding of this process, which includes all the levels of microscopic and macroscopic organization, is still required, with special attention to the conditions under which long-range coherence is possible. The latest studies point to the importance of interfacial water that effectively neutralizes thermal disturbing effects and facilitates coherence (Del Giudice et al., 2005, 2010).

It can be concluded that the brain evidently provides an environment that is sufficiently shielded against thermal noise, making the ZPF the dominating agent and communication medium that orchestrates the brain activity and enables the emergence of quantum phenomena. This indicates that the recurrent formation and dissolution of quantum states constitutes a fundamental mechanism in the brain. Whenever the activity of the brain reaches a stable attractor, a ZPF information state is generated and a conscious experience arises.

Brain and Consciousness

In order to define the relationship between brain and consciousness still more precisely, additional input is required. In my approach, I take this input from Eastern philosophy, a discipline that has a long tradition in studying consciousness very systematically. A detailed comparison between the findings of SED and the insights of Eastern philosophy reveals not only a striking congruence as far as the basic principles behind matter are concerned. It also gives us the important hint that the ZPF is a promising candidate for the carrier of consciousness, suggesting that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe, that the ZPF is the substrate of consciousness and that our individual consciousness is the result of a dynamic interaction process that causes the realization of ZPF information states (Keppler, 2012).

These hypotheses express that consciousness as such is not produced by matter. Rather, they imply that matter and consciousness have a common basis in the ZPF, which not only orchestrates matter and gives birth to the enormous variety of phenomena in our physical world, but also forms the foundation of our conscious experiences. In that it is ubiquitous and equipped with unique properties, the ZPF has the potential to define a universally standardized substratum for our conscious minds, giving rise to the conjecture that the brain is a complex instrument that filters the varied shades of sensations and emotions selectively out of the all-pervasive field of consciousness, the ZPF. This is achieved by the fundamental mechanism described above, which leads to sequences of attractors. Every attractor acts as a frequency filter on the ZPF and generates a characteristic frequency pattern, thus specifying a ZPF information state that is associated with a conscious state. In this way the brain produces an individual stream of consciousness by periodically modifying the ZPF and generating ZPF information states. This process is illustrated in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1:

Figure 1. The brain produces a stream of consciousness by periodically modifying the ZPF and generating ZPF information states.This process is triggered by appropriate stimuli that induce macroscopic patterns of synchronized activity in the gamma frequency band. These long-range activity patterns, which represent attractors in an attractor landscape, are the NCC. In the regular perceptual process the alternation of synchronization and desynchronization is linked to theta oscillations. Whenever the brain activity falls into a stable attractor, there is a corresponding ZPF information state, which carries the integrated information of the attractor and is characterized by specific correlations between frequency components of the ZPF spectrum. Every ZPF information state is associated with a conscious state, i.e., every ordered pattern in ZPF information space corresponds to a phenomenal state in qualia space.

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

The SED-based approach addresses a core problem of current neuroscience and casts new light on the mechanisms underlying conscious experience. In this way, it opens a door to the transition from correlation to explanation, which “requires an understanding of why particular NCCs have a privileged relationship with consciousness” (Seth, 2009). The crucial point is that only attractors, which are synchronized activity patterns orchestrated by the ZPF, provide access to the substrate of consciousness to such an extent that they leave fingerprints in this substrate. Hence, conscious processes can be distinguished from unconscious processes in that only the former processes bring about activity patterns that reach equilibrium with the ZPF and are accompanied by ZPF information states. Depending on the dynamic situation, the same assemblies of a network can be involved in conscious and unconscious processes.

In the wider context of the cognitive cycle every conscious process is preceded by a set of preconscious processes that are potentially capable of entering consciousness (Dehaene et al., 2006; Franklin and Baars, 2010). According to the ideas brought forth in this article, none of the competing activity patterns representing the preconscious processes is a fully developed attractor. Rather, these activity patterns are attractors in early stages of development, which display some of the dynamical characteristics of fully developed attractors but have not exceeded the required equilibration time and reached equilibrium with the ZPF. Therefore, in the preconscious phase no ZPF information state is generated and no conscious experience arises. Only one selected and attentionally amplified activity pattern gets the chance to fully unfold and develop to a full-blown attractor that reaches equilibrium with the ZPF, generates a ZPF information state and results in a conscious moment.

The concept of ZPF information states is totally in line with the double-aspect principle of information, which is a “candidate for a basic principle that might form the cornerstone of a fundamental theory of consciousness” (Chalmers, 1995). Moreover, the SED-based approach specifies this principle in that it imposes a constraint on the sort of information that is associated with consciousness. Based on the hypothesis that the ZPF is the carrier of consciousness, only nonlinear systems that interact dynamically with the ZPF and generate ZPF information states can produce conscious states. The internal aspects of such information states are phenomenal, i.e., a conscious moment is a ZPF information state experienced from inside. The external aspects of such information states are physical and show up as NCC (Keppler, 2012).

Taken to its logical end, the SED-based approach indicates that all microscopic and macroscopic quantum systems may be conscious, with the quantity and quality of consciousness being associated with the complexity of the system. While simple systems, which are characterized by relatively sparse attractor landscapes and relatively simple attractors, are endowed with a rudimentary form of consciousness, complex systems have very rich and highly adaptive attractor landscapes with complex attractors, giving rise to a broad spectrum of conscious experiences. These concepts are related to the integrated information theory (Tononi, 2004, 2008) and similar approaches that measure consciousness by means of dynamical complexity (Seth, 2009). The strong point of the SED framework is that it is able to underlay these approaches with a universal dynamical mechanism of information integration and, hence, specifies how and where the integration takes place. The key finding is that the integration cannot be accomplished by the network architecture alone. Rather, it requires the ZPF as an integrating agent and it is the ordered ZPF configuration behind an attractor that carries the integrated information.

In summary, the presented approach is fully consistent with the findings of physics, neuroscience, and Eastern philosophy. Instead of tying consciousness completely and utterly to the material structure of the brain, the approach suggests that the universe is imbued with an all-pervasive substrate of consciousness and explains how the brain shapes this substrate in a causally closed functional chain, thus opening up entirely new perspectives for consciousness research. The next step consists in making testable predictions. This will involve a high degree of physics and means that we have to build SED-based oscillator models of the brain that are sufficiently realistic in order to reproduce the observed attractor dynamics. When such models are in place, we can pass through a number of conscious states, identify the attractors, determine the corresponding ZPF information states and systematically classify ZPF information space on the basis of the first-person accounts (Keppler, 2012). This will bring us closer to the goal of understanding how exactly the human brain produces a stream of phenomenal consciousness.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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This article comes from Frontiers in Cognition, an open access journal from FrontiersIn.org. In an attempt to extend the embodied mind hypothesis, the authors "propose that words, due to their social and public character, can be conceived as quasi-external devices that extend our cognition. Moreover, words function like tools in that they enlarge the bodily space of action thus modifying our sense of body." It's an enticing argument that, at first read, seems eminently reasonable to me.

Full Citation:
Borghi AM, Scorolli C, Caligiore D, Baldassarre G and Tummolini L. (2013). The embodied mind extended: using words as social tools. Frontiers in Cognition. 4:214. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00214

The embodied mind extended: Using words as social tools

Anna M. Borghi1,2*, Claudia Scorolli1, Daniele Caligiore2, Gianluca Baldassarre2 and Luca Tummolini2

1. EMbodied COgnition Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
2. Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy

The extended mind view and the embodied-grounded view of cognition and language are typically considered as rather independent perspectives. In this paper we propose a possible integration of the two views and support it proposing the idea of “Words As social Tools” (WAT). In this respect, we will propose that words, also due to their social and public character, can be conceived as quasi-external devices that extend our cognition. Moreover, words function like tools in that they enlarge the bodily space of action thus modifying our sense of body. To support our proposal, we review the relevant literature on tool-use and on words as tools and report recent evidence indicating that word use leads to an extension of space close to the body. In addition, we outline a model of the neural processes that may underpin bodily space extension via word use and may reflect possible effects on cognition of the use of words as external means. We also discuss how reconciling the two perspectives can help to overcome the limitations they encounter if considered independently.

Introduction

The embodied-grounded (EG) view and the extended mind (EM) view of cognition and language are typically considered as rather independent perspectives. Aim of this paper is to show how the two views can be integrated considering the case of words in their relationship with the bodily space. Specifically, we will propose that words are a very peculiar kind of tool.

According to embodied views of cognition, cognitive processes are constrained by our body, that is, human-like cognition cannot occur independently of a human-like body. In the embodied view, cognition is not for knowing; rather, “cognition is for action” (Wilson, 2002). Proponents of grounded views make a similar argument but posit that the involvement of the body is not exhaustive of cognition, which is grounded in many ways (Barsalou, 2008). In fact, while initially the label “embodied” was used in a more comprehensive way, in the recent literature a slight distinction between embodied and grounded approaches, and between the terms “embodied” and “grounded,” is emerging (see Pezzulo et al., 2011; Fischer, 2012; Myachykov et al., in press). According to this view cognition can be grounded in multiple ways. These include not only bodily states, but also situations, actions, etc. (Barsalou, 2008; Pezzulo et al., 2011). In the following, we will use the term embodied and grounded cognition (EG) to refer to both approaches, since the distinction is not relevant for the proposal we will advance.

When it comes to language processing, EG views argue that language is grounded in perception and action systems (for reviews: Willems and Hagoort, 2007; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Gallese, 2008; Toni et al., 2008;Jirak et al., 2010; Borghi and Pecher, 2011, 2012; Glenberg and Gallese, 2012). Comprehending language would imply activating a simulation, consisting in a re-enactment of the previous interaction with objects, situations, etc., to which linguistic expressions refer.

In the last years another perspective on cognition, the EM view, is gaining credit, in particular in philosophy. The underlying idea, initially promoted by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is that the human mind is not wholly in our head/brain, but it is rather distributed in our brain, body, and external devices. These external devices (e.g., computers) have the power to complement and augment our internal cognitive processes (see Wilson, 2010).

In this paper, we will first discuss some general limitations of EG and EM views, then address some more specific limits of these views in understanding the role of language. We will then suggest that words can be understood as social tools, and explain why, in our opinion, this approach helps to reconcile EG and EM views of cognition and to overcome their limitations. Finally, we will discuss experimental evidence to support the Words as social Tools (WAT) proposal and we will outline a computational model to specify the neural mechanisms that might underlie the aforementioned processes.

Embodied-Grounded and Extended Views

Even though we favor an EG approach to cognition, we hold that EG theories have some problems (for critiques to aspects of the embodied approach, see Borghi and Cimatti, 2009, 2010; Chatterjee, 2010; van Elk et al., 2010; Wilson and Golonka, 2013). We will consider first some problems characterizing the EG approach in general, and then we will focus on the limitations of the EG approach to language, in particular to language comprehension. We will focus on content issues and not on methodological problems, as for example the problem of the lack of precise and unidirectional predictions, which in our opinion can be solved with a more extensive use of computational models (see for discussions on this problemBorghi et al., 2010; Chersi et al., 2010; Willems and Franken, 2012). Notice that our critiques might not necessarily concern all versions of EG views, which are sometimes rather different (see Goldman and de Vignemont, 2009, for an analysis of this). One major problem of EG views is the high risk of adopting the view that Clark (2008) has called “brainbound.” In this view, human cognition directly depends on neural activity, with the mind being modeled as inner and neurally realized. This position does not accept the idea that cognition might be distributed and extended beyond bodily borders. The brainbound view is not convincing for a simple reason, as explained by Noe (2009): “the subject of experience is not a bit of your body. You are not your brain. The brain, rather, is part of what you are” (pp. 7). In our opinion many versions of the EG view are too brainbound: they emphasize too much the role of the brain with respect to the body. This might seem paradoxical for an embodied approach: obviously no embodied view does fully neglect the importance of the body, but many EG approaches ascribe a too relevant role to the brain compared to the whole body, at the same time neglecting the possible role of body extensions. Similar critiques are expressed by Wilson and Golonka (2013) who claim: “The major problem with this research is that it again assumes all the hard work is done in the head, with perception and action merely tweaking the result.” (Wilson and Golonka, 2013, p. 11). van Elk et al. (2010) further deepen this point, arguing that in cognitive neuroscience embodied approaches are still cognitivist. We report their own words: “In cognitive neuroscience the notion that concepts are embodied primarily means that there is a correspondence between the brain activations associated with processing the referent of a concept and the processing of the concept itself. For instance, seeing a car and thinking or reading about a car involves the activation in comparable visual areas. Thus, the dispute between modal and amodal theories of language comprehension is basically a discussion about the representational vehicle of concepts (i.e., whether the representational vehicle of concepts is shared with neural resources used for perception and action). Both modal and amodal theories of language thus share a cognitivist notion of cognition in terms of discrete internal representations of the world” (van Elk et al., 2010, p. 3).

The second problem with many EG theories is that they do not sufficiently consider and emphasize the fact that the sense of body might be plastically rearranged. Body boundaries are treated as rather static while some studies have revealed that they are flexible and can be modified, for example through the use of tools, changing with our sense of body (see for example the special issue on the sense of body by Tessari et al., 2010). We will further address this problem in the rest of the paper.

When they deal with language, one major limit of EG views is that language is mainly conceived in its referential aspects. This way of conceiving language relies on the classical notion that knowing the meaning of a word is knowing what it refers to. Accordingly, the meaning of a word like “hammer” consists in the re-enactment of past multimodal experiences with the word referent, i.e. hammers. For example, according to the indexical theory (Glenberg and Robertson, 2000) words would index their referents in the world, which would be represented in terms of perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999). This referential view of language has a number of merits. First, it provided the instruments to contrast the propositional view, which was dominant in psychology and cognitive sciences (see Lakoff, 2012, for a description of the times before the idea of embodied cognition). In this view concepts and word meanings were seen as the product of a transduction process from sensorimotor to abstract knowledge. Knowledge would be represented in terms of amodal symbols only arbitrarily related to their referents, organized through syntactic combinatorial rules (e.g.,Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984). More recent non-embodied views posit that word meaning is a consequence of the statistical distribution of words in language (for an influential version, see Landauer and Dumais, 1997). However, today the necessity to contrast the statistical and the embodied view is not so critical, and conciliatory approaches have been proposed (see for example Andrews et al., in press).

Second, the influential research program based on these premises has inspired many studies, which have led to important and sophisticated experimental results (for reviews see Barsalou, 2008; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Gallese, 2008; Toni et al., 2008; Jirak et al., 2010; Borghi and Pecher, 2011, 2012). However, an embodied referential view is probably not sufficient to provide a thorough account of word meaning.

While in psychology and cognitive science the propositional view has dominated for a long time and the referential view was introduced by EG theorists as an alternative to it, in philosophy the referential view of language has been widely criticized since at least the seminal work ofWittgenstein (1953; see Noe, 2009 for a contemporary statement): the most widespread view in philosophy holds that, for example, we can speak about fawns even if we have never seen them since we can rely on the expertise of our community. Words are compositional and we can access the meaning of words of which we do not know or cannot see the referent thanks to the expertise of other members of our community. As Noe (2009) nicely argues, “meaning depends on the practice” (p. 90), and being able to use words corresponds to knowing what they mean.

Curiously, while philosophical examinations have gravitated toward treating the practical nature of meaning, the referential view is still the predominant one in EG cognition theories. This has probably been due to the desire, on the part of EG proponents, to contrast the traditional propositional view, according to which words are arbitrarily linked to their referents. EG proponents have assumed that it was necessary to demonstrate that words are grounded, as their referents activate perception and motor systems.

Beyond the limit of the focus on referentiality, in our view the EG view of language has two further limitations given that it has neglected two other important aspects of words. The first concerns the social and public nature of words, the second the fact that words can be instruments for action. Words are social and public because, since they are a heritage of our speakers’ community, to be effective they require someone else’s presence, implicit or not. Indeed, speaking implies performing complementary actions in coordination with someone else (Clark, 1996). Words can be instruments for action since their use allows humans to modify the current state of the world, as it happens during tool-use. This point will be further developed in the course of the paper.

If EG approaches often tacitly assume a brainbound view of cognition, the most vigorous attack to this view derives from the idea that cognition is not limited to the boundaries of body/skull but is extended. In other words, “minds like ours emerge from this colorful flux as surprisingly seamless wholes: adaptively potent mashups extruded from a dizzying motley of heterogeneous elements and processes” (Clark, 2008, p. 219). According to the EM view, tools complement our mental abilities: for example, a diary complements our memory. As a consequence of this relationship between brain-body system and external tools, our mind would be distributed (Hutchins, 1995) across a variety of bodily parts and non-bodily devices (Clark, 2003; Thompson and Stapleton, 2009). One potential limitation of EM views, and possibly one of the reasons why they have encountered resistance, is their appeal to functionalism (Kiverstein and Clark, 2009) which might conflict with the assumptions of an embodied view of cognition (but see Clark, 2008, for a different position, which does not put the two approaches in contrast).

The EM approach holds a peculiar view of the relation between words and cognition. Words themselves are considered as external devices and as cognitive tools capable of augmenting our computational abilities (Clark, 1998). This view (e.g., Clark, 1998) has its roots in the seminal work ofVygotsky (1962) who underlined the role played by inner language and its scaffolding function supporting actions. However, in our opinion, one of the most interesting aspects of Vygotsky’s notion of inner language is that it involves the internalization of a phenomenon which is initially (and inherently) social and public and which augments our computational abilities. Such a social and public component is, however, underappreciated in the EM approach, which instead underlines the importance of language for developing thought and computational abilities.

Here we propose that EG and EM views can, and should, be integrated. Such integration will overcome their respective limitations when dealing with language: the limited focus of the EG view on the referential aspect of words and the neglect of the social dimension of words in the EM view.

Read the whole article.

Another new study is out demonstrating the quick and effective benefits of ketamine therapy for treatment-resistant depression (i.e., the usual serotonin-based medications do not produce enough of a high to offset the depression).

Here are some of the previous studies: How Ketamine Defeats Chronic Depression, Ketamine Improved Bipolar Depression Within Minutes, Secrets of 'Magic' Antidepressant Revealed, Ketamine Reduces Suicidality In Depressed Patients, Study Suggests.

Full Citation:
Mount Sinai Medical Center. (2013, May 18). Ketamine shows significant therapeutic benefit in people with treatment-resistant depression. ScienceDaily. Retrieved May 18, 2013.

Ketamine Shows Significant Therapeutic Benefit in People With Treatment-Resistant Depression

May 18, 2013 — Patients with treatment-resistant major depression saw dramatic improvement in their illness after treatment with ketamine, an anesthetic, according to the largest ketamine clinical trial to-date led by researchers from the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. The antidepressant benefits of ketamine were seen within 24 hours, whereas traditional antidepressants can take days or weeks to demonstrate a reduction in depression.

The research will be discussed at the American Psychiatric Association meeting on May 20, 2013 at the Moscone Center in San Francisco.

Led by Dan Iosifescu, MD, Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Mount Sinai; Sanjay Mathew, MD, Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Baylor College of Medicine; and James Murrough, MD Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at Mount Sinai, the research team evaluated 72 people with treatment-resistant depression -- meaning their depression has failed to respond to two or more medications -- who were administered a single intravenous infusion of ketamine for 40 minutes or an active placebo of midazolam, another type of anesthetic without antidepressant properties. Patients were interviewed after 24 hours and again after seven days. After 24 hours, the response rate was 63.8 percent in the ketamine group compared to 28 percent in the placebo group. The response to ketamine was durable after seven days, with a 45.7 percent response in the ketamine group versus 18.2 percent in the placebo group. Both drugs were well tolerated.

"Using midazolam as an active placebo allowed us to independently assess the antidepressant benefit of ketamine, excluding any anesthetic effects," said Dr. Murrough, who is first author on the new report. "Ketamine continues to show significant promise as a new treatment option for patients with severe and refractory forms of depression."

Major depression is caused by a breakdown in communication between nerve cells in the brain, a process that is controlled by chemicals called neurotransmitters. Traditional antidepressants such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) influence the activity of the neurotransmitters serotonin and noreprenephrine to reduce depression. In these medicines, response is often significantly delayed and up to 60 percent of people do not respond to treatment, according to the U.S Department of Health and Human Services. Ketamine works differently than traditional antidepressants in that it influences the activity of the glutamine neurotransmitter to help restore the dysfunctional communication between nerve cells in the depressed brain, and much more quickly than traditional antidepressants.

Future studies are needed to investigate the longer term safety and efficacy of a course of ketamine in refractory depression. Dr. Murrough recently published a preliminary report in the journal Biological Psychiatry on the safety and efficacy of ketamine given three times weekly for two weeks in patients with treatment-resistant depression.

"We found that ketamine was safe and well tolerated and that patients who demonstrated a rapid antidepressant effect after starting ketamine were able to maintain the response throughout the course of the study," Dr. Murrough said. "Larger placebo-controlled studies will be required to more fully determine the safety and efficacy profile of ketamine in depression."

The potential of ketamine was discovered by Dennis S. Charney, MD, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Dean of the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs of The Mount Sinai Medical Center, in collaboration with John H. Krystal, MD, Chair of the Department of Psychiatry at Yale University.

"Major depression is one of the most prevalent and costly illnesses in the world, and yet currently available treatments fall far short of alleviating this burden," said Dr. Charney. "There is an urgent need for new, fast-acting therapies, and ketamine shows important potential in filling that void."

Robin S. Rosenberg - Abnormal Is the New Normal

As the DSM-5 begins to hit the shelves in the next week, people are already lining up to throw rotten vegetables at it. And with good reason. This version of the diagnostic bible for psychiatrists, psychologists, counselors, marriage and family therapists, and social workers has gone alarming deep into the realm of making basic human experience pathological.

Fortunate for me, I generally only use one diagnosis - PTSD. Occasionally, I need to look up the code for major depressive disorder, or a substance abuse disorder, or much more rarely, an Axis II personality disorder. If it were up to me, the DSM would cease to exist as anything other than an index for billing insurance.

In this article from Slate, Robin Rosenberg offers her criticisms of the DSM-5.

Abnormal Is the New Normal

Why will half of the U.S. population have a diagnosable mental disorder?

By Robin S. Rosenberg  |  Posted Friday, April 12, 2013

Illustration by Robert Neubecker.

Beware the DSM-5, the soon-to-be-released fifth edition of the “psychiatric bible,” the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. The odds will probably be greater than 50 percent, according to the new manual, that you’ll have a mental disorder in your lifetime.

Although fewer than 6 percent of American adults will have a severe mental illness in a given year, according to a 2005 study, many more—more than a quarter each year—will have some diagnosable mental disorder. That’s a lot of people. Almost 50 percent of Americans (46.4 percent to be exact) will have a diagnosable mental illness in their lifetimes, based on the previous edition, the DSM-IV. And the new manual will likely make it even "easier" to get a diagnosis.

If we think of having a diagnosable mental illness as being under a tent, the tent seems pretty big. Huge, in fact. How did it happen that half of us will develop a mental illness? Has this always been true and we just didn’t realize how sick we were—we didn’t realize we were under the tent? Or are we mentally less healthy than we were a generation ago? What about a third explanation—that we are labeling as mental illness psychological states that were previously considered normal, albeit unusual, making the tent bigger. The answer appears to be all three.

Second, we really are getting “sicker.” The high prevalence of mental illness in the United States isn’t only because we’ve gotten better at detecting mental illness. More of us are mentally ill than in previous generations, and our mental illness is manifesting at earlier points in our lives. One study supporting this explanation took the scores on a measure of anxiety of children with psychological problems in 1957 and compared them with the scores of today’s average child. Today’s children—not specifically those identified as having psychological problems, as were the 1957 children—are more anxious than those in previous generations.First, we’ve gotten better at detecting mental illness and doing so earlier in the course of the illness. For decades, mental health clinicians, physicians, the U.S. surgeon general’s office, and various state and local agencies have been advocating for better detection of mental illness. If we are better at spotting it, we can treat it. And if we detect it earlier, we can, hopefully, intervene to reduce the intensity and/or frequency of symptoms. For instance, people who decades ago may have had undiagnosed attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression, or substance abuse are now more likely to have their problems recognized and diagnosed. But the increased awareness and detection translates into a higher rate of mental illness.

Another study compared cohorts of American adults on the personality trait of neuroticism, which indicates emotional reactivity and is associated with anxiety. Americans scored higher on neuroticism in 1993 than they did in 1963, suggesting that as a population we are becoming more anxious. Another study compared the level of narcissism among cohorts of American college students between 1982 and 2006 and found that more recent cohorts are more narcissistic.

An additional study supports the explanation that more people are diagnosed with mental illness because more of us have mental illness: The more recently an American is born, the more likely he or she is to develop a psychological disorder. Collectively, this line of research indicates that more is going on than simply better detection of mental illness.

Here’s a third explanation for the increased prevalence of mental illness, one that implies something important about our culture: What was once considered psychological healthy (or at least not unhealthy) is now considered to be mental illness. Some of the behaviors, thoughts, and feelings that were within the then-normal range of human experience are now deemed to be in the pathological part of the continuum. Thus, the actual definition of mental illness has broadened, creating a bigger tent with more people under it. This explanation implies that we, as a culture, are more willing to see mental illness in ourselves and in others.

The increasing prevalence is in part because each edition of the DSM has increased the overall number of disorders. The DSM-I, from 1952, listed 106; the DSM-III, from 1980, listed 265, and the current DSM-IV has 297. (Complaints about this ever-increasing total led the chair of the DSM-5 task force, David Kupfer, to announce that the total number of disorders in DSM-5 will not increase. One way to add new diagnoses—and DSM-5 will—but not increase the total is to make a disorder in a previous edition into a “subtype” of another disorder in the new edition, thereby keeping two diagnostic entities, but with one subsumed under another.)

The increasing number of disorders comes about because some “problems” that were not previously considered to be mental illness were reclassified as such by their inclusion in the DSM—and it is the DSM that functionally defines mental illness in the United States.

As an example, prior to the DSM-IV, there was no diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome; rather, people with what is now called Asperger’s would have been diagnosed with autism (“high functioning” autism) or not diagnosed at all. This syndrome was added as a separate disorder to highlight the different forms that autism symptoms may take and to focus research on the most effective treatments for Asperger’s. Others, however, claimed that the diagnostic label pathologized quirkiness. (In DSM-5, Asperger’s is classified as a subtype of a newly consolidated single diagnosis “autism spectrum disorder.”)

Some of the disorders added to DSM editions are primarily—or wholly—medical in nature. One example is the diagnosis of “breathing-related sleep disorder,” which arises from medical problems that interfere with sleep. One such medical problem is obstructive sleep apnea, which occurs when the muscles of the throat relax so much during sleep that they narrow or block the airway. Throughout the night, people with obstructive sleep apnea have their deep sleep cut short as they relax because they stop breathing; once in a lighter phase of sleep, they breathe normally again. This disorder is not a mental disorder, but a medical one.

Another example is the “disorder” “caffeine intoxication,” characterized by at least five symptoms after consuming the equivalent of two to three cups of coffee: restlessness, gastrointestinal problems, difficulty sleeping, nervousness, and rapid heartbeat. To meet the diagnosis, the symptoms must impair functioning in some way. It’s hard to believe that an episode of too much coffee or Red Bull constitutes a mental disorder, but there you have it. DSM-5 has added “caffeine withdrawal” as a diagnosis—characterized by a withdrawal headache plus at least one other symptom, such as drowsiness, that interferes with some aspect of functioning. With disorders like this in the DSM, it’s no wonder that half of Americans will have a diagnosable disorder in their lifetimes. The wonder is why more Americans won’t!

Asperger's syndrome, which will be redefined into the broader category of autism spectrum disorders in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, is one of several changes to the "psychiatry bible." Above, Matthew Kolen was diagnosed at age 8 with Asperger's. Photo by Shannon Stapleton/Reuters

In addition to classifying some medical disorders as mental disorders, the DSM also has been nibbling at the edges of “normal” by reclassifying as pathological the patterns of thoughts, feelings, or behaviors that were previously considered normal (albeit perhaps weird or odd). For instance, people who are extremely shy and concerned about how others might evaluate them, and who thus avoid certain types of activities, might be diagnosed with “avoidant personality disorder.” These same characteristics didn’t used to be considered pathological, and in some other cultures they are not considered to be so.

Another way that the increased prevalence of mental illness occurs is by lowering the threshold of what it takes to be diagnosed with a given disorder. For instance, DSM-5 will change in the criteria for “generalized anxiety disorder,” a disorder that involves excessive and persistent worrying. Whereas the criteria in DSM-IV required three out of six symptoms of worrying, only one symptom is needed in DSM-5. Similarly, whereas in DSM-IV the symptoms must have persisted for at least six months, in DSM-5 the duration has been reduced to three months. So if you are excessively worried for three months about your finances or your health or that of a family member (to the point where you can’t control the worries), you would be considered to have a disorder, whereas in the past you would not have.

One effect of a bigger mental illness tent is that there are fewer people standing outside the tent. Although the next edition of the DSM might not increase the overall number of disorders, if the criteria are loosened (that is, if it takes fewer symptoms or less severity to meet the criteria for diagnosis), then more people would qualify for a disorder. There are, and probably will continue to be, fewer and fewer people who will live their lives in relatively good mental health according to the DSM.

The normal trials and tribulations of life—the periods of sadness, or worry, of anxiety, or grief, of difficulty sleeping, of drinking too much caffeine or having caffeine withdrawal headaches—have been pathologized. They’ve been made into mental illnesses. More “normal” thoughts, feelings, and actions have come to merit a diagnosis. This way toward providing a bigger tent for mental illness leaves us with an increasingly restricted definition of mental health and can make us all more likely to see mental illness even when it isn’t there—where there is just normal human struggle. We can become so used to seeing psychopathology that we think—erroneously—that being odd or having difficulties must be an expression of mental illness.

What is going in our culture that allows for this expanding definition of mental illness? There are many explanations. The first is related to payment for treatment. Psychological treatments and medications can be useful for a variety of problems, but for those treatments to be even partially paid for by health insurance companies, the problems must have a diagnosis. It’s not enough that there’s a problem that’s being addressed. It has to be a problem. (Of course, if you treat a problem before it becomes a mental illness, the health insurance company will have ended up saving a significant amount of money, but they don’t pay for early mental health intervention—there has to be a problem. But that’s a story beyond the scope of this article.)

Second, pharmaceutical companies search for ever-wider markets for their products. When more people are diagnosed with a given disorder (perhaps because of less stringent criteria), or a new diagnosis is created, it widens the market for their drugs. They push for “off-label” uses of their medications that in some way reduce a problem, and then they push for that “problem” to be redefined as a problem. In fact, DSM-5 and the pharmaceutical industry have a significant number of connections: One study found that 70 percent of DSM-5 task-force members have financial ties to the pharmaceutical industry.

Third is increased work expectations. The pace and demands of many jobs have increased. Many companies maintain as few workers as possible to get the work done, and if an employee can’t reliably perform up to the (more intense) pace, he or she risks getting fired. If an employee has been feeling “down” or “anxious” enough that it’s not possible to work at near 100 percent or even 90 percent productivity, a pill that promises to counteract the symptoms of a newly identified psychological disorder seems like a better alternative than limping along, worried about being fired on top of other problems.

Fourth, in our era of instant gratification, ushered along by online shopping, downloaded entertainment, and the immediate access to the world available through the Internet, if we have problems, we want a quick fix. If a medication will help lessen uncomfortable thoughts or feelings or maladaptive behavior, we are receptive to medication. To quote Sami Tamimi, an adolescent psychiatrist in the United Kingdom, “Like fast food, recent medication-centered practice comes from the most aggressively consumerist society (USA), feeds on people’s desire for instant satisfaction and a ‘quick fix,’ fits into a busy life-style.” But if we’re going to take a medication, we need to have a problem that is being treated—at least to get those doctors’ visits reimbursed by the insurance company.

Fifth, certain diagnoses—along with other criteria—make the sufferer eligible for government services or programs or supplementary educational services, or allow them to claim legal rights of nondiscrimination. People who feel they or their loved ones could benefit from those services may advocate for a widening in criteria that enables more people to be diagnosed and thus eligible for those services. For instance, the diagnostic criteria for autism will change with DSM-5, and people diagnosed with the disorder—per DSM-IV—and their loved ones have vociferously expressed their concern that the new criteria will be more restrictive and thus will exclude some who currently have the diagnosis.

Finally, I think there is an additional reason: As our lives take on an even more frantic pace and our workload becomes ever greater, having a diagnosis gives a name to the suffering we feel and the hope that with a label can come relief. In dark or difficult times, hope is essential. But I’m not sure that ultimately labeling half of us with a mental disorder is the best way to give people realistic hope. Having a diagnosable mental illness has almost become the new “normal.” As a society, we have an opportunity to think about how we define mental health and illness. It shouldn’t only be up to the authors of the DSM.