Showing posts with label interviews. Show all posts
Showing posts with label interviews. Show all posts

Thursday, January 01, 2015

Shrink Rap Radio #436 – Brain, Mind, and Body in The Healing of Trauma with Bessel van der Kolk MD

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Dr. Bessel van der Kolk is not only one of the main figures in the treatment of trauma and traumatic stress, he was one of the architects of the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis. Before the return of soldiers from the Vietnam War, PTSD was often seen as cowardice, battle fatigue, or shell shock.

When the then young Dr. van der Kolk began treating returning soldiers at a VA hospital with pharmacological interventions, he quickly realized these drugs - as powerful as they were - could not touch the trauma these men (and some women) were experiencing.

For nearly a decade (late 1970s and into the 1980s), PTSD was seen primarily as a battle related disorder (a fact that allowed the military, until quite recently, to discharge the victims of sexual assault within the ranks with a diagnosis of a personality disorder). However, due to Dr. van der Kolk, Dr, Judith Herman, and others, the diagnosis began to be applied to ANY form of trauma that presents the survivor with witnessing or experiencing a threat of severe bodily harm and/or death.

If it were not for Dr. van der Kolk and others in his generation of psychiatrists and psychologists, there would not be a sexual trauma field and I would not be doing the work I am doing.

Shrink Rap Radio #436 – Brain, Mind, and Body in The Healing of Trauma with Bessel van der Kolk MD

A psychology podcast by David Van Nuys, Ph.D.
copyright 2014: David Van Nuys, Ph.D.

Bessel van der Kolk

Bessel van der Kolk, MD is a world renowned researcher and clinician in the field of traumatic stress. His innovative work to integrate mind, brain, body, and social connections in the healing of trauma has had a profound impact on the care and treatment of trauma victims all over the world. Dr. van der Kolk’s research includes brain imaging studies on trauma’s impact on childhood development and the effects of therapies such as yoga, neurofeedback, EMDR, theater and movement on traumatic stress. Dr. van der Kolk, a professor in the department of psychiatry at Boston University Medical School, is the founder and medical director of the Trauma Center in Boston and the director of the National Child Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN), established by Congress to raise the standard of care and improve access to services for traumatized children, their families and communities. Dr. van der Kolk’s newest book, The Body Keeps The Score: Brain, Mind and Body in the Healing of Trauma (Viking, 2014)—a New York Times Best Seller—offers a sweeping and revolutionary new understanding of the causes and consequences of trauma and how to heal the traumatized brain.

Check out the following Psychology CE Courses based on listening to Shrink Rap Radio interviews:

Friday, November 07, 2014

Ingenious: Christof Koch Tackles Consciousness and the Self

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From Nautilus, this is a nice interview with neuroscientist and author (and panpsychism proponent). His recent book is Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist (2012).

https://www.sciencenews.org/sites/default/files/15559

Ingenious: Christof Koch

The neuroscientist tackles consciousness and the self

Consciousness may be the greatest illusion of all. Or at least the greatest mystery. “It is in the brain that the poppy is red, that the apple is odorous, that the skylark sings,” wrote Oscar Wilde. But how does the brain construct conscious experience? For the past 25 years, Christof Koch has been trying to provide an answer. At the Allen Institute for the Brain, where he is chief scientific officer, Koch is steering an ambitious project to map the complex networks of the brain. The goal is nothing short of understanding how we function in the world—how we see, fall in love, feel pain, marvel at a night sky full of stars.
In his most recent book, Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist (2012), Koch writes that “consciousness is a fundamental, an elemental, property of living matter.” He puts forth an “integrated information theory” that he believes provides the first rigorous scientific theory to explain consciousness. On a recent afternoon at the Allen Institute in Seattle, Koch took time to explain the captivating, if not entirely clear, theory. Koch, formerly a professor of cognitive and behavioral biology at the California Institute of Technology, has a capacious mind and a piercing intensity. In our discussion, his explanations ranged across brain biology and artificial intelligence, infamous patient Terri Schiavo and the film Her.

Interview Transcript


Why do you say consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain?

Well, I mean, “emergent” fundamentally means that at some level it’s not there, but then at a different level something is there. So the classical example of an emergent property is the wetness of water. If you take one or two molecules of H2O, they’re not wet. But then you take trillions of them, 1023, and then suddenly you get this property that it clings to surfaces that we know as wetness. With consciousness, for the longest [time] I also believed, well, it’s an emergent property—small brains don’t have it and then once you get to some bigger brains they do have it. But the problem with that assertion is that consciousness is so fundamentally different from anything else. Neurons and neuromechanisms are so different from the perception they can generate. My perception of having pain, or my perception of seeing red, is so radically different from the neurons that support the perception of seeing red or the neurons that support the perception of having pain that it’s totally unclear how we can go from one to the other.

So finally then, I at least came to the conclusion that it is a fundamental property of certain pieces of highly organized matter, that highly organized matter such as brain are capable of, and do have, experiences. We just live in a world with space and time and mass and energy, and also where complex organized matter has conscious experience; and that’s just the character of the world we are in. Now we can study this property; and the property that organized matter has to have in order to have consciousness; and how much consciousness [it has]. And if every piece of organized matter has consciousness, what about a fetus? What about an early born? What about a patient with severely compromised … [with] most of his brain dysfunctional? What about a dog? What about a cat? What about a worm? And then of course, I can ask the same question: If this is true, what about other pieces of organized matter that didn’t evolve but that we built, like computers or like the Internet? To what extent do they have conscious experience? To what extent does it feel like something to be there?

How can a computer or the Internet be conscious?

Well I mean, unless … In some sense it’s fairly obvious. Once you don’t have the notion any more that of course, we have in our culture for thousands of years that there is this magic thing—the soul, right? So if you believe in the thing called a “soul,” and only we have it and nobody else [has] it, right, then of course, you know you can ask what’s the nature of the soul. And of course it’s been impossible to understand what a soul is and what’s it made out of and where it was before I was born and where it’s going to go after I die. But once you get rid of this notion of a soul as just, as not being compatible with anything else I know and not consistent; then if you believe that consciousness is a property of certain types of natural systems, then in principle you should be able to replicate in a different natural system—once you think about it in that way. And yes, so in principle, once a computer is complex enough to begin to rival the human brain, then in principle, why should it not also have conscious experience? 

So was Watson on Jeopardy conscious? 

Well, okay, so there the difference is: So Watson wasn’t conscious, Watson is just very good, was programmed. It doesn’t feel like anything to be Watson, right? Watson was very cleverly programmed by a team of, you know, up to 100 engineers and scientists to answer a particular question. Now of course, you know, if you ask something related like you know, what’s the weather like today, it probably couldn’t answer that. But it was programmed exactly to answer Jeopardy.
But let’s take this process fast, forward. Let’s wait 20 or 30 years, right. In fact, let’s take the recent movie, Her, right. Now you remember Samantha, right? So Samantha was the name of this entity. Think of it like Siri but in 20 years from now, right. So now I have this highly conversant voice that talks like a human and has the same memory and can, you know, remember things and feel things and you have to ask your question: Does it feel like anything to be Samantha? In fact, at some point, she asks herself that in the movie, Her.  Does it feel like anything? Does she actually have feelings or is she just a set of very complicated input-output routines? And this now really depends on your metaphysical stance and it depends on your theory of consciousness. Interestingly, the dominant theory today, the dominant sort of, metaphysical assumption about consciousness that’s known as “functionalism”—and most philosophers these days are functionalists—would say yes, if she replicates all the causal relationships, if she simulates all the causal relationships of a human brain, then there would be no question. She would be conscious.

Now Integrated Information Theory of consciousness takes a somewhat different tack. It says, well, if you build a neuromorphic brain that has, you know, let’s say copper instead of axons, and transistors instead of neurons, then if you have the same cause-effect repertoires as [the] human brain, then this entity would actually be conscious. But if you simulate the brain like Samantha did, you would not be conscious. So the IIT claims that it doesn’t feel like anything to be Samantha. Essentially, for the same reason that a computer simulation of the weather, of a storm, of a tornado is never wet, right? You can simulate these days on modern computers; you can simulate the details of a tornado and of a hurricane. But it’s never wet inside the computer, right. It simulates the effect of water, but it’s never wet. For the same reason, IIT says that you can simulate consciousness, but this system itself will not have consciousness. In order for it to have consciousness, you have to replicate the detail—not simulate, but you have to replicate the actual cause-effect repertoire of the brain.

What is “Integrated Information Theory?”

Integrated Information Theory is the attempt by one particular, very gifted individual—a psychiatrist and a neuroscientist, Giulio Tononi—he’s at the University of Wisconsin, in Madison—to make sense of all this knowledge, know all that we have on the one hand about the philosophy of consciousness, but more importantly, about your conscious experiences and about the neurology of consciousness, and to put that into a rigorous scientific axiomatic theory that tells you quite precisely what consciousness is, how it originates, which systems have it, and which ones do not have it. And which also gives rise to a whole set of predictions that you can test in the lab, in the clinic, to again measure and ascertain which systems are conscious and which ones are not. Because in clinical practice, it is very often problematic, for certain classes of patients, to really be sure that the patient is conscious.
You may remember Terri Schiavo? You know, many years ago in Florida. So, she was a patient whose heart had stopped for 15 minutes, and she was in a so-called persistent vegetative state, or permanent vegetative state, where she clearly was … she had wake-sleep periods but when she was “awake” it was impossible to communicate with her. And so in patients like this, they may look normal. If you just see a picture of them, she may look like she’s smiling, but she doesn’t respond in any meaningful way to you. So here, it is not easy in this patient—and there are a few thousands of these patients in the U.S. alone—to ascertain to what extent do they feel anything. Does it feel like something to be Terri Schiavo? Or is it just sort of a brain mechanism? There still are some brain stem reflexes left so she’s clearly alive but without any conscious experience. Just like you are in a deep sleep. In a deep sleep, you’re clearly alive but you don’t have any conscious experiences.

Do you believe Terri Schiavo was conscious?

No. I mean, together … I looked at, you know, I looked at all the evidence. There were four separate clinical teams of medical experts that went over this question. All the evidence suggests that she, like thousands of sad cases like her, was sort of operating on brain stem mechanism. Yeah, occasionally you know, if you shine a bright light, occasionally she would track. Occasionally, she would, you know, look like she [was trying] to smile. But you know, if I film somebody for hours or days, yes, occasionally I can interpret you know, I can interpret if I really, if I’m hoping for a signal—like if I’m the loved ones, or the parents of this unfortunate patient—I can interpret there is something there but if you do this over a long time and if you’re a little bit more detached from it, you clearly see there doesn’t … there didn’t seem to … All the evidence indicated that there wasn’t anybody home anymore That she literally, Terri Schiavo, her conscious self, had died 14 years earlier. The shell of her self, particularly her brain and the brain stem, was still operating. And at autopsy, it was … the brain showed all the cerebral cortex had shrunk by more than a factor of two. So clearly she couldn’t see anything. All of her visual brain at the back was sort of degenerated. So all of that supports the contention: No, that she was not there. It didn’t feel like anything to be her. She, the her, she wasn’t present anymore.

How does Integrated Information Theory explain consciousness where other theories don’t?

Well I mean, a) there really aren’t that many consistent theories around. There are lots of hypotheses, but if by theory you mean a well formulated axiomatic body of short statements from which you can derive a mathematical calculus that you can then turn into predictions, there really isn’t any good alternative around. So … But that’s exactly what I like about the theory. It seems to be very plausible. It shares many elements of a conceptual framework that people have grappled with over the years. So for example, David Chalmers, a philosopher, he in his work 20 years ago already surmised that there was something key about particular types of information—that’s essentially what the theory says. It says particular types of systems generate a particular type of information called, “integrated information,” and it is integrated information that is experienced as experience. That’s what … it’s an identity relation. The theory essentially says that a particular type of information that makes a difference with the system in and of itself is what experience is. So it’s a fundamental assertion that tells you have a complicated, you have an organized system, it makes a difference to itself, and this difference that it makes to itself you can describe in mathematical terms—that’s what conscious experience is.

In a sense it takes us back to Pythagoras—you know in Sicily, the Greek philosopher and mathematician in Sicily who said that everything is ultimately numbers. It ultimately makes this assertion that consciousness is a particular informational structure in a high dimensional space. We don’t experience it as such. We experience it as sounds and sights and the tastes and the pains and the pleasures of life. But it says conscious is this high dimensional structure in these abstract spaces, and from there I can make predictions and I can turn toward neuroscience and toward the clinic to test to what extent these predictions are valid. And it also makes extrapolation. It also says which types of artificial systems, like which types of computer may or may not be conscious.

How can a subjective sense of blue be reduced to immaterial information?

You do it the other way around. You start with your sense of blue. You ask: What is it that makes a sense of blue, blue? Well for one, there is a sense. I do have experience of blue; it exists. It is the way it is because it’s different from any other experience I could have. So it’s different from black; it’s different from seeing you; it’s different from seeing a frame of the movie Blade Runner; it’s different from tasting, you know, wine. So it’s very different and … But it’s integrated. I cannot … So for example, you know, I see this video on a blue background but while I see the blue background, I see a lot of other things at the same time. I cannot separate that out. It’s holistic, it’s integrated; something philosophers have much remarked upon. It’s also structure. When I see a blue sky, it’s blue above, it’s not blue to the below. It’s blue on the left or blue on the right, so it has a sub-structure. And there’s only one blue. It’s not that I experience blue while simultaneously, there’s another Christof that experiences something very slowly and there’s another Christof that experiences something at an incredibly fast scale. There’s only one conscious experience.

And so, then you ask, given all these different properties about blue or any other experience—a kind of blue—you ask what is the mathematical calculus? How does a system have to be structured in order to support that? And that gives rise to a mathematical calculus. If you now, if you take those sort of, ways of defining your phenomenal experience, if you take them seriously and ask what mechanism can support them, then you turn into this … So you translate into mechanisms and then you give rise, you get out this calculus, that’s this calculus that says well in order to have an experience that has these different properties, you need to have a particular system that makes a difference to itself that is structured in a particular way; there’s only one of these systems and it has to make a difference to itself. So there has to be a mechanism like a neuron or like a transistor, it can be on and off—the type of information it has has to be integrated, has to be highly differentiated and then you get to IIT. So it’s a systematic process of going from the different aspects of conscious experience to a particular mechanism that supports. But you start out with experience. You don’t start out with a mechanism like a brain and ask how does a brain mechanism predict “y” conscious experience. You start with your conscious experiences and you ask what is the underlying mechanism have to be? What property does it have to obey in order to have conscious experiences? 

You write that Integrated Information Theory is “an elaborate form of panpsychism.” What is panpsychism?

So panpsychism is a very ancient philosophical belief. It goes back to, in our culture, to Plato and it’s very widespread. If you talk to Buddhists … I spent last year, a week with His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, so he and his Buddhists have reasons—are certainly all panpsychists—that assumes that consciousness is very widespread. Now it depends exactly what type of panpsychist you are—of course, there are many different forms—but essentially, it says that it’s very, very widespread and certainly may extend throughout the entire animal kingdom or may even extend wider. 
Now as a philosophical position it’s appealing, but it’s very difficult to get anything more out of it. Like you want to ask, well are there all-system conscious? What makes them conscious? Are there any systems that are not conscious? And so panpsychism doesn’t answer these questions. IIT, Integrated Information Theory, does. It makes certain very predictive—it makes some very specific predictions. It says, for instance, probably all complex neurobiological systems—all creatures that have brains—may well have consciousness, including bees and worms and octopi, etc. It may also be possible that if you build a brain out of wires and transistors, that you find consciousness there too.
But it also says that other systems like, for example, digital simulations will not be conscious. And it also says that there isn’t super-consciousness, that if I take a bunch of … For example, clearly answers the question that you and I, although we’re interacting, there’s no super-consciousness, there’s no right now Christof-Kevin or Kevin-Christof super-consciousness. There’s you, your conscious, you have conscious experience; I have conscious experience. We interact, but right now there is no über-consciousness. So [IIT] makes a number of very precise predictions that panpsychism was never able to make so it’s a much richer, more quantitative, more scientific form of panpsychism. But it does share the basic intuition that consciousness is graded and it’s much more widespread than we think in nature.

When you write things like, “the entire cosmos is suffused with sentience, ” you sound pretty New Age-y.

Yes, so here I have to confess that the nice turn of phrase I probably shouldn’t … It’s a beautiful turn of phrase, right? And so as a writer, you want to use it but … So you always have to make a judgment. As a scientist, you know, I ought to be very careful what I say. Yes because IIT again says that you’re conscious, I’m conscious, but it’s not … there isn’t this sort of woven consciousness everywhere. What I meant to say [was] that it’s much more widespread than we think. Many animals may have it; in fact, most animals for all I know will have it and lots of other systems may have it, so that’s what I meant by it. I may be taking too much of a license here as a writer compared to being a very accurate and precise scientist!

It sounds like a contradiction to say consciousness is both panpsychic and quantifiable.

Yeah, but I … So that’s the advantage of IIT. So IIT—finally, we have something that philosophers have not been able to do over the last 2,600 years with a precise mathematical definition of what it is, how to measure it. In fact, that’s … It has this number called ϕ that measures sort of the quantity. It has an informational structure that measures the quality of it so you can now make some very precise statements about consciousness. And while I don’t think Integrated Information Theory is the final word on consciousness, it’s certainly, it’s a big step in the right direction, and those sorts of theories will take us in a direction where we can turn, just like we’ve turned many other subject from metaphysics into physics, and ultimately into scientific subjects, to be able to ultimately explain this most mysterious of all phenomena—how does subjectivity, how do feelings, how does experience get into the physical world.

The self is often called an illusion. How do you define the self?

Well, the self is this sense of ego, this sense of continuity in space and time—that I wake up you know, this morning, I’m the same that I was yesterday, and I’m the same that I was last year, and then when my mom points at a picture of me, you know, where she says, “Well see? That’s you at 2 years old”—I have no idea it’s me, but I believe her. I say, well that’s my self, right. Although I know in the intervening time everything—a molecule in my body—has changed, I still believe that sort of is me.
So partly, it’s an illusion, because of course, we know we’ve changed radically, we have different … we may have different make up—we certainly have different memory—but still, I have this sense, and I think I need this sense in order to act in the world and to continue to act and to take advantage of experiences I’ve stored up over my lifetime. So partly, the Buddhists are right in the sense that it is partly illusory. But ultimately what remains is, and I’d like to end on this, with this phrase, what remains ultimately is my experience of having a self, my experience of having experiences as such. That is the most fundamental observation I can make about the universe and ultimately science has to explain how this feeling of having experiences comes into the physical world.

You write that, “some deep and elemental organizing principle created the universe.” What do you mean?

I find myself in a universe that’s conducive to life, right. This is the discovery over the last 30 years known as the “anthropic principle,” that everything in this particular universe seems to be extraordinarily balanced, so that you can have emergence of stable elements, you can have stable stars around which you can have stable planets and then you have natural evolution that gives rise to complex features. We also live in a universe where complexity begets conscious experience—that’s the heart of something like Integrated Information Theory, that complex piece of organized matter gives rise to consciousness. So isn’t it amazing that we are in this universe. Is that a chance event? Is there an infinite number of universes and we just happened to find ourselves in this one particular universe? So now for a reason I’m utterly unable to justify, I find this all deeply mysterious and deeply beautiful—that I do live in this universe, that is conducive to life, that is conducive to conscious experience. And I see looking back over the last 13 billion years of cosmic evolution, and then 4.3 billion years of terrestrial evolution, and then maybe 4 billion years of biological evolution, that here, we are very complicated creatures and the evolution is ongoing. So it’s all very mysterious, but it’s all very beautiful to me. In that sense, I guess I was born with this sense of mystery. I find that very, very surprising.

What would you be if you weren’t a scientist?

A climber. A professional climber. Climbing’s very addictive because in climbing, you can certainly experience … It’s all about conscious experience. You’re out there on the edge, you’re out there on the sharp end of a rope, and you’re hyper-conscious of the world. Your ego sort of recedes. It’s a form of meditation because you are engaged to such an extent with the world, with the environment, you have to pay such attention to every little unevenness in the rock, that your inner voice—this constant critic that’s always in your head—is completely silent and you just experience the raw feels of the world. It’s a wonderful, it’s an ego-loss, it’s a very addicting experience so I wish in a different life, I could just be a climber all the time.

Thursday, October 23, 2014

From Neuroscience's Perspective: Our Brains in Love and The Harmful Effects of Loneliness

http://www.99hdwallpaper.com/loneliness/wallpapers/photos-of-loneliness-and-sadness.jpg

This two-part interview with neuroscientists John and Stephanie Cacioppo (conducted by Marin Gazzaniga, daughter of Michael Gazzaniga, the well-known and highly respected neuroscientist) comes from Cafe, a cool online magazine. In the interview they discuss how the brain changes when it's in love, as well as the very negative impact of loneliness on the brain.

[For what it's worth, the image above came up on a search for "loneliness," but to me it feels like peace - but then, I am an introvert.]

Our Brains in Love: From Neuroscience's Perspective


What does a neuroscientist who studies loneliness have in common with a Ph.D. who studies love? For one, they share the same home, office and last name. In Part One of this two-part interview, John and Stephanie Cacioppo discuss how love helps you read minds, and whether you can experience desire without love.

What Qualifies Me to Talk Neuroscience?


I don’t claim to be a science writer; most have advanced degrees in their areas of expertise. But my father, Michael S. Gazzaniga, is well known in his field—one of the founders of cognitive neuroscience, and a pioneer in the theory of left and right hemisphere function. I grew up visiting his labs, and I have a basic comfort level with the vocabulary and methodology of neuroscience. One of the perks of being his daughter is that I can convince some of the world's leading neuroscientists to talk to me about their work. They will be patient with my simplistic questions—because some of them used to babysit me. 

He Wrote the Book on Loneliness; She Looks for Love in the Brain


My first call was to John and Stephanie Cacioppo. I met Stephanie when she was doing her post-doctorate work with Scott Grafton at the SAGE Center for the Study of the Mind at the University of California, Santa Barbara (which is run by my father). She helped me with a plot point in a play I was writing, in which my main character is in an fMRI scanner and a certain area of her brain lights up, which suggests she is in love. My question for Stephanie was: Is this possible? Is there a love area of the brain? Could our brains know we are in love before we do?  The answer was a qualified "yes."

Now, years later, Stephanie has fallen in love and married one of the founders of Social Neuroscience, John Cacioppo. Apparently their brains lit up when they met at a conference. They are a rom-com "meet cute." He wrote the book on loneliness. Literally. And she studies love.

© Stephanie Cacioppo
 
They spoke to me from their home office, sharing the phone, answering each others’ questions, and praising each others’ work. If they weren’t the researchers, they could be subjects for Stephanie’s studies on love relationships.

How Love Makes You a Mind Reader


MG: Stephanie, can you briefly describe your recent research?

SC: I try to better understand the role of the mirror neuron system in social interactions, and how social interactions, specifically with significant others, can be beneficial and detrimental to our mental and physical health.


(A side note: Mirror neurons were first discovered in monkeys, and later in humans. They are brain cells that are activated when you perform an action, and when you observe others doing the same action—hence the "mirror" name. The exact function of the neurons is still debated, but many believe they are associated with empathy.)

MG: Can you give an example?

SC: I’m interested in how a bond with your spouse, for instance, can make you think better, faster and make you healthier. In terms of thinking faster, one model I’m using is that of embodied cognition. How your social connection with your spouse can help you understand his intention very quickly, even before he’s finished his action. Is that clear?


MG: Can you give me an example of an experiment you do to look at that?

SC: Typically, we ask participants to watch different agents (a stranger, a friend, a family member, a beloved spouse) perform different actions (grasp a cup of coffee, hold a gun, toss a tennis ball in the air) with different intentions (meaningful, harmless, kind, etc.), and we ask the participants to guess what the agents’ intentions are, before they complete the actions. The participants are in an fMRI and we measure their brain activity while they do these tasks. Research suggests the more you feel "in tune" or "bonded" with someone, the faster you can anticipate their intentions. 

MG: What have you found about how love relationships impact this ability to predict behavior?

SC: When it comes to couples, theories of simulation and embodied cognition are in line with a model that is well-known in relationship science: The model of self-expansion. This model suggests that you fall in love with someone to expand yourself or to include the other’s attributes to make you a better person. Altogether, these theories suggest that the more in tune/in love you are with someone, the more time you spend with that someone, the more motor familiarity with them you acquire (unconsciously or not), the more your brain can encode their actions, the more your brain can then re-activate their actions by simple observation of the first step of a movement, and the faster you can understand their actions. In other words, the more you have a joint representation of yourself and the other person, the faster your mirror neuron system will be activated and the faster you can understand him or her.


MG: So somehow with our significant others we become more in tune with the motor processing cues. So, I can tell my husband is reaching for his car keys, say, rather than the mail, before he picks them up.

SC: Yes. And it doesn’t need to be conscious. That’s the beauty of it. It is largely a spontaneous and automatic process.

The Difference between Love and Desire


(At this point, John interrupts.)

JC: Tell her about the—

SC: Go ahead.

JC: (laughs) Steph’s work is brilliant. She’s looked at all of the fMRI studies of love and sexual desire and finds some overlapping brain regions but clearly some very different regions of the brain involved, as well. Importantly, love or desire isn’t represented as a spot in the brain. Each is the result of the collaboration of a set of neural regions operating on perhaps the same input to produce different inferences about and responses to that person. For instance, one distinction is in the insula – a long narrow nucleus on both sides of your head. There’s a front part (anterior) and a back part (posterior), and the distinctions within the insula are that the anterior regions are associated with more abstract representations and thought, and more temporal flexibility (for example, future orientation, mental time travel), whereas the posterior regions are associated with the present sensory, visceral and motoric inputs one is experiencing. This functional organization (concrete representations and operations in the back, abstract representations and operations in the front) is pretty typical of the brain generally.


MG: Uh huh. (At this point I felt my own brain getting a little overloaded.)

JC: What Stephanie found in the fMRI studies is that the back part of the insula, the posterior insula, is associated with desire whereas the front is associated with love. Now from that, Steph has developed a model of love and desire where both can actually occur together but, of course, need not do so. When both are active, the person is more likely to not only love someone but also desire that person.


Can You Love Someone but Not Desire Him? Or Vice Versa?


JC: Imaging research is correlational, though. It tells you these areas are associated, but it doesn’t tell you what they are doing. So the insula is an area of the brain where it’s hard to find lesion patients; because it’s not a richly vascularized region, strokes that compromised just a single part of the insula are uncommon.


(An aside: John spoke earlier about the need to study the "hole in the brain." That means looking for patients with a lesion (injury) to a specific part of the brain in order to learn more about what that area actually does—to see if the damaged area disrupts the behavior. In other words, if your anterior insula is damaged, do you lose the ability to love?)

JC: Steph found such a patient in South America. The front of the insula was damaged. She tested that patient for tasks she has used in her behavioral and neuroimaging research on love and desire. And she also tested other South American men to make sure that it wasn’t a cultural difference. The South American men were like the US men in how they responded to the tasks. Importantly, she also found that the patient whose anterior insula was damaged had trouble with tasks when it involved making judgments about love, but not when it involved making judgments about desire (photos they were looking at). That’s brilliant work showing it’s not just correlational. There’s something causal about what the anterior insula contributes to love. Stephanie is still looking for a patient with a lesion in the posterior insula. But her combination of neuroimaging and lesion research illustrates the kind of rigor that characterizes her research. I just love her mind.


SC: And I love his mind!

MG: I’m curious, what kind of task do you come up with that distinguishes between love and desire?

SC: So we have different tasks. One of them is to present images of single individuals, fully clothed, and we use the same exact stimuli for the love and the desire task. But the instruction is different. For the same set of pictures, the participants are being asked if the person is love material. And in another block, we present the same pictures in different order and ask if they could feel sexual desire for them. And the participants are asked to press keys to tell us their response and we analyze their brain activity based on their behavioral response rather than on the category of the stimuli. During previous studies, researchers have tended to categorize the stimuli ahead of time as being desirable or loveable. But someone who is desirable for you may not be for me. So we thought that it was very important to analyze the brain activity based on the participant's response rather than the experimenters' categorization.


How a Doctor of Love Can Help


MG: You mentioned that one of the lessons you learned from Scott Grafton and my father was to always ask the question, "And so what?" What is the "so what" of your research on love?

SC: People wonder why you need a Ph.D. to study love. A lot of people have a lot to say about this topic and they all think they know what love is and why we fall in love, and actually they don’t. We need to understand the brain in love, scientifically. And to bring the psychological model and biologic sciences to this field.  By breaking down love with different scientific and mathematical approaches we can really try to reconstruct it and better understand it in healthy couples and patients who have neuropsychiatric issues with love relationships. We can try to treat jealousy, people with obsessive-compulsive disorders—stalking—autism, patients who have social disorders and difficulty relating to others. By bringing science into this so-called soft science we can help patients in their early life.

NEXT….In Part Two of this series, John explains the brain science of loneliness.
 photo: S. Cacioppo. Modified from NeuroImage, 2008; Vol. 43, no. 2

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The Harmful Effects of Loneliness


In Part 1 of this interview, married neuroscientists John and Stephanie Cacioppo discussed her research on love. Here, John explains his research and some paradoxical behaviors of the lonely.

MG: You are one of the founders of social neuroscience. Can you explain what that is?

JC:  The premise of social neuroscience is complementary to cognitive neuroscience – but distinct. In cognitive neuroscience you look at the brain as if it were a computer. The metaphor stimulates a number of questions. For instance, language is viewed as a way of representing information in the brain. So you ask: What is that representational system? Where is the encoding and decoding? What types of storage and memory systems exist? In social neuroscience, the appropriate metaphor is the cell phone. Brains are viewed as mobile, broadband-connected computing devices. This metaphor raises different questions, such as: Where’s the wifi card? What’s the communication protocol? Language is seen as one of the ways these devices are linked, rather than a way to represent information within the device. Neither cognitive nor social neuroscience is "correct." They are distinct and complementary perspectives on the human brain. 

Why we need grandchildren to survive


MG: So what is the focus of your work?

JC: I’ve been interested in a combination of social and biological perspectives on the human brain for years now. What struck me as interesting about social in the first place was that social species, by definition, create super-organismal structures. These structures evolved hand in hand with neural, hormonal, cellular, and genetic mechanisms because they promote behavior that foster survival, reproduction, and care for offspring sufficiently that they reproduce. For mammals, whose offspring are dependent on parental care, it’s not your ability to reproduce that determines your genetic legacy but your ability to have grandchildren. If you reproduce a great deal but in conditions where there is no care for those offspring, then they perish during infancy, leaving you with no genetic legacy. So one interesting question is, What are the biological mechanisms that help us survive as a social species? The way I’ve been investigating this question for the past twenty years is to determine what happens when an individual is absent social connections. 

MG: Loneliness.

JC: Yes. So you see it’s actually a complement to what Stephanie studies. 

MG: She studies love - how people create deep connections - and you study what happens when they feel isolated.

JC: Yes, the reason I took that approach is very straightforward. If I want to understand what a gene does, I create an animal model where I can compare the responses from an animal that has that gene and an animal that does not. If I want to understand what the orbital frontal cortex does, I look at Phineas Gage before and after his orbital frontal cortex was obliterated. It’s not that I’m interested in the hole in Gage’s brain; I’m interested in what happens before and after that hole existed. Similarly, if I want to know what the effects of meaningful social connections are, I can compare individuals who feel socially connected with those who feel absent meaningful social connections – that is, individuals who feel lonely.

What Robin Williams knew about loneliness


JC: We’ve been doing experiments and longitudinal research on loneliness to determine the effects of loneliness on behavior, brain function, autonomic and neuroendocrine activity, sleep, and gene function. Fairly quickly we found that it isn’t the objective presence or absence of people, it’s whether you feel isolated. The brain is the key organ for forming, monitoring, maintaining, repairing, and replacing salutary connections with others, so the presence of others in many cases is less important than whether one feels connected or isolated. Stephanie gave me a quote from Robin Williams, from 2009. He captured this point better than many scientists: "I used to think the worst thing in life was to end up all alone. It’s not. The worst thing in life is to end up with people that make you feel all alone."

We’ve found that chronic loneliness is associated with early morbidity and mortality as well as a number of psychological disorders. For instance, our longitudinal and experimental research suggests that loneliness increases depressive symptoms. Loneliness also leads to heightened sympathetic tonus of the vasculature.

MG:  What does that mean?

JC:  Loneliness can lead to higher blood pressure. It also disrupts sleep due to an increased number of micro-awakenings over the course of the night. These effects are independent of the amount of sleep, or whether or not you’re actually sleeping with someone. We’ve seen this effect in studies of undergraduates and in the Hutterites (a communal population), and we’ve seen loneliness predict less salubrious sleep longitudinally. If you feel lonely tonight, you are likely to have more micro-awakenings across the course of the night. 

MG: Why is that?

JC: We have an evolutionary theory to account for these findings. If it’s dangerous to fend off wild beasts all day with a stick, imagine how dangerous it is to lay that stick down at night and sleep when predators are out and you don’t have a safe social surround. Going to sleep feeling isolated puts the brain into a state of alert for threats to promote self-preservation. The disruption of sleep has been seen in an experimentally isolated social animal, as well. 

MG: How do you determine the difference between someone who is feeling lonely vs. not feeling lonely? Is it just self-reported?

JC: We have a couple different ways. We have a monkey model and we are developing a rodent model of loneliness. In both of these models, we focus on the behavior of the animals to define loneliness. When working with people, however, we typically use a set of questions to measure loneliness. We don’t ask, "Do you feel lonely?" because men, in particular, tend to under-report. But there are other questions we can ask that relate to loneliness. If you ask, "Do you feel lonely?" there’s a bit of defensiveness that is aroused. But if you ask, "Do you feel socially isolated?" "Do you have others in whom you confide?" Then you start to get a more accurate picture of the extent to which they feel socially connected or isolated. 

Why loneliness can make you negative


JC: You know what the Stroop test is, right?

MG: Uh…I know the name. But…remind me?

JC: Stroop developed a test in which you show people the names of colors, but they appear in an incongruent color or ink, such as the word "blue" printed in red.

MG: Yes, yes.

JC: In the Stroop task, you ask a participant to identify what color the ink is. To people’s surprise, this is a difficult task because, whether they want to or not, people automatically read the words. Because you’ve read "blue" but it’s written in red, it takes you longer to say "red." And in fact often you make an error and say, "blue."

MG: Right.

JC: The Stroop task illustrates how information can be processed by the brain even when we did not intend to do so and are unaware of having done so. We used a version of this task to investigate how individuals who felt lonely or non-lonely preattentively (automatically) processed positive and negative social and nonsocial information. We presented social and nonsocial words in different colors and instructed participants to identify the color of ink in which the word was presented.

MG: What’s a social or nonsocial word?

JC: A negative nonsocial word is "vomit." A negative social word is "reject." As you can see, both are very negative words. What we found is that the lonelier you feel, the longer it takes to name the color of the negative social words. 

MG: Huh.

John can tell I’m not completely following…

JC: That’s evidence that if you feel lonely, your brain is especially paying attention to negative social stimuli because we did not find this interference effect when we contrasted positive social and positive nonsocial words. 

So, the idea is, you aren’t just being a Negative Nancy, you are actually on the lookout for things—or more specifically, people—that could hurt you because there’s no one around you feel would protect you.

How depression may actually be a way to connect


JC: Whether a fish or a herd animal on the social perimeter, the attack of another member is not only sad but also a threat to your survival. So the brain is more likely to focus on self-preservation than on the welfare of others. In fish, for example, an attack increases the tendency for each of the fish to swim to the middle (as far from the social perimeter as possible). We see similar behavior in herd animals. And we see something similar in the brains of humans. In brain imaging studies we have also found that the lonelier you are, the less brain activation found in the temporal parietal junction when viewing a negative social scene—for example, a photo of someone being hurt. Activation of the temporal parietal junction occurs when you take the perspective of another person, empathize with that person, or think about what they are thinking or experiencing. The fact that loneliness is related to less activation of this brain region is interpretable in terms of the lonely brain emphasizing self-preservation rather than concern for others.

The interesting part of this story is that people do not have conscious access to what their brain is doing. You don’t know your brain is in self-preservation mode because the brain was selected to do this long before humans walked the earth. The absence of accurate insight into what our brains are doing increases the likelihood that lonely individuals engage in self-protective—but paradoxically self-defeating—behavior. They are motivated to reconnect, but they engage in defensive, sometimes downright prickly behavior. When you feel lonely, you are more likely to be negative and disagreeable. Although this seems dysfunctional, it actually can promote survival in a potentially hostile social environment while an individual seeks to reconnect. We actually think that the depressive postures, vocalizations, and behavior that result from loneliness is adaptive—specifically, they may be ways to connect at a distance. I don’t have to push my way back into the group. I can sit there and cry, and look very sad, and if there are others in the setting who are willing to reconnect they are more likely to do so. If you’ve ever put your child in "time-out," you know what a strong force the child’s sadness can exert on you. These depressive behaviors, then, may have the positive effect of being a safe way to reconnect when you’ve been socially isolated. 

The paradox of loneliness


JC: I didn’t even mention all of the biologic effects that have been seen in human and animal studies. The lonelier you feel at the end of a day, the greater rise in cortisol we see the next morning. We see a change in gene expression, one of the most robust being increased inflammatory responses. In animal studies, an animal who is isolated from others and subjected to an experimental stroke shows three times greater brain cell death than normally housed animals who are subjected to the same experimental stroke. The differences in cell death appear to be due to differences in neuro-inflammation. Although there is more to do, these findings appear to be fitting together to tell an interesting story of how loneliness can lead to earlier dementia and earlier mortality through a variety of specific biologic processes which, from an evolutionary perspective, occur to increase your likelihood of short-term survival when you find yourself on the social perimeter.

Final Pop Quiz


Stephanie has rejoined the conversation, and I decide to let them go with an easy question. 

MG: If you weren’t neuroscientists what would you be?

Long pause. 

JC: Probably a mathematician.

MG: So not so far afield.

SC: Same. A physician.

JC: Steph likes to help. I don’t. I like taking things apart.

MG: Sounds like you’re doing exactly like what you want to be doing.


Friday, October 03, 2014

The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy (via Omnivore)

http://cdn.meme.am/instances/35469986.jpg

From Bookforum's Omnivore blog, this is a new collection of links on philosophy and particularly on the state of analytic philosophy. Here are a couple of highlights:
  • From PUP, the introduction to Analytic Philosophy in America: And Other Historical and Contemporary Essays by Scott Soames and the first chapter from The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy, Volume 1: The Founding Giants by Scott Soames.  
  • Scott Soames thinks philosophy is majestic and multi-faceted, is a leading philosopher of language and writes about the history and development of the analytic tradition in philosophy.
Enjoy the linkage.

The analytic tradition in philosophy

Oct 2 2014 
9:00AM

  • Zhang Haipeng (Hong Kong): The Concepts of Analyticity. 
  • Nat Hansen (Reading): Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy. 
  • Eugen Fischer (East Anglia): Verbal Fallacies and Philosophical Intuitions: The Continuing Relevance of Ordinary Language Analysis. 
  • Kevin C. Klement reviews The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaney. 
  • From PUP, the introduction to Analytic Philosophy in America: And Other Historical and Contemporary Essays by Scott Soames and the first chapter from The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy, Volume 1: The Founding Giants by Scott Soames.  
  • Scott Soames thinks philosophy is majestic and multi-faceted, is a leading philosopher of language and writes about the history and development of the analytic tradition in philosophy. 
  • From the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, Tim Crane interviews John Searle: “What’s your view of the state of philosophy at the moment? I think it’s in terrible shape!” 
  • Claudia Bianchi reviews The Philosophy of J. L. Austin by Martin Gustafsson and Richard Sorli. 
  • Grace Boey interviews Peter Unger, author of Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy (and more). 
  • Truth, success and Frank Ramsey: Pascal Engel interviewed by Richard Marshall. 
  • Carlos M. Munoz-Suarez on the Tractatus: Is it so intractable? 
  • Gabriele Contessa on analytic philosophy and the English language: Some data and some preliminary thoughts. 
  • What's your opinion of history of analytic philosophy? The Leiter Reports readership revealed itself to be quite friendly to the history of analytic philosophy. 
  • From Existential Comics, a special look at Dungeons & Dragons and Philosophers: The Analytic Turn; and the Analytics go to a bar and try to pick up a woman.

Monday, September 22, 2014

Narcissism - To the Best of Our Knowledge

From NPR's To the Best of Our Knowledge, this week's show focuses on narcissism, including interviews with Jeffrey Kluger (The Narcissist Next Door), Elizabeth Lunbeck (The Americanization of Narcissism), and Sam Harris (Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality without Religion) - includes and extended interview with Harris about his new book.

Narcissism



09.21.2014 | TTBOOK

Nobody wants to be a narcissist -- a relentless, self-loving, self--promoter. But look at Facebook and Twitter. We talk about ourselves all the time on social media. Which raises the question -- Are we living in a Golden Age of Narcissism?

YOU CAN TAKE THE NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY QUIZ HERE


* * * * *

The Narcissist Next Door - Jeffrey Kluger


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Jeffrey Kluger talks about his book, "The Narcissist next Door: Understanding the Monster in Your Family, in Your Office, in Your Bed -- in Your World."

Sonic Sidebar: Tusk


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Narcissists make great film characters. Think Hannibal Lecter, Gordon Gekko. We can add a new one to the list -- the old sailor in Kevin Smith's new movie, "Tusk."

The Americanization of Narcissism - Elizabeth Lunbeck


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Elizabeth Lunbeck talks about her book, "The Americanization of Narcissism."

Unworthy: How to Stop Hating Yourself - Anneli Rufus


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Anneli Rufus talks about her book, "Unworthy: How to Stop Hating Yourself."

Dangerous Idea: We Matter


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Theoretical physicist Marco Gleiser's Dangerous Idea? We matter.

On Our Minds: Sam Harris


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Extended Interview

Neuroscientist Sam Harris is on our minds this week. Harris is best known as one of the guys who helpd lauch the New Atheist movement. So it comes as a surprise to see the title of hsi new book -- "Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality Without Religion."
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Related Books:


The Narcissist Next Door
(Jeffrey Kluger)



The Americanization of Narcissism
(Elizabeth Lunbeck)



Unworthy: How to Stop Hating Yourself
(Anneli Rufus)



The Island of Knowledge
(Marcelo Gleiser)



Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality without Religion
(Sam Harris)