Owen Flanagan - Buddhist Ethics: The Therapy of Desire and Delusion

I have been reading Owen Flanagan's The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them, an interesting book with which I am in almost complete disagreement. He sets out to "reconcile" the version of mind present in the "perennial philosophy" (humanism) with the version of mind present in materialist science (physicalism). In doing this, he spends a lot of time looking at the notion of free will. His thesis seems to be (I have not yet finished the book) that the mind is the brain, and that despite this deterministic view, the illusion of free will allows us to be and act morally.

Here is the book description from the publisher:

A reconciliation of two conflicting visions of what a person is--one embedded in our humanistic traditions, the other advanced by mind science--from one of the most influential philosophers of our time.

Science has always created problems for traditional ways of seeing things, but now the very attributes that make us human--free will, the permanence of personal identity, the existence of the soul--are threatened by the science of the mind. If the mind is the brain, and therefore a physical object subject to deterministic laws, how can we have free will?

If most of our thoughts and impulses are unconscious, how can we be morally responsible for what we do? If brains and bodies undergo relentless change, how can our identities be constant?

The Problem of the Soul shows the way out of these paradoxes. Framing the conflict in terms of two dominant visions of the mind--the "manifest image" of humanistic philosophy and theology, and the scientific image--Owen Flanagan demonstrates that there is common ground, and that we need not give up our ideas of moral responsibility and personal freedom in order to have an empirically sound view of the human mind. This is a profoundly relevant work of philosophy for the common reader.

Flanagan essentially rejects the notion of a unique self, which fits with much of modern brain science and philosophy, including people such as Dan Dennett, Thomas Metzinger, and others.

To his credit, he sees the self as a biologically, environmentally, and culturally embedded illusion - yet he glosses this very complex idea of how the self is constructed with very little explanation of its subtlety and just WHY it is true.

Despite an extremely reductionist (and simple-minded) approach - he says, at one point:

Several very intelligent philosophers, including some good friends, have received tenure for publishing long books on how subjectivity is possible.… The problem is surprisingly easy to solve – at least from my armchair. Experiences are unique in having what John Searle calls ‘first person ontology.’… Why is that? Nothing mysterious. Each individual has her own and only her own experiences because only she is connected directly to her own nervous system. End of story (223-224).

- this is still an interesting book, in part because he is influence by Buddhist psychology and ethics. In looking for more of his thinking on Buddhism (since he seems influenced by it in the book, yet spends little time looking into its variation on what he is arguing) I found this article.

Here he attempts to argue for a moral standard that does not require a soul, or a unique self, using Buddhist ethical philosophy.

Buddhist Ethics:

The Therapy of Desire and Delusion

Owen Flanagan

This alone -- one’s service to sentient beings (sattvaraddhana) is pleasing to Tathagatas [Enlightened or Awakened Ones]. This alone is the actual accomplishment of one’s goal. This alone removes the suffering of the world. Therefore, let this alone be my resolve. (Santiveda, Bodhicaryavatara, VI, 127)

My thinking about the topic of destructive states of mind owes much to His Holiness, the XIV Dalai Lama and the other participants in a week long conference on the topic in Dhararmsala, India in March, 2000. A splendid report on the meetings is narrated by Daniel Goleman, Destructive Emotions: How Can We Overcome Them? A Scientific Dialogue with the Dalai Lama (2003). My first paper on this topic was “Destructive Emotions” in Cognition & Emotion 1: 2 (2000) 259-281. There my aim was to defend the Tibetan Buddhist therapy of destructive emotions against those who might attempt to defend all emotions on evolutionary grounds, on grounds that all emotions are biological adaptations.

Thus, one who has patience should cultivate zeal, because Awakening is established with zeal, and there is no merit without zeal…What is zeal? It is enthusiasm for virtue. (Santiveda, Bodhicaryavatara, VII, 1 & 2)

Upon mounting the chariot of the Spirit of Awakening, which carries away all despondency and weariness, what sensible person would despair at progressing in this way from joy to joy? (Santiveda, Bodhicaryavatara,VII, 30)

Virtue and Happiness in Buddhism

In the previous chapter I offered and analysis of eudaimonia, Buddhist style. Eudaimonia – ‘happy flourishing’ or ‘happiness and flourishing’ – involves reaching a state, better: achieving a way-of-being, feeling and acting constituted by Wisdom (Panna) and Virtue (Sila). Only in Wisdom and Virtue do we actualize our full potential, our proper function, as human beings. In all likelihood we are happy, contented.

Here I continue the profitable comparative interplay of Buddhism and Aristotle’s philosophy, focussing specifically on their respective ethics. Three issues absorb me: (1) What is the connection between virtue and happiness? Is virtue the normal cause of happiness, even a necessary condition? Is the claim that there is strong, possibly necessary, connection between virtue and happiness an empirical psychological claim, or is the claim a normative one? (2) Which theory provides the most defensible conception of virtue? Is it possible that Aristotle’s theory is too undemanding, and the Buddha’s too demanding? (3) How much work needs to be done, specifically, on moderating, modifying, possibly eliminating destructive states of mind before virtue and happiness can take hold?

A Key Difference between Aristotelean and Buddhist Ethics

Despite some similarities between the Buddhist and Aristotelean concepts of the proper function (ergon) and ideal end (telos) of humankind, there are some important differences between Aristotelean Reason and Virtue and Buddhist Wisdom and Virtue. Reason, in so far as it is relevant to ethics, consists of the practical intelligence (phronesis) to see things-as-they are, assess a situation for what-it-is, evaluate means-ends relations, and settle on an appropriate course of action according to the doctrine of the mean. Wisdom involves Reason plus, as importantly, a deep and abiding recognition that all things -- including the self – are impermanent. The doctrine of annata (Pali) (anatman, Sanskrit) is simply the application of the general doctrine of the impermanence of all things to the self, and what it irrationally and narcissistically seeks to accrue, hold, and keep. Wisdom, conceived this way, is part of, or at least interpenetrates with Virtue since it provides the cognitive basis for quelling “thirst,” the cause of much suffering according to the second noble truth. It also provides deep insight into what states of mind and being inhibit and promote happiness.

Read the whole article (PDF).

Filed in: Buddhism, Philosophy, ethics, morality, Psychology, Eudaimonia, Owen Flanagan, Buddhist Ethics, The Therapy of Desire and Delusion, The Problem of the Soul, Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them, mind, brain, soul, free will, Destructive Emotions, Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhism, wisdom, virtue, Aristotle,