Josh Rothman reviews the new book from Patricia Churchland - Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality - for the Boston Globe. Churchland is brilliant, and as much as I enjoy reader her books, I don't buy the neuroscientific flatland viewpoint.The following is from the Princeton University Press site for the book.What Neuroscience Can, and Can't, Tell Us About Moral Life
Posted by Josh Rothman March 28, 2011What is morality? For thousands of years, that question has divided the world's greatest thinkers. Is morality divinely inspired? Is it an instinct, built right into human nature? Or is morality, at its most pure, actually an abstract set of rules -- rules we could figure out if we only approached moral problems rationally? Patricia Churchland, a philosopher at the University of California, San Diego, thinks she has the answer. In her new book, Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality, she argues that a proper understanding of morality begins with an understanding of the brain. That doesn't mean, though, that morality is as simple as an innate instinct. Instead, she writes, morality is "rooted in skills and dispositions." Those skills and dispositions come naturally out of the neurological systems we use to solve the practical problems of social life.
Patricia ChurchlandChurchland is a philosopher by training (and a former MacArthur "genius" fellow) who has argued for decades that understanding the thorny problem of morality means developing a "neurophilosophy" -- a combination of evidence-based neuroscience and ultra-clear philosophical reasoning. This seems like a sensible strategy, but it's made complicated by the fact that philosophers and neuroscientists come at the world differently. Neuroscientists are problem-solvers: they want to use what they know to solve big problems now. Philosophers are problem-nurturers, always wary of hubris and over-reach. The result, Churchland explains, has been a tendency for neuroscientists and psychologists to "wave vaguely in the direction of genes and innateness and selection" to explain morality, while philosophers insist that morality is more abstract -- a system of rules that's way more complicated than any single innate instinct.
Churchland, meanwhile, does what she calls the "modest" work of clearing a middle path. She starts by explaining what's most clearly known about how morality works in the brain. We know, she argues, that human moral behavior is rooted in the brain's "circuitry for caring." That circuitry is common to all mammals: it revolves around hormones, like oxytocin and vassopressin, that surge through mammalian bodies whenever we care about ourselves, our children, or our mates. This circuitry for caring is evolutionarily ancient: Human beings and wolves use the same hormones, brain areas, and even nerves when they care about their children. Human morality extends that circuitry. In human beings, the circle of caring is widened beyond oneself and one's children. Evidence shows that our caring circuits are engaged not only when we interact with family, but with friends, and even with strangers.
That doesn't mean that morality boils down to a few hormones and brain circuits, though. Caring about lots of people poses a challenging, practical problem: How do you balance out your many simultaneous directions of care? Churchland argues that we solve that problem the same way we solve other problems: not instinctually, but by drawing on our learning, reasoning, and culture. Morality, Churchland argues, is a problem posed by our broad circle of caring -- but it's a problem we solve using all our resources as human beings. We have moral lives because of our instincts, but that doesn't mean that human morality is instinctual.
In the end, Churchland's picture of morality recalls Hume's or even Aristotle's. Aristotle, she writes, knew that morality has its roots in human nature, but also recognized "moral problems for what they are - difficult, practical problems emerging from living a social life." Churchland, by insisting that morality is neither an innate instinct nor an abstract system, but rather a tough, practical problem posed by our instincts, is bringing together the best in both neuroscientific and philosophical thinking.
Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality
Patricia S. ChurchlandWhat is morality? Where does it come from? And why do most of us heed its call most of the time? In Braintrust, neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules, and pure reason in accounting for the basis of morality.
Moral values, Churchland argues, are rooted in a behavior common to all mammals--the caring for offspring. The evolved structure, processes, and chemistry of the brain incline humans to strive not only for self-preservation but for the well-being of allied selves--first offspring, then mates, kin, and so on, in wider and wider "caring" circles. Separation and exclusion cause pain, and the company of loved ones causes pleasure; responding to feelings of social pain and pleasure, brains adjust their circuitry to local customs. In this way, caring is apportioned, conscience molded, and moral intuitions instilled. A key part of the story is oxytocin, an ancient body-and-brain molecule that, by decreasing the stress response, allows humans to develop the trust in one another necessary for the development of close-knit ties, social institutions, and morality.
A major new account of what really makes us moral, Braintrust challenges us to reconsider the origins of some of our most cherished values.
Patricia S. Churchland is professor emerita of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, and an adjunct professor at the Salk Institute. Her books include Brain-Wise and Neurophilosophy. In 1991, she was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship.
List of Illustrations ix
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Brain-Based Values 12
Chapter 3. Caring and Caring For 27
Chapter 4. Cooperating and Trusting 63
Chapter 5. Networking: Genes, Brains, and Behavior 95
Chapter 6. Skills for a Social Life 118
Chapter 7. Not as a Rule 163
Chapter 8. Religion and Morality 191
Notes 205
Bibliography 235
Acknowledgments 259
Index 261
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