This article is an editorial introduction to the Research Topic Perspective Taking: building a neurocognitive framework for integrating the “social” and the “spatial”. In part, this overview looks at some of the previous articles in this research topic (of which there are many) and partly it raises questions and directions for future research.

Several articles from the series are linked to below.

Full Citation: 
Hamilton AFC, Kessler K, and Creem-Regehr SH. (2014, Jun 11). Perspective taking: building a neurocognitive framework for integrating the “social” and the “spatial.” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience; 8:403. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00403

Perspective taking: building a neurocognitive framework for integrating the “social” and the “spatial”

Antonia F. de C. Hamilton [1], Klaus Kessler [2] and Sarah H. Creem-Regehr [3]

1. Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
2. Aston Brain Centre, School of Life and Health Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, UK
3. Department of Psychology, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

From carrying a table to pointing at the moon, interacting with other people involves spatial awareness of one's own body and the other's body and viewpoint. In the past, social cognition has often focused on tasks like belief reasoning, which is abstracted away from spatial and bodily representations. There is also a strong tradition of work on spatial and object representation which does not consider social interactions. The 24 papers in this research topic represent the growing body of work which links the spatial and the social. The diversity of methods and approaches used here reveal that this is a vibrant and growing research area which can tell us more than the study of either topic in isolation.

Online mental transformations of spatial representations are often believed to rely on action simulation and other “embodied” processing and three papers in the current research topic provide new evidence for this process. Surtees and colleagues reveal that embodied egocentric transformations are used for visual as well as for spatial perspective taking, extending the generality of the embodied processing principle (Surtees et al., 2013). Braithwaite et al.'s contribution distinguishes between embodied and disembodied body-related hallucinations, showing that only the latter speeds up perspective taking (Braithwaite et al., 2013). Gardner and colleagues also highlight distinct processing routes towards perspective taking outcomes, where some individuals use embodied- while others use abstract (unembodied) calculation strategies (Gardner et al., 2013).

Several of the papers in this research topic have a focus on action systems in perspective taking. Creem-Regehr et al. analyze the literature on human judgments of other's affordances and how this relates to spatial perspective taking, concluding that these are complementary processes that work to inform understanding of another's behavior (Creem-Regehr et al., 2013). Maguinness et al. look at how observing another's action of lifting influences the discrimination of the weight of the objects lifted, and how this is modulated by age (Maguinness et al., 2013). Pezzulo et al. propose that that sensorimotor representations are recalibrated in social contexts to create shared action spaces serving joint action or more generally, social interaction (Pezzulo et al., 2013). Furlanetto et al. present a study examining the role of both gaze and action on perspective taking, finding the intriguing result that when gaze and action intention conflict, spontaneous perspective taking is increased (Furlanetto et al., 2013). Together, these papers suggest that perception, action and spatial processing all interact with and contribute to social cognition.

Direct interactions between spatial factors and social factors can be seen in a variety of domains, including emotional stimuli such as threat and pain. Takahashi et al. use virtual reality to show that potentially threatening objects are perceived as closer to the participant (Takahashi et al., 2013). Clements-Stephens et al. investigate the influence of the presence of an agent and the role of social skills on spatial perspective taking, finding a complex relationship among tasks, targets, and context (Clements-Stephens et al., 2013). Finally, the impact of perspective taking on observation of other's pain is examined by Canizales et al, finding both subjective evaluation and neural somatosensory responses are modulated by the perspective taken (Canizales et al., 2013).

The relevance of social and visuospatial perspective taking for successful communication is emphasized in five contributions in this research topic. Focusing on the integration of action- and spatial- perspective taking, Beveridge and Pickering propose that alignment of spatial perspectives may serve as a prerequisite for action language simulations (Beveridge and Pickering, 2013), in which language users adopt a particular action-perspective or frame-of-reference (FOR). Johannsen and De Ruiter show that priming of a relative FOR can dominate an a priori preference for an intrinsic FOR in communication, while communicative success is predicted by the amount to which interlocutors adapt to each other's strategies—whatever these are (Johannsen and Ruiter, 2013). De Boer and colleagues approach the question of communicative success from the angle of individual traits and report that motivational as well general-purpose cognitive abilities play a crucial role (De Boer et al., 2013). The flexibility of perspective taking in communication is further highlighted by Galati and Avraamides who show that people weigh multiple cues (including social ones) to consider the relative difficulty of perspective-taking for each partner, and adapt behavior to minimize collective effort (Galati and Avraamides, 2013). In this context cultural background could make a difference. Wu and colleagues report that Westerners and East-Asians differ in their strategies of controlling ego- vs. other-centred perspective taking outcomes but are similar in their immediate (egocentric) integration of communication context (Wu et al., 2013).

Developmental and neuroscientific approaches are also important in understanding perspective taking. New data from Hirai and colleagues shows that people with William syndrome find it hard to perform a level 2 visual perspective taking (VPT2) task, and this may be due to difficulties in spatial processing of body postures (Hirai et al., 2013). These data complement the review from Pearson et al. which shows that children with autism also find these VPT2 tasks hard (Pearson et al., 2013). Though Williams syndrome and autism are sometimes considered to have opposite effects on social cognition, here the intersection of spatial and social processing seems to be difficult for both populations. Moll et al. argue against the traditional view that VPT is simpler than cognitive perspective taking (theory of mind) and suggest that social coordination and communication occurs developmentally prior to full VPT abilities (Moll and Kadipasaoglu, 2013). This view contrasts with the paper from Wheatley and colleagues which suggests that in human evolution, brain systems for spatial processing have been repurposed for social cognition (Parkinson and Wheatley, 2013). Finally, Schurz and colleagues report a meta-analysis of fMRI data showing that perspective taking and theory of mind engage overlapping brain regions (Schurz et al., 2013). Together, these studies show clear links between spatial and social processing, and the question of which is “primary” may become an important debate in the future.

Finally, advances in our experimental data need to be interpreted in a solid theoretical framework. Several rival theories are available. Gross and Profitt make the claim that social connections can modulate participant's perception of space (Gross and Proffitt, 2013). Sun and Wang consider how both spatial and social problems can be conceptualized in terms of different frames of reference, and can be broken down to similar low-level components (Sun and Wang, 2014). May and Wendt evaluate theoretical accounts of perspective taking with a focus on two different tasks that require laterality judgments (May and Wendt, 2013). Limanowski and Blankenburg take a very different approach, providing an account of the experience of “self” in terms of the free energy principle that a brain functions to minimize surprise (Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013).

Overall, the variety of papers in this research topic reflect the diversity and dynamism of the field. Recognition of the importance of studying spatial and social information processing in the same framework has come from many angles. Future studies can examine how these different types of task can scaffold each other and interact, possibly in an embodied fashion, to enable humans to cooperate and engage in a social space.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

References

• Beveridge, M. E. L., and Pickering, M. J. (2013). Perspective taking in language: integrating the spatial and action domains. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:577. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00577 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Braithwaite, J. J., James, K., Dewe, H., Medford, N., Takahashi, C., and Kessler, K. (2013). Fractionating the unitary notion of dissociation: disembodied but not embodied dissociative experiences are associated with exocentric perspective-taking. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:719. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00719  Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Canizales, D. L., Voisin, J. I. A., Michon, P.-E., Roy, M.-A., and Jackson, P. L. (2013). The influence of visual perspective on the somatosensory steady-state response during pain observation. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:849. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00849 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Clements-Stephens, A. M., Vasiljevic, K., Murray, A. J., and Shelton, A. L. (2013). The role of potential agents in making spatial perspective taking social. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:497. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00497 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Creem-Regehr, S. H., Gagnon, K. T., Geuss, M. N., and Stefanucci, J. K. (2013). Relating spatial perspective taking to the perception of other's affordances: providing a foundation for predicting the future behavior of others. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:596. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00596 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• De Boer, M., Toni, I., and Willems, R. M. (2013). What drives successful verbal communication? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:622. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00622 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Furlanetto, T., Cavallo, A., Manera, V., Tversky, B., and Becchio, C. (2013). Through your eyes: incongruence of gaze and action increases spontaneous perspective taking. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:455. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00455 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Galati, A., and Avraamides, M. N. (2013). Flexible spatial perspective-taking: conversational partners weigh multiple cues in collaborative tasks. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:618. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00618 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Gardner, M. R., Brazier, M., Edmonds, C. J., and Gronholm, P. C. (2013). Strategy modulates spatial perspective-taking: evidence for dissociable disembodied and embodied routes. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:457. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00457 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Gross, E. B., and Proffitt, D. (2013). The economy of social resources and its influence on spatial perceptions. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:772. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00772 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Hirai, M., Muramatsu, Y., Mizuno, S., Kurahashi, N., Kurahashi, H., and Nakamura, M. (2013). Developmental changes in mental rotation ability and visual perspective-taking in children and adults with Williams syndrome. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:856. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00856 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Johannsen, K., and Ruiter, J. P. De. (2013). Reference frame selection in dialog: priming or preference? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:667. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00667 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Limanowski, J., and Blankenburg, F. (2013). Minimal self-models and the free energy principle. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:547. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Maguinness, C., Setti, A., Roudaia, E., and Kenny, R. A. (2013). Does that look heavy to you? Perceived weight judgment in lifting actions in younger and older adults. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:795. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00795 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• May, M., and Wendt, M. (2013). Visual perspective taking and laterality decisions: Problems and possible solutions. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:549. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00549 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Moll, H., and Kadipasaoglu, D. (2013). The primacy of social over visual perspective-taking. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:558. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00558 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Parkinson, C., and Wheatley, T. (2013). Old cortex, new contexts: re-purposing spatial perception for social cognition. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:645. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00645 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Pearson, A., Ropar, D., and Hamilton, A. F. D. C. (2013). A review of visual perspective taking in autism spectrum disorder. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:652. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00652 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Pezzulo, G., Iodice, P., Ferraina, S., and Kessler, K. (2013). Shared action spaces: a basis function framework for social re-calibration of sensorimotor representations supporting joint action. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:800. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00800 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Schurz, M., Aichhorn, M., Martin, A., and Perner, J. (2013). Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:712. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00712 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Sun, Y., and Wang, H. (2014). Insight into others' minds: spatio-temporal representations by intrinsic frame of reference. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:58. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00058 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Surtees, A., Apperly, I., and Samson, D. (2013). The use of embodied self-rotation for visual and spatial perspective-taking. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:698. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00698 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Takahashi, K., Meilinger, T., Watanabe, K., and Bülthoff, H. H. (2013). Psychological influences on distance estimation in a virtual reality environment. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:580. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00580 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text
• Wu, S., Barr, D. J., Gann, T. M., and Keysar, B. (2013). How culture influences perspective taking: differences in correction, not integration. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:822. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00822 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text

Here are several of the articles from this topic section, arranged by newest at the top (I think). There are two more pages worth of older articles here (scroll down).

Insight into others’ minds: spatio-temporal representations by intrinsic frame of reference

Yanlong Sun and Hongbin Wang

Hypothesis & TheoryRecent research has seen a growing interest in connections between domains of spatial and social cognition. Much evidence indicates that processes of representing space in distinct frames of reference (FOR) contribute to basic spatial abilities as ...
Published on 14 February 2014 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00058

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Developmental changes in mental rotation ability and visual perspective-taking in children and adults with Williams syndrome

Masahiro Hirai, Yukako Muramatsu, Seiji Mizuno, Naoko Kurahashi, Hirokazu Kurahashi and Miho Nakamura

Original ResearchWilliams syndrome (WS) is a genetic disorder caused by the partial deletion of chromosome 7. Individuals with WS have atypical cognitive abilities, such as hypersociability and compromised visuospatial cognition, although the mechanisms underlying ...
Published on 11 December 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00856

* * *

The influence of visual perspective on the somatosensory steady-state response during pain observation

Dora Linsey Canizales, Julien IA Voisin, Pierre-Emmanuel Michon, Marc-André Roy and Philip L. Jackson

Original ResearchThe observation and evaluation of other's pain activate part of the neuronal network involved in the actual experience of pain, including those regions subserving the sensori-discriminative dimension of pain. This was largely interpreted as ...
Published on 09 December 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00849

* * *

How culture influences perspective taking: differences in correction, not integration

Shali Wu, Dale J Barr, Timothy Matthew Gann and Boaz Keysar

Original ResearchIndividuals from East Asian (Chinese) backgrounds have been shown to exhibit greater sensitivity to a speaker's perspective than Western (US) participants when resolving referentially ambiguous expressions. We show that this cultural difference ...
Published on 02 December 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00822

* * *

Shared action spaces: a basis function framework for social re-calibration of sensorimotor representations supporting joint action

Giovanni Pezzulo, Pierpaolo Iodice, Stefano Ferraina and Klaus Kessler

Hypothesis & TheoryThe article explores the possibilities of formalizing and explaining the mechanisms that support spatial and social perspective alignment sustained over the duration of a social interaction. The basic proposed principle is that in social contexts the ...
Published on 26 November 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00800

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Does that look heavy to you? Perceived weight judgment in lifting actions in younger and older adults

Corrina Maguinness, Annalisa Setti, Eugenie Roudaia and Rose Anne Kenny

Original ResearchWhen interpreting other people’s movements or actions, observers may not only rely on the visual cues available in the observed movement, but they may also be able to ‘put themselves in the other person’s shoes’ by engaging brain systems involved in ...
Published on 25 November 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00795

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The economy of social resources and its influence on spatial perceptions

Elizabeth Blair Gross and Dennis Proffitt

ReviewSurvival for any organism, including people, is a matter if resource management. To ensure survival, people necessarily budget their resources. Our spatial perceptions contribute to resource budgeting by scaling the environment to our available ...
Published on 19 November 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00772

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The use of embodied self-rotation for visual and spatial perspective-taking

Andrew David Ridley Surtees, Ian A Apperly and Dana Samson

Original ResearchPrevious research has shown that calculating if something is to someone’s left or right involves a simulative process recruiting representations of our own body in imagining ourselves in the position of the other person (Kessler & Rutherford, ...
Published on 05 November 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00698

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Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

Matthias Schurz, Markus Aichhorn, Anna Martin and Josef Perner

Original ResearchWe performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Specifically, we compared brain activation found for visual-perspective ...
Published on 01 November 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00712

* * *

Fractionating the unitary notion of dissociation: disembodied but not embodied dissociative experiences are associated with exocentric perspective-taking

Jason Braithwaite, Kelly James, Hayley Dewe, Nick Medford, Chie Takahashi and Klaus Kessler

Original ResearchIt has been argued that hallucinations which appear to involve shifts in egocentric perspective (i.e., the out-of-body experience: OBE) reflect specific biases in exocentric perspective-taking processes. Via a newly devised perspective-taking task, ...
Published on 30 October 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00719

* * *

Reference frame selection in dialog: priming or preference?

Katrin Johannsen and Jan P. De Ruiter

Original ResearchWe investigate effects of priming and preference on frame of reference (FOR) selection in dialogue. In a first study, we determine FOR preferences for specific object configurations to establish a baseline. In a second study, we focus on the ...
Published on 16 October 2013 | Front. Hum. Neurosci. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00667

Sub-Clinical Narcissists CAN Feel Empathy, If They Can Take the Other's Perspective

This research was widely reported in the media last week, but this article from The Atlantic offers the most balanced report of the study of those I have read.

Okay, an important note, made below, is in order. The subjects of this study were only assessed for narcissistic traits, not for Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The results here should not be extrapolated to individuals with NPD.

The upshot is that your everyday, garden variety, pain-in-the-ass with narcissistic tendencies or traits can feel empathy for another person if asked to take that person's perspective. This means some of those around us who are not fully narcissistic can change. But it also means that we can teach children to be empathetic when they are still quite young and are, by nature, little narcissists.

How to Make the Narcissist in Your Life a Little Nicer

A new study finds that deliberately considering the perspectives of others can help conceited people feel empathy.

Olga Khazan | Jun 3 2014


Caravaggio/Wikimedia Commons/Atlantic
Love is great, but it’s actually empathy that makes the world go ‘round. Understanding other peoples’ viewpoints is so essential to human functioning that psychologists sometimes refer to empathy as “social glue, binding people together and creating harmonious relationships.”

Narcissists tend to lack this ability. Think of the charismatic co-worker who refuses to cover for a colleague who’s been in a car accident. Or the affable friend who nonetheless seems to delight in back-stabbing.

These types of individuals are what’s known as “sub-clinical” narcissists—the everyday egoists who, though they may not merit psychiatric attention, don’t make very good friends or lovers. "They tend to cheat on their partners and their relationships break up sooner and end quite messily."

“If people are in a romantic relationship with a narcissist, they tend to cheat on their partners and their relationships break up sooner and end quite messily,” Erica Hepper, a psychologist at the University of Surrey in the U.K., told me. “They tend to be more deviant academically. They take credit for other peoples' work.”

Psychologists have long thought that narcissists were largely incorrigible—that there was nothing we could do to help them be more empathetic. But for a new study in the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Hepper discovered a way to measurably help narcissists feel the pain of others.

First, she gathered up 282 online volunteers who hailed from various countries but were mostly young and female. They took a 41-question personality quiz designed to assess their levels of subclinical narcissism, checking boxes next to statements like “I like to have authority over other people” or “I will be a success.” They then read a story about a person named Chris who had just gone through a breakup, and then took another quiz to determine how bad they felt for Chris. The more narcissistic among them were indeed less likely to feel empathy for the fictional jilted man.

An important note here: The study participants, though they’re described as “narcissists,” were not clinically diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a bona-fide mental illness. Psychologists aren’t sure how much overlap there is between functional people who are very narcissistic and those who suffer from NPD. One rule of thumb, Hepper tells me, is that most ordinary narcissists are happy, while NPD tends to lead its sufferers to extreme dissatisfaction with life.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

For her next manipulation, Hepper and her co-authors asked a group of 95 female undergrads to take the same narcissism quiz, and then later to watch a 10-minute documentary about Susan, a victim of spousal abuse. Half were told to try to put themselves in Susan’s shoes (“Imagine how Susan feels. Try to take her perspective in the video...”), while the others were told to imagine they were watching the program on TV one evening.

The subjects who were told to take Susan’s perspective were significantly more likely to score higher on empathy. In fact, the more narcissistic they were, the more the trick seemed to work.

“I think what's going on here is that people who are low on narcissism are already responding to people—telling them what to do isn't going to increase their empathy any further,” Hepper said. “But the higher on narcissism you get, the less empathy [you feel]. By instructing them to think about it, it activates this empathic response that was previously much weaker.”

And the narcissists weren’t just faking it. In a third experiment, Hepper showed that extreme narcissists had lower-than-average heart rates when listening to a recording of a woman in distress. (That is, “Their lack of empathy is more than skin-deep,” Hepper writes.) But if they were told to take the woman’s perspective, their heart rates leapt back up to a normal level.

Hepper thinks that eventually, this research could help shape therapeutic interventions aimed at narcissists. Teachers or human resources representatives could use such tools to try to get their resident egomaniacs to be more charitable.

Perhaps one day we can banish all the world’s narcissists to a desert island littered with tanning beds and TV cameras. Until that day, this type of compassion training might be the best weapon we have against the self-absorbed. As Hepper said, maybe it can help make the world “a nicer, more prosocial place.”

Jochen Fromm - Solving the Problem of Subjectivity

From the CAS-Group Blog (CAS = complex adaptive systems), Jochen Fromm discusses how Google Glass and GoPro cameras might allow us to solve the problem of subjectivity by offering us a point of view of the person engaged in a particular activity.

He gives the example of a helmet camera on a mountain biker. I have mountain biked, but I am not a skilled rider such as, say, a professional racer. The perspective of a professional rider would feel much different as I watched then my own perspective, for example, the speed, the maneuvers around obstacles, or the descent on a steep mountain will be significantly different between myself and a professional.

Still, it's an interesting article.

Solving the Problem of Subjectivity

Posted by Jochen Fromm (jofr)

Google Glass and GoPro cameras make it easier than ever to show what it is like to be someone or to do something, because they show the world from a first person perspective and from a deeply subjective point of view. Everybody is able to record his own personal film from his individual point of view. If you ever wondered for example what is it like to take part in a Kayak Championship, then watch these videos and you will get a glimpse of it:

What is alpine skiing or mountain biking like? Watch these videos and you will get a first impression. We say “so this is what it is like to..” if we experience s.th. ourselves, if we are in the same situation, if we travel along the same path. 

Why does this help to solve the problem of subjectivity? Because apparently “wearable” camera/camcorders such as helmet cameras show the world from a certain point of view, from the point of view of a particular subject. And as Thomas Nagel said [1] “..every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view”.

And as we have seen earlier, because subjective experience is path dependent we can solve the hard problem of consciousness by simply following the same path, showing for example what it is like to be an adventurer.

What is subjectivity? According to the “Oxford Companion to Philosophy” [2], subjectivity is a term that “often refers to unargued or unjustified personal feelings and opinions as opposed to knowledge and justified belief”. It goes on to say that “subjectivity has been argued [..] to be the ultimate obstacle to any reduction of the mental to the physiological. Subjectivity, on this account, is phenomenological experience, or ‘what it is like to be’ a certain conscious being”. And..

“the notion of subjectivity is also used, particularly in multicultural contexts, to underscore the importance of perspective, the fact that everyone sees the world from his or her (or its) individual vantage-point, defined in part by nature, by culture, and by individual experience” [2]

The vantage-point, the point of view and the first person perspective of the subject can apparently be well understood by cameras which show what the subject sees. What they do not capture directly is what the subject feels. The secret ingredients of subjective experience are emotions. Emotions are, according to Martha Nussbaum [3], “highly discriminating responses to what is of value and importance”, they are “judgements of value” and indicate which things are important to us and our well being. They also always belong to someone and contain an in eliminate reference to that person, they “view the world from the point of view of my own scheme of goals”. In principle, they “see the world from my point of view”.

Martha Nussbaum argues subjective experience means to make judgements of value. They involve emotions which contain a reference to a certain subject. In general one can speak of subjectivity if there is someone who makes a value judgements, for a example a jury. In sports there are “subjective” disciplines like dancing and figure skating which are assessed and judged by a jury. And there are “objective” disciplines where the results can be measure (was it short/long, light/heavy, slow/fast).

• Subjective means to assess values

• Subjective: making value judgements (good/bad) and assess values
• Objective: making value measurements (short/long, ..) and measure values

• Subjective means emotions are involved, which contain a reference to the subject

• Subjective: in relation to ourselves, emotions involved
• Objective: in relation to other things, no emotions involved

• Subjective means there is a jury somewhere, which has to make a value judgement

• Subjective: if there is a jury somewhere which has to make a judgement
• Objective: if there is no jury, if it an be measured physically

So far so good, does it help us to tackle the problem of subjectivity? Yes. The longer the path we follow a certain person, the smaller the difference becomes between watching what a person does and experiencing what a person feels. Consider this film of the Mountain Games Steep Creek Championships. Notice the difference to the small Kayak clips above? There is an additional soundtrack. Sound effects and film music are used in films to represent the character’s emotions [4].

We do not only see what the actor sees, we also feel it to a certain degree because the sound effects and film music trigger certain emotions. We can see in films what is like to be in a train crash, to cancel your wedding, or to murder someone. And the sound additionally tells us what it feels like to be in that situation. The effect is so profound that humans indeed go to dark rooms to watch humans pretending to be other humans. Films allow us to view the world through the eyes of someone else. When we watch a photo or a film, we see the world through someone else’s eyes – those of the photographer or filmer. In films we learn to see the world differently, since everybody has a unique perspective and an individual point of view. And now we have even the devices that show it.

[1] Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” in “Mortal Questions”, Cambridge University Press, 1979
[2] Ted Honderich (Ed.), “Oxford Companion to Philosophy”, Oxford University Press, 1995
[3] Martha Nussbaum, “Upheavals of Thought”, Cambridge University Press, 2001
[4] Timothy Corrigan and Patricia White, "The Film Experience: An Introduction", Bedford/St. Martin’s; 3rd edition, 2012

Research - The Role of the Self in Perspective-Taking and Empathy

This is an interesting article on the role of the "self" in perspective-taking and empathy. The authors present four studies showing that observers are more empathic to the extent that they can easily imagine themselves in the target’s position, across a wide variety of need domains - i.e., being able to take the perspective of the other is essential to being more empathic.

The Role of the Self in Perspective-Taking and Empathy: Ease of Self-Simulation as a Heuristic for Inferring Empathic Feelings

John R. Chambers 

University of Florida - Department of Psychology

Mark H. Davis 

Eckerd College

April 5, 2011
Social Cognition, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 153-180, 2012

Abstract:
When judging their empathic reactions for another person, people may rely on a relatively effortless, self-based heuristic: the ease with which they can imagine themselves in the other person’s position. We present four studies showing that observers are more empathic to the extent that they can easily imagine themselves in the target’s position, across a wide variety of need domains. Furthermore, we find that use of this “ease of self-simulation heuristic” (ESS), like other judgment heuristics, is conditioned by certain predictable factors: when deliberate attempts are made to take the perspective of the target person (Study 1), when the target’s needs are ambiguous (Study 2), and when the observer’s ability to engage in more effortful perspective-taking processes are constrained by performing a cognitively demanding second task (Study 3). In the discussion, we evaluate our findings in light of contemporary theorizing on the role of the self in perspective-taking and empathy.

Citation:

Chambers, John R. and Davis, Mark H. , The Role of the Self in Perspective-Taking and Empathy: Ease of Self-Simulation as a Heuristic for Inferring Empathic Feelings (April 5, 2011). Social Cognition, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 153-180, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189421

Here is the introduction to the paper:

What is the role of the self in perspective-taking and empathy? This long-standing question has been addressed over the years by a variety of social theorists. Smith (1759), Mead (1934), and Piaget (1972) have all offered analyses that emphasize connections between self-awareness, self-knowledge, and our responses to others. In recent years, social psychologists have addressed this issue in a number of empirical ways. Davis and colleagues (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996) found evidence that deliberate perspective-taking led observers to attribute more self related and primarily positive traits to targets—a “merging” of self and others.

They argued that perspective-taking activates self-knowledge, and the greater accessibility of such information then leads it to be used in characterizing others. In support of this interpretation, Davis et al. (2004) used a thought-listing procedure and found that perspective-taking observers reported more self-related thoughts. Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, and Gilovich (2004) implicate the self in perspective-taking via an “anchoring and adjustment” heuristic. That is, people infer others’ perspectives by starting from their own point of view and then making a series of adjustments to account for likely differences between the two. However, these adjustments require time, resources, and motivation, which are often in short supply. As a consequence, the adjustment process often stops short of where it should, and people’s estimates of others’ perspectives end up looking too much like their own.

Finally, Ames (2004) proposed a similarity-contingency model which argues that attempts to infer the internal states of others will often rely on one of two relatively effortless heuristics: projection and stereotyping. Perceived similarity to the target determines which heuristic is more likely to be used. People impute their own internal states to others who are perceived as similar (e.g., ingroup members), but employ stereotypes to infer the internal states of those who are perceived as dissimilar (e.g., outgroup members; see also Robbins & Krueger, 2005).

All of these approaches share a critical central feature: the assumption that the self is a template that observers apply to the target during perspective-taking. That is, all three approaches argue that aspects of self are in some way projected onto the target, and because such projection is relatively effortless, it constitutes a kind of inferential heuristic (e.g., Ames, 2004; Epley et al., 2004). However, this may not be the only role for the self. In this article, we argue for the operation of another self-related heuristic: ease of self-simulation. In brief, we argue that observers often use their own imagined experiences in the target’s situation as a heuristic for gauging their empathic reactions to the target, such that they will be more empathic if they can easily imagine themselves in that situation and less empathic if they cannot. We report the results of four experiments showing that observers employ this heuristic when judging their emotional and behavioral reactions to another person’s misfortunes, and we further illustrate some of the important situational variables moderating the use of this heuristic.