A few days ago, Bookforum offered up a collection of philosophy links. One of the interesting - or strange - articles is from a lawyer talking about attachment. Seriously. The author is using a very general definition of attachments:
I am using the term in a common, non-technical way. It is not confined to any specific emotion, or range of emotions, nor is it confined to happy, or willing attachments. There are ones we have in spite of ourselves. And there are ones we struggle to free ourselves from, or are ambivalent about. But they are connections we have to people, or objects, places, or groups of which we are aware. -- I will not be concerned with attachments to ideas, or theories. To simplify I will not consider complex and multifaceted attachments, such as religious ones, and will spend more time on attachments to people than to other objects.Here is the abstract:
Attachments and Associated Reasons
Anyway, that was a strange little article - here are the rest of them.Joseph Raz
Columbia University - Law School; University of Oxford - Faculty of Law
November 7, 2011
Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 11-287
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 59/2011
The paper will unfold in 5 parts dealing with five questions: first, does the partiality of attachments present an obstacle to their being or giving practical reasons? Second, given a value-based approach to practical reasons, can universal values generate reasons that are specific to their subjects, reasons – say – towards my friends that only I have? Third, do attachments affect what we do independently of any reasons that they provide? Fourth, in what ways do attachments constitute or provide normative reasons, and briefly, how do attachment-related reasons relate to other practical reasons? Finally, I turn to the question of the nature of and justification for partiality to oneself.
A new issue of Annales Philosophici is out, including Danielle Macbeth (Haverford): Reading Rorty: A Sketch of a Plan. From Purlieu, a special issue on Philosophy and the University. J. David Velleman (NYU): Time for Action. Joseph Raz (Columbia): Attachments and Associated Reasons. Neil Sinhababu (NUS): The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality. Albert H. Y. Chen (Hong Kong): The Concept of "Datong" in Chinese Philosophy as an Expression of the Idea of the Common Good. Brian Ribeiro (Tennessee): Philosophy and Disagreement. From The Philosopher's Eye, a series on the future of philosophy, with contributions by Robert Stern, Vincent F. Hendricks, Tim Mulgan, Matti Eklund, and Luciano Floridi. Metaphysics is the philosophical study of reality — but what does that mean in pratice, and what are the limits of what it can reveal? Kit Fine addresses the question. Thomas Nagel reviews Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction: Modality and Value by Barry Stroud. How we (should) decide: Philosopher Caspar Hare aims to develop theories of practical rationality that may just help us make real-world decisions. Ethical pluralism: Ian Pollock on the ugly theory that could. Ethics matter: A conversation with Peter Singer. An interview with Peter Ludlow, author of The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics. Simon Blackburn on Hume and bondage: Why is the idea that desire is the master of reason still causing fear and loathing in philosophy? A review of Wittgenstein by William Child. Could David Hume have known about Buddhism? From The Chronicle, Lee McIntyre on making philosophy matter — or else; and Adam Briggle and Robert Frodeman on a new philosophy for the 21st century. Is there a useful distinction to be made between analytic and continental philosophy? Brian Leiter thinks not (and an interview at 3:AM).