I found this at Archive Fire, a fine blog by Bright Abyss. Shaun Gallagher is the Moss Chair of Excellence in Philosophy at The University of Memphis, and has been a leader in the fields of embodied mind and extended cognition (see here, here, and here for starters - see also How the Body Shapes the Mind). You can read an interview with Gallagher at Science and Consciousness.
From the eSMCs Summer School 2011, San Sebastián, Spain, 5-9 September, 2011:
Enactively Extended Intentionality
I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore the connections between this concept and recent embodied approaches to social cognition.
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