Cool discussion from PhilosophyTV. Before launching into their discussion, it might be helpful to have a brief definition of qualia, from the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy:
Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem.The whole entry is quite educational.
Richard Brown (left) and Keith Frankish (right) on qualia.
Suppose you’re a physicalist and you want to include qualia in your ontology. Unfortunately, “classic qualia” (intrinsic, ineffable, private properties of experience) seem incompatible with physicalism, while “zero qualia” (mere dispositions to judge that we have classic qualia) don’t seem like genuine qualia at all. After all, even zombies have zero qualia! Perhaps you can be satisfied with “diet qualia” (subjective feels of experience). But are there meaningful distinctions between diet qualia and the other two conceptions? Is the notion of diet qualia even coherent? Frankish and Brown discuss the issue.
Related works
by Brown:
“Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism” (2010)
“The Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness” (draft)by Frankish:
“Quining Diet Qualia” (forthcoming)
“The Anti-Zombie Argument” (2007)
Consciousness (2005)
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