Sunday, February 20, 2011

Embodied language comprehension requires an enactivist paradigm of cognition

Interesting (and geeky) article from Frontiers in Cognition - an open access publication.

Embodied language comprehension requires an enactivist paradigm of cognition

  • 1 Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, Netherlands
  • 2 Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Brain Mind Institute, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
  • 3 Department of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, Netherlands

Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the “necessity question” (i.e., is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) and the “simulation constraint” (i.e., how do we understand language for which we lack the relevant experiences?). In the present paper we argue that the criticisms encountered by the embodied approach hinge on a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. We argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as supporting a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language comprehension, according to which language comprehension can be described as procedural knowledge – knowledge how, not knowledge that – that enables us to interact with others in a shared physical world. The enactivist view implies that the activation of modality-specific brain areas during language processing reflects the employment of sensorimotor skills and that language comprehension is a context-bound phenomenon. Importantly, an enactivist view provides an embodied approach of language, while avoiding the problems encountered by a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment.

From the introduction - here is a brief explanation of how they define the terms of the discussion - the cognitive approach vs. the enactivist approach:

We state that these problems for an embodied approach to language comprehension hinge on a cognitivist, representationalist understanding of embodied cognition. Tackling them requires switching to an enactivist paradigm of cognition. Cognitivism is here defined as the theoretical approach that attempts to explain cognition in terms of the manipulation of discrete internal representations. Although on this account cognition may be used for the purpose of guiding actions, the cognitive process as such is thought of in terms that do not essentially involve the actions that it may help to guide. Cognition understood as the manipulation of internal representations is supposed to mediate between perception and action. But although it is enabled by perception and used for action, neither perception, nor action is constitutive of it. By contrast, enactivism can be defined as the view that cognition emerges in the interaction between an organism and the environment, such that perception and action are co-constitutive of it. Cognition is manifested in the kind of appropriate, dynamic perception–action coupling that allows us to cope effectively with our physical and social environment. On the enactivist view it is misleading to think of such coupling as requiring discrete representations of one’s environment: effectively dealing with one’s environment does not presuppose awareness of features of one’s environment, rather it reflects such awareness. Enactivism implies that cognition is essentially tied to action and that cognition is always context-bound.

In the present paper, drawing a parallel with the recent enactivist criticism of the simulation interpretation of the mirror neuron system, we argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as supporting a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language comprehension. We will start by outlining evidence from cognitive neuroscience in favor of an embodied approach to language comprehension and by elaborating on the problems such an approach faces. We will then briefly turn to a parallel with the debate on the function of the mirror neuron system and highlight the recent enactivist move made in that debate. After having contrasted the enactivist cognition paradigm with the current cognitivist paradigm in cognitive neuroscience, we will introduce a similar move in the present context and discuss how an enactivist approach to embodied language comprehension can deal with the objections to an embodied approach to language comprehension. We will conclude with a discussion on the perspectives and limitations of the enactive approach to language and discuss the prospective for future research on language and embodiment.

Full Citation:

van Elk M, Slors M and Bekkering H (2010) Embodied language comprehension requires an enactivist paradigm of cognition. Front. Psychology 1:234. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00234


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