Some Reflections On Post-Formal Thought - Helena Marchand

Very interesting article on the nature post-formal thought and cognition - a stage that Piaget never seriously accounted for in his cognitive model. One of the very interesting and important elements of post-formalism, as I believe and the theorists cited in this article seem to suggest, is its dialogical nature:

The postformal thought theorists furthermore questioned (1) the lack of parsimony and of empirical adequacy of the Piagetian tasks employed in the evaluation of adult subjects; (2) the separation of thought from the processes of the Self, of context, and of history; (3) the excessive value given, in the Piagetian conceptualization, to the structural dimension, to the detriment of the dialectical dimensions; and (4) the model of formal operations, which appealed excessively to the logic of the truth tables.

I agree with these criticisms and have recently made them myself in another article, Thoughts on a Post-Wilberian Integral Theory - Part 1 - Wilber's Integral Theory Is Less than Integral.

From The Genetic Epistemologist: Volume 29, Number 3, posted at DARE Association.

Some Reflections On PostFormal Thought

Helena Marchand

Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Lisbon, Alameda da Universidade, 1649_013 Lisboa, Portugal. E_mail: helenamarchand@hotmail.com

Thirty years after the most important conceptualizations of postformal thought, there still remain various questions about the nature of such thought. The aims of this article are (1) to succinctly describe the emergence of these conceptualizations and the most important characteristics of this level of thought, (2) to put forth some considerations regarding these characteristics and (3) to analyze whether it is now possible to speak of a fifth stage of development, beyond formal operations.

Of all the phases of the life cycle, adult life is the longest and, until very recently, the most unknown. For decades the terms human development and psychological development were seen as related to childhood and adolescence, that is, to the first twenty years of life. Traditionally experts in developmental psychology analyzed the growth of the child and of the adolescent, holding that development ends before adult life begins.

One of the authors who defended this position was Piaget, when he wrote, referring to the stage of formal operations, "this general form of equilibrium should be understood as final, both in the sense that it will not change further during the rest of the lifetime, even if it is integrated into broader systems (multivalent logical systems), and in the sense that it unites into a single system groupings which until now were without operational connections among them" ( Inhelder & Piaget, 1955, pp. 294_295). He again expressed this view twenty-five years later, when he wrote, "(formal thought) constitutes a complex but coherent system, relatively different from the logic of the child: it constitutes the essence of the logic of educated adults, as well as the basis of the elementary forms of scientific thought" ( Piaget, 1970/72, p. 6). These comments, widely criticized, brought a group of authors to raise the hypothesis that there could be a stage (or stages) beyond the formal, which would better represent adult cognition.

With the objective of expanding the Piagetian view of formal thought, various theories arose (cf. Arlin, 1975; Basseches, 1980; Commons, Richards & Armon, 1984; Commons, Sinnott, Richards & Armon, 1989; Kramer, 1983, 1990; Pascual-Leone, 1984; Riegel, 1973; Sinnott 1981, 1984, 1989, among others) which were based on the assumption that the distinctive characteristic of adult thought was the acceptance and integration of various, and at times incompatible, truths which are highly dependent upon context and upon the way in which the subject perceives them without the subject needing, as the adolescent does, to look for and to find a single truth. Such theories provoked great enthusiasm in the scientific community. According to Sinnott (1993), we were in the presence of a "new area" of development, called "postformal".

Although the main criticism made of Piaget was directed at his affirmation that the stage of formal operations constituted the last stage of psychogenesis, the postformal thought theorists furthermore questioned (1) the lack of parsimony and of empirical adequacy of the Piagetian tasks employed in the evaluation of adult subjects; (2) the separation of thought from the processes of the Self, of context, and of history; (3) the excessive value given, in the Piagetian conceptualization, to the structural dimension, to the detriment of the dialectical dimensions; and (4) the model of formal operations, which appealed excessively to the logic of the truth tables.

To overcome such limitations, specific tasks were proposed to evaluate adult thought; descriptions of adult thought were made in which diverse dimensions (cognitive, subjective, intuitive, imaginative, interpersonal) ( Labouvie-Vief, 1992) were integrated; and alternate models of formal thought, different from the Piagetian one, were used. In the opinion of various authors, models existed which, better than the model of the logic of binary operations, could portray the complex, and at times contradictory, forms of thought which develop at the end of adolescence and during adult life: the dialectical model (cf. Basseches, 1984; Kramer, 1983; Riegel, 1973); the relativistic model (cf. Sinnott, 1984, 1991); moral philosophy (cf. Armon, 1984); the general theory of systems and Buddhism (cf. Koplowitz, 1984, 1990).

From among the models, which were alternatives to Piaget’s model of formal operations, the dialectical and the relativist models stand out, because of the influence they exerted on the bulk of the conceptualizations of postformal thought. Divulged by Klaus Riegel, Hegel’s dialectic philosophy had a great influence on the majority of the descriptions of postformal thought. Riegel (1973, 1975, 1976, 1978) was one of the first authors to criticize Inhelder and Piaget’s affirmation (1955) that formal operations constituted the level of final equilibrium. For Riegel, development consists of continuous and constant changes in which contradictions would be the motor of advances, there being --contrary to what Piaget postulated -- no stable levels of equilibrium. In his view, stability and equilibrium would occur if the task of development would one day be complete; but that never happens. According to Riegel (1973, 1975, 1976), the subject does not necessarily effect, such as was postulated by Piaget, an equilibration of conflicts. On the contrary, the dialectical thought, which characterizes maturity, consists in living with contradictions, accepting them as such. It is the dialectical interaction between equilibrium and disequilibrium that makes development possible. The influence which the dialectical model had on the majority of postformal authors is notorious (for example, Basseches and Kramer, who designate the last stage of development as the dialectical stage; among others.)

The relativistic model, based on axioms and properties of models from physics, exerted, just as the dialectical model did, a great influence on the majority of the conceptualizations of postformal thought. If Klaus Riegel was the great divulger of the dialectical model, Jan Sinnott (1981, 1984, 1989, 1993) is the author who most dedicated herself to the study of the properties of two models taken from physics (the pre-relativistic model, namely that of Newton, and the relativistic model of Einstein) and to the analysis of the repercussions that these models had in the diverse conceptualizations of human development in general, and of adult development, in particular. According to Sinnott, the concepts postulated in each of the two models reveal assumptions of differing natures regarding knowledge: absolutistic assumptions, in the case of Newton’s model; relativistic, in the case of the more recent models.

In the words of Sinnott (1993, p. 78), "one conclusion drawn from the new physics is that sometimes multiple contradictory views of truth are all 'true' simultaneously, although they appear contradictory at first, and that reality is therefore the view of truth to which we make a 'passionate commitment' (...)". This conclusion had a great impact on the diverse conceptualizations of adult cognition, in which it is postulated that different and incompatible truths are accepted and integrated by the subject without his feeling the need to seek and find a single truth. In her view, the Piagetian analysis of formal operational thought was inspired by the Newtonian perspective and, thus, would be insufficient to explain adult thought. For Sinnott (1984), the "soft", relativist model, by containing and coordinating the "strong" Newtonian logic in a broader system of relationships among elements, would be a more adequate model for representing postformal thought than the bivalent logic model of propositions.

Arlin defends a similar opinion (1984) when she affirms that the logical relativist model combines, or synthesizes, various INRC groups, and integrates hypothetico-deductive logic. This opinion is also supported by Labouvie-Vief (1984), who distinguishes a "hard" logic which, imposing limitations, shows itself insufficient to explain postformal thought, from a more "flexible" logic which, although containing the former, would be less restrictive and would better explain the complexity of adult thought. The "hard" logic, proper to formal thought, would be manifested in the exhaustive search for truth; in it reality is analyzed in terms of truths and logical falsities, the latter being rejected.

Consequently, subjects can perform well in abstract, well defined tasks, but fail, however, in tasks which are more complex and less structured, in which it becomes necessary to take into consideration different and, at times, conflicting points of view. For Labouvie-Vief (1984), the reference to the Self and to others in more ample systems is only manifested in the higher levels of development (the intersystemic and autonomous levels) in which the expansion of logical absolutism (i.e., of the logic of truth, or "hard logic") gives way to logical relativism (i.e., to "flexible logic").

Most descriptions of postformal thought are based on a dialectical epistemology and on an epistemology of relativity. Such descriptions look to these two epistemologies for notions such as dialectical operations, the study of the subject through the life cycle, problem finding, logical relativism, contextualism, self-reference, and acceptance of contradiction.

The first references to the eventual existence of a stage beyond the formal were made by Bruner (1959). In Bruner’s opinion -- and, later, in the opinion of Gruber and Vonèche (1976) and of Commons & Richards (1984a, b) such a stage would not be universal, as only a few scientists would manifest such a level of thought. However, the majority of authors who postulate the existence of a fifth stage don’t hold to this view, and maintain that such a stage characterizes adult thought in general, and not just that of a small elite. Riegel (1973) was one of the first authors to postulate the existence of a fifth stage of development, characterized by dialectical operations. For him, dialectical operations, by their capacity to integrate contradictions into broader systems, can explain the creative dimension of adult thought. Following on Riegel, Arlin (1984), for one, proposes a fifth stage of development, that of problem finding, which is characterized by the progressive substitution of problem solving (the dominant activity, in his opinion, of adolescent thought) by the capacity for the discovery and formulation of questions about oneself and about life (an activity which is constant in, and distinctive to, adult thought). In the words of Arlin (1984), "the argument for a fifth stage is based on this definition of problem finding and on the observations that 'general questions' are uncommon in adolescent thought" (p. 265).

Labouvie-Vief (1984, 1992) holds the position that adult thought is characterized by logical relativism and by progressive reference to the Self. Kitchener et al. (cf. Kitchener & Brenner, 1990; Kitchener & King, 1981, 1990a,b) defend, in their reflective judgement model, that in the highest stages, knowledge is conceived of as relative, circumscribed, and resulting from a constant evolution, which is susceptible to being evaluated and reevaluated. For Kramer (1983) formal operational thought is dual and absolutist (i.e., it is very dependent upon a true/false logic), and it does not allow for mutually incompatible systems. Postformal thought, which is of a relativistic and dialectical nature, is more independent from bipolar logic (i.e., from the true/false dichotomy), allowing the subjects to become conscious of the existence of mutually incompatible systems arising from the subjective and arbitrary nature of knowledge ( Kramer, 1983, 1990). Commons and coworkers (cf. Commons, Richards & Kuhn, 1982; Richards & Commons, 1984, 1990) describe stages of development qualitatively distinct from and logically more complex than that of formal operations, which develop in sequence to this stage (the systematic stage, the metasystematic stage, the paradigmatic stage, the transparadigmatic stage). In these stages subjects become progressively capable of analyzing and of coordinating diverse systems, creating supersystems of a metatheoretical nature.

The great diversity of theories, and of methodologies (e.g., Basseches (1984), with the dialectical schemata interview; Commons and coworkers (1984a,b), with the four stories and, more recently (1995, 1998), with the balance beams task; Kitchener and King (1981, 1990a,b), with the reflective judgement interview; Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), with the moral judgement interview; and Kramer (Kahlbaugh & Kramer, 1995), with the elaborated interview for the evaluation of the relativistic and dialectical levels of thought) presented by authors who postulate the existence of stages of development beyond the formal operations stage makes it difficult, if not impossible, to get a unified view of the characteristics of this level of thought. However, it is possible to identify in the diverse descriptions of postformal thought (cf. Kramer, 1983, 1989) some features which would be specific to this level: (1) the recognition and understanding of the relativistic, non-absolutist, nature of knowledge; (2) the acceptance of contradiction to the extent that it is part of reality; and (3) the integration of contradiction into comprehensive systems, i.e., into a dialectical whole ( Kramer, 1989).

Read the rest of the article - the next section is "The relativistic and non-absolutist nature of knowledge."

Tags: Some Reflections On Post-Formal Thought, Helena Marchand, Piaget, development, psychology, Psychology, cognitive development, stages, consciousness, structuralism, Jerome Bruner, Commons, dialectical dimension, Klaus Riegel, Hegel, The Genetic Epistemologist, DARE Association