Showing posts with label phenomenal consciousness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label phenomenal consciousness. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 13, 2014

J. Kevin O’Regan - Why Things Feel the Way They Do?

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This is an interesting talk from J. Kevin O'Regan, former director of the Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception (LPP), which specializes in human visual and auditory perception both in babies and adults. He is currently, since June 2013, working on a 5-year European Research Council Advanced project (FEEL) on the sensorimotor approach to consciousness and "feel," which I am currently pursuing at the LPP. This talk, and the 2011 book, Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the feel of consciousness, are related to that project.

J. Kevin O’Regan - Why Things Feel the Way They Do?

Published on Aug 7, 2014


Why things feel the way they do: the sensorimotor approach to understanding phenomenal consciousness, J. Kevin O’Regan (Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, Université Paris Descartes, France)

Why does red not look green? Why does it not sound like a bell? Why does pain hurt rather than just provoking pain behavior and avoidance reactions? These are the questions of “qualia” or “phenomenal consciousness”, which the philosophers consider to be a “hard” problem.

The sensorimotor approach provides a way to make the hard problem easy. It suggests that we have been thinking about phenomenal consciousness the wrong way. Instead of thinking of it as being something that is generated by the brain, we should think about it as being a way of interacting with the world. Taking this stance provides simple explanations of why sensations are the way they are, and why there is “something it’s like” to have a sensation. Taking this stance also makes interesting scientific predictions and opens new experimental paradigms which I shall describe in change blindness, color psychophysics, sensory substitution, the rubber hand illusion and spatial cognition.

The talk is a précis of the book: J.K. O’Regan, Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the feel of consciousness, OUP, 2011.

Monday, July 23, 2012

Dan Dennett - A Phenomenal Confusion About Access and Consciousness


On the opening night of the Summer Institute on the Evolution and Function of Consciousness, Dan Dennett gave one of the two opening night lectures (Antonio Damasio gave the other one, but the video has not been posted yet) on the topic of A Phenomenal Confusion About Access and Consciousness (PDF of powerpoint slides). Essentially, he is refuting Ned Block's distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness (papers linked to below).





Dan Dennett A Phenomenal Confusion About Access and Consciousness
Abstract: Many researchers on consciousness have adopted Ned Block's purported distinction between "access" consciousness and 'phenomenal' consciousness (Block, 1995, 2005, 2007), but in spite of its evident appeal, it is not a defensible distinction. Earlier critiques (Dennett, 1994, 1995, Cohen and Dennett, 2012) have not deterred those who favor the distinction, but perhaps one more exposition of the problems will break through.