Showing posts with label somatic psychology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label somatic psychology. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 10, 2014

The Limits of Talk - An Interview with Bessel van der Kolk

Bessel van der Kolk has been a central figure in the study and treatment of traumatic stress for more than two decades. Among the books he has (co)written or (co)edited are Psychological Trauma (1987) Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body, and Society (2006), Treating Complex Traumatic Stress Disorders (Adults): Scientific Foundations and Therapeutic Models (2013, reprint edition), and his newest book is The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma (September 25 release date).

Posted below are the first few pages of an interview he did with Psychotherapy Networker magazine. The title link will take you to the full PDF of the interview.

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The Limits of Talk

Bessel van der Kolk wants to transform the treatment of trauma
by Mary Sykes Wylie


Psychotherapy Networker:
The Limits of Talk
 
For more than 20 years, Bessel van der Kolk has been in the forefront of research in the psychobiology of trauma and in the quest for more effective treatments. Now he’s touched off an intense debate about the role of scientific evidence in finding ways to alleviate suffering and the future of the traditional talking cure itself.......

Bessel van der Kolk likes to introduce his workshops on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with medical film clips from World War I showing veterans diagnosed with what was then called “shell shock.” In these dramatic and riveting clips, one soldier sits hunched over on his hospital cot, staring blankly ahead, responding to nothing and nobody until the single word “bomb” is said, whereupon he dives for cover underneath the small bed. Another man lies almost naked on the bare floor, his back rigidly arched, his arms and hands clawing the air as he tries, spasmodically and without success, to clamber onto his side and stand up. Yet another, who once bayoneted an enemy in the face, now opens his mouth wide into a gaping yaw and then closes it, and opens it and closes it, over and over and over again.


The images are disturbing, heartbreaking, and all the stranger because these particular men, technically speaking, are physically unharmed. Their physical symptoms-paralysis, violent trembling, spasmodic movements, repetitive facial grimaces, zombie-like demeanor-look exotic to our eyes because PTSD generally doesn’t show up like this anymore in most clinicians’ offices. Time and Western cultural evolution have changed the way traumatized people express their distress in a therapist’s office. Now, trauma patients may look fine on the surface, but complain of nightmares, flashbacks, feelings of numbness, generalized fearfulness, dissociative symptoms, and other problems that aren’t as visible to the world at large. But to van der Kolk, these old images still represent what he calls the “pure form” of PTSD. The appearance in these World War I film clips that the veterans are possessed, mind and body, by invisible demons still captures the fundamental truth about PTSD-that it can reduce its victims to mute, almost animal-like, creatures, utterly isolated in their fear and horror from the human community.
 

Van der Kolk first became aware of the world of trauma in 1978, when he decided to go work for the Veterans Administration (VA), not to study PTSD (it hadn’t been recognized yet as a formal diagnosis), but to get the government benefits to pay for his own psychoanalysis. While there, he discovered the reality of PTSD - and the beginnings of a stunning, nationwide phenomenon. “At that time, tens of thousands of men who’d served in Vietnam suddenly seemed to come out of the woodwork, suffering from flashbacks, beating their wives, drinking and drugging to suppress their feelings, closing down emotionally,” recalls van der Kolk. “It was a phenomenon that spawned a whole generation of researchers and clinicians fascinated by what had happened to these guys.”

Van der Kolk himself soon became intrigued by the mysterious mental and emotional paralysis that seemed to afflict these traumatized veterans. Why, he wondered, did many of his patients seem so stuck emotionally in their horror that they relived it over and over in flashbacks and nightmares? What kept these men circling round and round on an endless treadmill of memory, unable to step off and resume life? In spite of their obvious suffering, why did they seem so obsessively attached to their traumatic experiences?


In the 25 years since then, the trauma field has gone from obscurity, if not disreputability, to become one of the most clinically innovative and scientifically supported specialties in mental health. Trauma researchers have led the pack in setting off an explosion of knowledge about psychobiology and the interaction of body and mind. And van der Kolk, as much as anyone else in the field, has defined the current framework for understanding trauma.


He’s the author of more than a hundred peer-reviewed scientific papers on subjects such as self-mutilation, dissociation, the therapeutic efficacy of Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR), the developmental impact of trauma, and the nature of traumatic memories. He’s also been a featured contributor in most of the standard textbooks in the trauma field. In addition to teaching at Boston University, Tufts, and Harvard, he directs the Trauma Center in Boston, possibly the largest trauma specialty center in the country, with 40 clinicians working with clients who range from infants to geriatrics, from incest survivors to international torture victims. Inhabiting both the world of the clinician and the researcher, he also runs a major research laboratory at the Trauma Center, staffed by 15 researchers who investigate everything from neuroimaging of treatment effects on the brain to the effects of theater groups on violent, traumatized teenagers.


Glowing testimonials about his contributions aren’t hard to come by from the field’s leading lights. “Very early on, more than anybody else, he introduced neurobiology to the trauma field, and helped us see the interaction between mind and body in trauma,” says Charles Figley, professor at the School of Social Work at Florida State University and Vietnam vet, whose early work on war trauma is often credited with prompting the inclusion of PTSD as a diagnosis in the DSM. “He’s one of the most generative and creative minds in the trauma field, and his influence has been pervasive,” says psychiatrist Judith Herman, renowned trauma expert at Harvard Medical School.


At the same time, van der Kolk is also one of the trauma field’s most controversial figures. Often prickly, rarely shy about offering his own opinions, and unafraid of a good fight, he’s scandalized a number of cognitive-behavioral therapists and academic researchers by openly embracing EMDR, demonstrating an interest in such truly outrĂ© techniques as Thought Field Therapy, enthusiastically taking up nonstandard somatic therapies, and even sending his patients off to participate in theater groups and martial arts training.


Van der Kolk’s bold criticism of the orthodoxies of psychotherapy and public advocacy of somatic approaches have, in particular, outraged many. “Advocating unproven body psychotherapies is professionally irresponsible,” says Edna Foa, professor of psychology in the psychiatry department at the University of Pennsylvania. “He’s marginalized himself as a scientific thinker-he’s no longer in the mainstream,” adds Richard Bryant, noted trauma researcher and psychology professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “Until he provides data in support of his new [somatic] approach, the field isn’t obligated to pay any attention to what he’s doing,” sniffs psychologist Richard McNally, author of the widely cited Remembering Trauma, a critique of recovered-memory theory.


The intensity of response van der Kolk kicks up is an indication of the crusader’s fervor underlying his work and his determination to make the field viscerally understand that trauma isn’t simply a neutral mental health issue, but a profoundly moral concern. Spicing his talks with earthy, Dutch-accented American slang, van der Kolk regularly reminds his audience in a tone of subdued indignation that trauma forces the reality of human evil into our consciousness, often the evil of presumably good and upright people-our neighbors, our leaders, our families, and ourselves. It’s not a perspective people always welcome because, as he writes in his book Traumatic Stress, most of us like to believe “that the world is essentially just, that ‘good’ people are in charge of their lives, and that bad things only happen to ‘bad’ people. . . . Victims are the members of society whose problems represent the memory of suffering, rage and pain in a world that longs to forget.”


A Diagnosis Non Grata
 

While trauma is always clinically described as a horrifically abnormal event, for any casual student of the human condition, it’s actually a perfectly normal feature of history, one that has emotionally scarred billions of men, women, and children since before the beginning of recorded time. And yet, while philosophers, writers, and ordinary people have always known that terrible events can cause a lifetime of psychological pain, until the latter part of the 20th century, mental health professionals were oddly blind to this fact of life. “Psychiatry itself has periodically suffered from marked amnesias in which well-established knowledge has been abruptly forgotten,” writes van der Kolk in Traumatic Stress, “and the psychological impact of overwhelming experiences has been ascribed to constitutional or intrapsychic factors alone.” In other words, a failure to “get over” a trauma was often ascribed to personal weakness or an unconscious desire not to recover.

Even the official nosology of the psychiatric profession reflected this peculiar obtuseness. The 1952 edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I) had included combat-related stress under the diagnosis of “gross stress reaction,” but this was dropped from the DSM-II in 1968-the same year that troop strength reached its peak in Vietnam. All that was left of trauma in DSM-II was the pallid diagnosis “adjustment reaction to adult life,” under the general heading of “transient situational disturbance.” Adjustment reaction was a grab-bag diagnosis, including “fear associated with military combat and manifested by trembling, running and hiding” and “unwanted pregnancy.” It wasn’t until 1980, after years of lobbying and wrangling, that PTSD was included in DSM-III.


So when van der Kolk first went to the VA in 1978, not only was there no official traumatic stress diagnosis, but the VA assumed that any psychiatric problems occurring more than one year after discharge couldn’t be related to military service. Besides denying veterans any compensation for delayed traumatic reactions probably the overriding consideration in the VA’s longstanding lack of interest in the enduring impact of “combat stress”-this rule effectively scotched any research or clinical treatment directly focused on trauma. “When I went to work for the Boston VA,” remembers van der Kolk, “there wasn’t a single book in the library on war neurosis.”


Unable to do research on war trauma because the VA wouldn’t fund studies on a diagnosis that didn’t exist, van der Kolk and his colleagues did the first study ever on the real nightmares the vets had and, in another first, used the Rorschach inkblot test to reveal the twin pattern of hyperarousal and dissociation that traumatized vets showed. For van der Kolk, this research pointed to the paradoxical conundrum at the heart of trauma. “This is still the issue with traumatized people-they see and feel only their trauma, or they see and feel nothing at all; they’re fixated on their traumas or they’re somehow psychically absent.” In either case, traumatic memories from the past have utterly usurped the present.


By the late-1980s, van der Kolk had had extensive experience working with vets and was becoming a well-known figure among PTSD researchers. He’d been responsible for several important studies, including, besides the Rorschach and nightmare papers, research into psychopharmacology and trauma, and had published the book Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Psychological and Biological Sequelae, the first book published specifically about PTSD. But in spite of his impressive re´sume´, he felt deeply discouraged. He’d learned a lot, but he didn’t think he was fundamentally helping his patients. Even after months or years of work, his patients still suffered from flashbacks, nightmares, depression, aggressive rage, anxiety. They still either couldn’t talk about their trauma at all or when he pushed them to talk about it - as he and many therapists often did, and still do - they began hyperventilating, shaking, yelling, crying, became physically agitated, or just collapsed in a state of helpless fear and dread. “I’d become a reputable PTSD researcher and clinician, but I felt I’d utterly failed my patients,” van der Kolk remembers. “I guess they thought I was a good guy, they felt understood by me, but that didn’t necessarily help them to get back into their lives.”


And what was the treatment that he felt was not really helping his patients to move on? It was standard talk therapy 101-helping them explore their thoughts and feelings-supplemented with group therapy and medications. During individual sessions with clients, he often focused intensely on patients’ past traumas, in the interest of getting them to process and integrate their memories. “I very quickly went to people’s trauma, and many of my patients actually got worse rather than better,” he says. “There was an increase in suicide attempts. Some of my colleagues even told me that they didn’t trust me as a therapist.”


The Neurobiology of Trauma
 

The fundamental conundrum of how trauma affects the mind and body that still plays out in treating trauma survivors was already crystallizing in van der Kolk’s mind 20 years ago. “When people get close to reexperiencing their trauma, they get so upset that they can no longer speak,” he says. “It seemed to me then that we needed to find some way to access their trauma, but help them stay physiologically quiet enough to tolerate it, so they didn’t freak out or shut down in treatment. It was pretty obvious that as long as people just sat and moved their tongues around, there wasn’t enough real change.”

Back in the early 1980s, believing that future progress lay in a better understanding of the biology particularly the neurobiology of trauma, van der Kolk had applied for a VA research grant on the subject. Even though PTSD was now “official,” his proposal was turned down flat. The opening sentence of the rejection letter still vividly resonates in his mind. “It’s never been shown that PTSD is relevant to the mission of the Veterans Administration.” Since then, the VA has grown up and become a leading supporter and funder of trauma research, but in the early ’80s, it was clearly a diagnosis non grata to the establishment. Both dumbfounded and enraged by the VA’s response, van der Kolk says he never read past that first sentence, and decided right then to seek greener pastures and put in his notice.


He moved back to the Massachusetts Mental Health Center, a state hospital and psychiatric teaching institution associated with Harvard Medical School, where he’d received his psychiatric training and, before that, had spent a year as a mental health worker on a research ward for unmedicated schizophrenic patients. Here he discovered how easy it is for the best-intentioned therapist to inadvertently make traumatized patients worse. He was struck how some female patients fell apart during personal contacts with him and other male staff, becoming agitated and assaultive. Why would they so suddenly switch from being pleasant and sensible, to losing their minds when a man would pay attention to them? he wondered. Looking into the histories of the women, most of whom had been diagnosed as borderlines or schizophrenics, he found that they’d all been severely and chronically sexually abused as children and adults.


Van der Kolk began to realize that, for these women, being in a room alone with a man who directed questions at them emotionally hurled them back into their traumas. He noted that their entire bodies responded as if they were being molested again-heart pounding, muscles tensing-they seemed, literally, to take leave of their senses-unable to distinguish now from then. “It seemed that their traumatic memories, like those of Vietnam veterans, prevented them from being able to modulate their autonomic arousal,” he observes. “Their physiological housekeeping systems had been messed up by trauma.”


It now seemed to him that chronic trauma explained a great deal about how borderline patients acquired their deep impairments, and why they were so hard for therapists to treat. “Borderlines have a terrible reputation because they often are simply impossible,” says van der Kolk. “They cling to you and then hate you, and, either way, they won’t leave you alone. But if you look at their behavior through their traumatic background, it makes perfect sense. If you’ve been raped and abused for years as a child and adult, your entire organism and personality has been organized around your trauma. If they have PTSD, the way they act is understandable-they’re not just people trying to make your life miserable, but people trying to survive.”


Van der Kolk’s experience with borderlines reinforced his belief that talk therapy by itself, even in the context of a warm, supportive therapeutic encounter, wasn’t enough to reverse the profound physical and emotional changes wrought in his patients by pervasive trauma. But he credits Hurricane Hugo with showing him see just how physical helplessness contributes to the development of serious post-traumatic symptoms, and making him wonder if physical movement might not contribute to healing.


In 1989, directly after Hurricane Hugo had ravaged Puerto Rico, van der Kolk accompanied FEMA officials to lend his expertise to dealing with the traumatic aftermath of the devastating storm. “I arrived in the middle of this devastation, and what I saw were lots and lots of people working with each other, actively putting their lives back together-carrying lumber, rebuilding houses and shops, cleaning up, repairing things.”
 

But the FEMA officials immediately told everybody to cease and desist until assorted bureaucracies could formally assess the damage, establish reimbursement formulas, and organize financial aid and loans. Everything came to a halt. “People were suddenly forced to sit still in the middle of their disaster and do nothing,” van der Kolk remembers. “Very quickly, an enormous amount of violence broke out-rioting, looting, assault. All this energy mobilized by the disaster, which had gone into a flurry of rebuilding and recovery activity, now was turned on everybody else. It was one of the first times I saw very vividly how important it is for people to overcome their sense of helplessness after a trauma by actively doing something. Preventing people from moving when something terrible happens, that’s one of the things that makes trauma a trauma.”

Pondering this striking lesson, van der Kolk wondered if perhaps the most damaging aspect of trauma wasn’t necessarily the awfulness of it, but the feeling of powerlessness in the face of it, the experience of being unable to escape or fight or have any impact on what was happening. “The brain is an action organ,” he says, “and as it matures, it’s increasingly characterized by the formation of patterns and schemas geared to promoting action. People are physically organized to respond to things that happen to them with actions that change the situation.” But when people are traumatized, and can’t do anything to stop it or reverse it or correct it, “they freeze, explode, or engage in irrelevant actions,” he adds. Then, to tame their disorganized, chaotic physiological systems, they start drinking, taking drugs, and engaging in violence-like the looting and assault that took place after Hurricane Hugo. If they can’t reestablish their physical efficacy as a biological organism and recreate a sense of safety, they often develop PTSD.

Monday, June 09, 2014

The Mind–Body Relationship in Psychotherapy: Grounded Cognition as an Explanatory Framework

 

From the open access journal, Frontiers in Psychology: Psychology for Clinical Settings, this is an interesting review article suggesting grounded cognition as the foundation for the mind-body relationship in psychotherapy.

I get that the mainstream is still far behind the leading edge on understanding the mind, but for me, when someone talks about the "mind-body relationship," it's clear that they don't get that the body (including, of course, the brain) IS the mind, or at least part of it (mind is also the relational context to other people, environment, and temporal space).

Anyway, this is an article definitely worth a quick read.


Full Citation: 
Leitan, ND, and Murray, G. (2014, May 20). The mind–body relationship in psychotherapy: grounded cognition as an explanatory framework. Frontiers in Psychology: Psychology for Clinical Settings; 5:472. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00472

The mind–body relationship in psychotherapy: Grounded cognition as an explanatory framework

Nuwan D. Leitan and Greg Murray
Department of Psychological Sciences and Statistics, Faculty of Health, Arts and Design, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, VIC, Australia

Abstract

As a discipline, psychology is defined by its location in the ambiguous space between mind and body, but theories underpinning the application of psychology in psychotherapy are largely silent on this fundamental metaphysical issue. This is a remarkable state of affairs, given that psychotherapy is typically a real-time meeting between two embodied agents, with the goal of facilitating behavior change in one party. The overarching aim of this paper is to problematize the mind–body relationship in psychotherapy in the service of encouraging advances in theory and practice. The paper briefly explores various psychotherapeutic approaches to help explicate relationships between mind and body from these perspectives. Themes arising from this analysis include a tendency toward dualism (separation of mind and body from the conceptualization of human functioning), exclusivism (elimination of either mind or body from the conceptualization of human functioning), or mind–body monism (conceptualization of mind and body as a single, holistic system). We conclude that the literature, as a whole, does not demonstrate consensus, regarding the relationship between mind and body in psychotherapy. We then introduce a contemporary, holistic, psychological conceptualization of the relationship between mind and body, and argue for its potential utility as an organizing framework for psychotherapeutic theory and practice. The holistic approach we explore, “grounded cognition,” arises from a long philosophical tradition, is influential in current cognitive science, and presents a coherent empirically testable framework integrating subjective and objective perspectives. Finally, we demonstrate how this “grounded cognition” perspective might lead to advances in the theory and practice of psychotherapy.

Introduction


As a discipline, psychological science is “mounted above the philosophical gap between mind and body” (Tschacher and Haken, 2007, p. 1). The inherent challenges of this position are clearly seen in psychology’s primary application, psychotherapy (the use of psychological science to improve mental health and wellbeing). The theoretical foundation of psychopathology (the study of the nature and treatment of mental disorders) has been described as akin to that of biology’s before Darwin (Frances and Egger, 1999), and arguably, the elephant in the room is the lack of consensus, both implicit, and explicit, about the relationship between mind and body (Kendler, 2008). Whether expressed as human versus natural sciences, hermeneutic versus positivist methods, or understanding versus explanation, Cartesian or substance dualism (mind and body are two types of substance) is yet to be resolved in psychopathology and psychotherapy. The field is consequently characterized by polarized schools of thought, identifying it as an immature science in Kuhnian terms (Kuhn, 1962).

In the absence of a consensus position on the mind–body relationship, psychotherapists juggle tangible and intangible features of their clients without integrative models (Murray, 2011). It is noteworthy that international guidelines for psychology training programs rarely require a competency around this ontological issue, suggesting that the discipline may have relegated it to the “too hard” basket. Contemporary research across multiple disciplines, however, suggests that the case should be re-opened.

Recent research in philosophy (Clark, 1997; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), cognitive science (Brooks, 1991; Chemero, 2009) and psychology itself (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg and Robertson, 1999) advocates a fundamental reappraisal of the relationship between mind and body. The “embodied cognition” research program has many strands, but all commence with a rejection of the dualistic separation of body and mind (Shapiro, 2011). Here, we propose grounded cognition as an embodied, psychological framework which provides a holistic conceptualization of body and mind. It is our position that articulating the relationship between body and mind from a psychological perspective will provide a consensus position and an organizing framework for the mind–body relationship for psychotherapy research and practice. We contend that this will encourage practitioners to reflect on their assumptions about cognitions and how they conceptualize body and mind in treatment, leading to a better understanding of the tensions between psychotherapy theory and practice and the identification of gaps in existing therapies and consequently an expansion of the range of therapies offered to the patient.

The paper is structured in four sections. First, we briefly consider a range of approaches to psychotherapy through the lens of their apparent assumptions about mind–body. Themes arising from this analysis include a tendency toward an uncritical dualism (separation of mind and body from the conceptualization of human functioning), exclusivism (elimination of either mind or body from the conceptualization of human functioning), or mind–body monism (conceptualization of mind and body as a single, holistic system) and we conclude that the psychotherapy literature, as a whole, does not demonstrate consensus, regarding the relationship between mind and body. We propose that an organizing framework for the mind–body relationship, underpinned by a holistic conceptualization of the relationship, would benefit psychotherapy research and practice. Second, philosophical accounts which portray a holistic mind–body relationship from phenomenological and objective perspectives are outlined. Third, we propose that these perspectives are integrated, psychologically, by “grounded cognition,” constituting a comprehensively articulated, empirically informed, organizing framework for conceptualization of the mind–body relationship in psychotherapy. In the final section we consider how the application of psychological science in psychotherapy might advance through a thoroughgoing consideration of “grounded cognition.”

Mind–Body Assumptions Underlying Current Psychotherapies


There is no agreed taxonomy of psychological therapies (e.g., Kahl et al., 2012; Tschacher et al., 2014), but to achieve an adequate coverage of existing approaches for the present purposes, we categorise psychotherapies into five fuzzy-bordered groups: psychoanalysis, behavioral therapies, cognitive therapies, mindfulness-based therapies, and body psychotherapies. Each of these has many branches and extensive literatures – thus, in this brief review we aim only to explore different ideas regarding the relationship between mind and body from within each approach, and across approaches, rather than attempting to assign particular conceptualizations of the mind–body relationship to particular approaches.

Psychoanalysis

Although psychoanalytic theory and practice have fallen out of favor in contemporary psychological science, aspects of Freud’s thinking can still be discerned in current psychotherapy (Dowd, 2004). An important aspect of psychoanalytic theory is the “cognitive unconscious,” or the “unconscious mind.” In opposition to the popular enlightenment view at the time, Freud argued that behavior is driven by unconscious motivations and drives, rather than rational choice (Luborsky et al., 2008; Wolitzky, 2011). As discussed by Luborsky et al. (2008), central therapeutic strategies of psychoanalysis include free association (expressing any thoughts which come to mind during therapy), therapeutic listening and responding (examining the content and emotion of thought), and interpretation (drawing inferences about unconscious underpinnings of conscious experience).

However, the body also figures strongly in psychoanalytic theory. For Freud, structures of the mind (e.g., id, ego, superego) arise out of tensions between the organism’s bodily drives and societal structures (Muller and Tillman, 2007). This is reflected in the psychoanalytic conception of psychosomatic illness, which was the idea that emotions and unconscious desires caused bodily symptoms; for example Gregor Groddeck, a psychoanalyst who developed Freud’s ideas about psychosomatic illness proposed that a tumorous abdominal growth could result from a warded-off unconscious wish to be pregnant. Furthermore it has been suggested that the “ego,” in psychoanalysis, commences as an embodied entity, and emphasizes the continuity between animals and humans, suggesting a monist, or holistic mind–body conceptualization (Muller and Tillman, 2007).

Behavior Therapy

Traditional behavior therapy arose in an American setting in the early 1950s and saw a shift from the psychoanalytical ideas of studying the mind to the pragmatic, evidence-based study of behavior (Dowd, 2004). This shift was triggered by J. B. Watson’s criticism of subjectivity and mentalism as the subject matter of psychology and his advocacy of the objective study of behavior. This was followed by the advent of “modern learning theory,” which referred to the principles of classical and operant conditioning. These early ideas underlying traditional behavior therapy were exclusivist, rejecting the notion of mind and cognition, on the grounds that they are unobservable entities and therefore unfit for scientific study (Wilson, 2008; Zinbarg and Griffith, 2008).

However, later theories stemming from behaviorism developed a more complex account of the mind–body relationship. For example, Bandura (1977) spoke of a reciprocal determination between behavior and the environment, stating that “it is largely through their actions that people produce the environmental conditions that affect their behavior in a reciprocal fashion” (p. 345). Bandura also seemed to encourage conceptualization of the mind as a part of the same system as behavior and environment, for example, “…experiences generated by behavior also partly determine what individuals think, expect, and can do, which in turn affects their subsequent behavior” (p. 345).

This holistic conceptualization of the mind–body relationship is also apparent in popular behavior therapies for children with autism spectrum disorder, such as music therapy, Floortime, rhythm therapy, and reciprocal imitation training which are broadly underpinned by behavioral and functional developmental approaches (Greenspan and Wieder, 1999; Ingersoll and Schreibman, 2006; Overy, 2008; Vismara and Rogers, 2010; Srinivasan and Bhat, 2013). For example, reciprocal imitation training teaches children the spontaneous social use of imitation, which as targeted at attention, language and communication cognitions (Ingersoll and Schreibman, 2006) and Floortime utilizes child-led playful interactions, experiential problem-solving interactions and motor, sensory and spatial play, which is targeted at language and other cognitive skills (Greenspan and Weider, 1997).

Cognitive Therapy

With the advent of the cognitive revolution, pure behavioral therapies begun to fade out in favor of cognitive therapies, which followed the prominent model of human functioning at the time; computational theory (Hayes et al., 1999). Computational theory conceptualized the body as an “input-output device,” or the “hardware,” and the mind as the “central processor,” the “software,” or the “controller” (Shapiro, 2007). Due to their concurrent rise, articulation of the relationship between mind and body in cognitive therapy has been influenced by this computational perspective (Dowd, 2004).

Cognitive therapies are defined by their elevation of the cognitive system in the adjustment of information processing and initiation of positive change (Beck and Weishaar, 2008). This perspective is fundamental to a family of theories underpinning cognitive therapy, including those of Ellis (1962) and Beck (1967). Beck’s (1967) cognitive theory remains one of the most influential to this day, in particular his major contribution to cognitive therapy, the cognitive model (Triad) of depression. This model suggests that depression is underpinned by automatic, negative thoughts about the self, others and the world. Beck contends that these negative cognitions also activate negative motivational, behavioral, emotional, and physical symptoms (Beck and Weishaar, 2008). Thus, for Beck and his contemporaries, it is implied that the mind should be the primary target of psychotherapy.

One of Ellis’ major contributions to cognitive therapy was the A-B-C method used in his rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT). The A-B-C method challenged the assumption that when a consequence (C) follows and activating event (A), A causes C. Ellis posited a cognitive construct, beliefs (B), which he argued was the greatest determinate of (C). Thus, the idea was that (C) could be modified by (B), even if (A) remains stable (Dowd, 2004; Ellis, 2008). Ellis’ REBT explicitly considered the importance of content of the “mind” (i.e., thinking, feeling, wanting etc.), and of operations of the “body” (i.e., behavior). However, the relationship between mind and body was conceptualized in terms of cognitive modification to change behavior or behavior change to modify thought (Ellis, 2008). Thus, despite acknowledgment of both mind and body, REBT, akin to Beck’s cognitive therapy, implies a dualist conception of their relationship.

Mindfulness-Based Psychotherapies

Recently, there has been an influx of so-called “third wave” psychotherapies which have their roots in learning theory and are held together by their subordination of content-oriented cognitive interventions (Kahl et al., 2012). One of the key features of some of these psychotherapies (e.g., Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy etc.) is their focus on “mindfulness.” One of the features of mindfulness as applied in psychological therapies is to develop an awareness of the present experience by self-regulating attention to momentary sensations, thoughts, and feelings (Keng et al., 2011). Thus, in contrast to standard cognitive and behavioral therapies, one of the aims of mindfulness-based psychotherapies is to increase awareness of the body.

Awareness is contrasted with “thinking” during mindfulness exercises such as breathing meditation (Michalak et al., 2012). Awareness is not about cognition but more about feeling; and the body is seen as the reference point for awareness. Thus changes in cognitions (e.g., restricting rumination) following mindfulness practices are bought about by becoming more aware of the body, without referring to cognitive dominion (i.e., conscious thought) to bring about this awareness (Burg and Michalak, 2011). It is difficult to articulate the relationship between mind and body implied by mindfulness-based psychotherapies due to two reasons. First, awareness is not conceptualized as a cognitive feature, but may still be a feature of the “mind.” Second, the body is not conceptualized as a physical agent of change like behavior is assumed to influence cognition in cognitive behavior therapy (CBT); rather it is awareness of the body which is the agent of change in mindfulness-based therapies. These questions illustrate some of the issues which arise when dualistic thinking is reflected upon carefully.

Body Psychotherapy

Body psychotherapy (BP) refers to a variety of schools (e.g., dance/movement therapy, analytical body psychotherapy, concentrative movement therapy etc.) which share the aim of enhancing self-awareness, modifying behavior, and facilitating insight-oriented psychological problem solving via a mode of action concerning perceptive/self-awareness, affective-cathartic, interactive, and/or movement oriented therapy (Röhricht, 2009). Although, there have been randomized controlled trials (RCTs) conducted for some schools of body psychotherapies, they are not empirically supported to the same extent that cognitive and behavioral therapies have been (Röhricht, 2009). In practice, BP primarily works on releasing and re-shaping somatic memories in order to release associated psychological constraints (Totton, 2003). The theoretical foundation for BP has been explained as the way “core beliefs are embodied, and that until we begin to experience the pain held in them directly through our bodies they will continue to run our lives” (Staunton, 2002, p. 4).

The practice of BP implies a very close relationship between body and mind, to the point that they are seemingly undifferentiated during therapy. BP has been described as being fundamentally underpinned by an explicit theory of mind–body functioning which assumes a functional unity between body and mind in which there is no separation or hierarchical relationship between the two (www.eabp.org).

Summary

This brief review exposes a lack of consensus, both implicit and explicit, regarding the mind–body relationship across psychotherapeutic approaches. Themes arising from this analysis include a tendency toward dualism (separation of mind and body from the conceptualization of human functioning), exclusivism (elimination of either mind or body from the conceptualization of human functioning), or mind–body monism (conceptualization of mind and body as a single, holistic system). It is our position that psychotherapeutic research and practice would benefit from an organizing framework for the mind–body relationship, which could be applied across all psychotherapies. Recent research in philosophy (Clark, 1997; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), cognitive science (Brooks, 1991; Chemero, 2009) and psychology itself (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg and Robertson, 1999) suggests that this framework should be underpinned by a holistic conceptualization of the mind–body relationship.

Embodied cognition offers a psychological framework underpinned by a holistic conceptualisation of the mind–body relationship. Some of the abovementioned psychotherapies which have implied a holistic mind–body perspective have already started to draw on embodied cognition and related ideas. For example, Totton (2009) has recently highlighted the utility of drawing on embodiment from a social perspective to enhance the practice of body psychotherapy, while Michalak et al. (2012) has described how embodied cognition could describe some of the processes involved in mindfulness. Before describing the psychological framework of embodied cognition, it is important to briefly examine its philosophical underpinnings which form the foundation for its conceptualisation of a holistic mind–body relationship, from both phenomenological and objective perspectives.

Holistic Mind–Body Philosophies


Merleau-Ponty’s Lived-Body

Edmund Husserl developed the philosophical approach of phenomenology as a reaction to his concern that the assumptions of naturalistic, Western science about the nature of the mind, body, and world had caused it to miss fundamental questions about human nature (Marcum, 2004). He argued that primary consideration should be given to the subject’s experience in the world, before studying the mind, body, and world objectively (Marcum, 2004; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007). Husserl’s argument was progressed by Merleau-Ponty, who proposed that this would both uncover the subjective element of knowledge, which was being overlooked by naturalistic sciences, and provide a stronger framework for its enquiries (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007). Thus, phenomenology does not provide a mechanistic account of mind in the vein of naturalism, or psychological and biological accounts because it focuses on giving a proper description of humans’ experience in life, rather than attempting to forge an objective account of mind (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007; Marshall, 2008).

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology argues for the prioritization of the subjective, lived-body in cognition and more specifically that cognitions cannot be understood without reference to the body which engages with the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1965; Marshall, 2008). Merleau-Ponty provides a comprehensive theory of the “lived-body,” or the “subject-body,” contrasting it to the “thing-body,” or the “object-body” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1965; Marshall, 2008). The subject-body can be considered the body experienced from a first-person perspective which acts on the world, whereas the object-body can be considered the body as an object of the world experienced from a third-person perspective. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the subject-body in cognition, implying that humans fundamentally are, and thus should be studied as embodied beings who form cognitions via interaction in the world with their bodies, rather than cognition as an activity of the “mind” which utilizes the object-body (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1965; Borrett et al., 2000; Matthews, 2004).

Dewey’s Principle of Continuity

In contrast to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach, an alternative holistic account of the mind–body relationship starts from an objective position. American pragmatism offers an objective, philosophical account of a holistic mind and body in the form of naturalism (Johnson, 2006). As Horst (2002) explicates, there have been various definitions and strands of naturalism. The account we refer to in this section aligns with the Darwinian paradigm and, more specifically with physicalism, emergence, and supervenience (Harbecke, 2013; Montero, 2013; McLaughlin and Bennett, 2014).

This form of naturalism is committed to an account in which all things in the world, including body and mind are natural or naturally emergent (Horst, 2002; Aikin, 2006). In turn, it posits that all explanation should be causal and reducible to natural explanations and is consequently committed to the study of the person as an object and the natural evolution of all human functions (Aikin, 2006; Johnson, 2006). One account of naturalism, from this emergent, supervenient perspective is Dewey’s “principle of continuity” (Dewey, 1981, 1991).

The principle of continuity posits that there is no break in experience between the processes of perceiving, feeling, moving, and thinking; instead they are levels of organic functioning from which higher function emerges. It describes three levels of organization: the “physical” level of inanimate material processes; the “psycho-physical” level of living things which have needs, interests, and satisfactions; and the “mental” level of organisms which can perform higher level cognitions. The principle explains the progression from the physical level to the level of the mind without introducing new ontological entities, structures, or forces. Dewey argues that new organization is the reason that organisms with minds can do things which psycho-physical entities cannot do, and why psycho-physical entities can do things which physical entities cannot do. Thus, according to Dewey, what we refer to as “mind” is a complex new organization of what we refer to as “body,” but they are in essence the same entity. According to the principle of continuity, what is termed “mind” and “body” are simply ways to identify aspects of the organism–environment interaction which have arisen from an organic process (Dewey, 1981, 1991; Johnson, 2006, 2007).

Phenomenology and Naturalism as Complementary Approaches

Phenomenology is committed to describing subjective experience, which is where meaning putatively arises for humans, while naturalism as characterized here provides an objective explanation of how meaning arises ontogenetically, organically and biologically, independent of the personal experience of the individual (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007; Marshall, 2008). As Aikin (2006, p. 326) puts it “Lovers may love, and pains may pain, but the naturalistic perspective can attend only to the lovers, not their love; to the pains, but not their feelings of pain.” Similarly, the phenomenological perspective can attend only to the love, not the lovers and to the feelings of pain rather than the pains. Thus, phenomenologists can provide to naturalists, psychologists and neuroscientists a more precise model of the phenomenon which they attempt to explain than they would if they were to start only with an “objective” scientific theory of cognition (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007). Thus, phenomenology and naturalism are contrasting, but complementary approaches (Aikin, 2006; Zahavi, 2010).

Accordingly, the different directions from which Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Dewey’s principle of continuity approach the question of the relationship between mind and body are complementary, providing ultimately a more comprehensive, pluralistic understanding of the holistic mind–body relationship. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account can inform Dewey’s objective account of how a person experiences the holistic mind–body described in his theory.

Thus, a philosophical integration of these perspectives may be possible (Zahavi, 2010), but our aim here is to provide a framework for psychotherapeutic research and practice. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a psychological account which integrates subjective and objective perspectives of a holistic mind–body relationship. We propose that grounded cognition provides such a framework.

Grounded Cognition as a Psychological Framework Reflecting a Holistic Mind–Body Relationship


Embodied cognition is a research program consisting of a number of accounts and topics, held together by the underlying assumption that the body functions as a constituent of the mind rather than a perceiver and actor serving the mind, thus being directly, and subjectively involved in cognition (Borrett et al., 2000; Shapiro, 2007). Different accounts of embodied cognition provide various models of this underlying assumption, so it is useful to focus on one to explore the holistic conceptualization of body and mind and how it aligns with the principles of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Dewey’s principle of continuity.

“Grounded cognition” reflects the underlying embodied cognition assumption by proposing that cognition is derived from, and dependent on, bodily interactions with the world which are represented in the brain (Barsalou, 2008). Grounded cognition has been comprehensively articulated and critiqued in the literature (Barsalou, 1999, 2008), has a strong empirical foundation (e.g., Schubert, 2005; Chandler and Schwarz, 2009; Jostmann et al., 2009; Natanzon and Ferguson, 2012 etc.) and most importantly, clearly explicates the holistic relationship of body and mind, aligning with both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Dewey’s principle of continuity as considered next.

Grounded cognition is underpinned by two major assumptions, namely that cognition is dependent on the body’s interaction with the world and that these interactions are represented in the brain (Barsalou, 2008). Grounded cognition’s first assumption is illustrated neatly by Shapiro (2011) in considering the concept of a morel mushroom for Sally, a mycologist, Charles, a provencal chef, and Lucy, a young child. Sally conceptualizes a morel as an epigenous ascocarp, Charles conceptualizes a morel as a delicacy to be sautĂ©ed with butter, and Lucy conceptualizes a morel as the yucky thing she has to eat before being allowed dessert. Thus, each according to their bodily experiences with morels forms different conceptualizations of it. However, these concepts are not determinate: for example, if Lucy grows up to become a mycologist, her concept of a morel would be more similar to Sally’s. Furthermore, it is important to note that there is nothing stopping Sally, Charles, and Lucy from having the same concept for a morel, it is simply their differing bodily interactions with the morel which has determined their conceptualizations. Finally, it can be assumed that they have the same visual conceptualization of a morel; they all know one when they see it. However, if Lucy were to have been born blind, she would never be able to obtain the same concept of a morel as Sally and Charles. Thus, grounded cognition aligns with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology by emphasizing the importance of subjective body-in-the-world experience for cognition (Johnson, 2006).

The second major assumption of grounded cognition is that the body’s relationship with the world is represented in the brain (Barsalou, 2008). Theories within grounded cognition differ on how these bodily interactions are represented in the brain, with some theories positing “image schemas” of bodily interactions in the world which are proposed to underpin abstract conceptual knowledge (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). However, most grounded cognition theories propose “simulations,” which are neural reconstructions of experience using representations contained in modal systems of the brain (Glenberg, 1997; e.g., the sensorimotor system; Barsalou, 1999; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). Thus grounded cognition is also consistent with Dewey’s principle of continuity in that from an objective, neuroscientific perspective, cognitions are emergent from, and inextricably intertwined with the body.

In sum, grounded cognition implies that cognition is emergent from and inextricably tied to the subjective, lived, experience of the body-in-the-world. Thus, “mind” and “body” only function as labels attached to properties of human functioning which we perceive as originating either mentally or physically. Conceiving of the relationship between body and mind from this holistic, psychological perspective can be expected to have a number of important implications for psychotherapy theory and practice.


Implications for Psychotherapy Theory and Practice


First, a holistic conceptualization of the mind–body relationship leads to a better understanding of the tensions between psychotherapy theory and practice. When the mind–body relationship is conceptualized from a dualist or exclusivist perspective, a tension is created between the phenomenological needs of the patient who is present mind and body and the emphasis on either mind or body according to the theoretical assumptions of the psychotherapy practiced by the therapist. One example of this is the de-emphasis of the body during the practice of psychotherapies whose underlying theory disembodies the mind. During such therapies (e.g., cognitive therapy), touch is purposefully excluded from therapeutic practice since the mind is conceptualized as the agent of change, even though therapeutic practice could possibly be enhanced by touch (Feltham, 2008).

Second, a psychologically articulated, holistic framework for the mind–body relationship encourages theoretical reflection about this relationship by challenging dualist and exclusivist assumptions inherent in some psychotherapies. In turn, this helps to clarify some of the points of difference between the psychotherapies described above. Numerous psychotherapies discussed in “Mind–Body Assumptions Underlying Current Psychotherapies,” have similar theoretical background and similar therapeutic practices. An example of this is traditional behavioral therapy and body psychotherapy. Both emphasize the body and conceptualize it as the agent of change and as a consequence, both prioritize the body in therapy. One of the primary differences between the two can be ascertained by reflecting on the mind–body relationship. Traditional behavior therapy is very much exclusivist, dismissing the mind and cognition and emphasizing the body and behavior, both methodologically and theoretically. Contrastingly, body psychotherapy recognizes cognitions whilst treating them via the body, thus implying a holistic conceptualization of mind and body.

Third, a holistic conceptualization of the mind–body relationship has the potential to further de-stigmatize mental illness (Thomas, 2013; Ungar and Knaak, 2013a,b). Ungar and Knaak (2013a) suggest that dismissive and blaming attitudes toward mental health issues can be attributed to the absence of an organic explanation for most mental health issues. Thomas (2013) suggests that promoting mental illness to non-psychiatric health professionals as an interaction between cognitive, behavioral, emotional, biological, and environmental factors would reduce dualistic thinking around mental health issues and help with de-stigmatization in these settings. The psychologically articulated, holistic conceptualization of the mind–body relationship presented here elaborates on Thomas’ idea by conceptualizing cognitive, behavioral, emotional, biological, and environmental factors as part of the same functional system, implying that “organic” causes are inseparable from “mental” causes. Thus, we propose that the holistic conceptualization of the mind–body relationship presented here will further help with de-stigmatization of mental illness in non-psychiatric settings.

Fourth, the clearly articulated, explicit position of a holistic mind–body portrayed by grounded cognition encourages a more reflective approach to the issue in practice. Theories underlying most current psychotherapies do not explicitly state their position regarding the relationship between mind and body. Consequently, practitioners unreflectively adopt the assumptions inherent in the psychotherapies they utilize. The clear articulation of a holistic mind–body from both phenomenological and objective perspectives may assist practitioners to reflect on this relationship. For example, from a grounded cognition perspective “mind” and “body” are only labels attached to properties of human functioning which we perceive as originating either mentally or physically. The issue for psychotherapy practice is that in using these labels with patients, they automatically divide psychopathologies into arbitrary categories and thus portray dualist or exclusivist agendas. This then restricts the patient’s conceptualization of what the psychopathology is and how to manage it. A grounded cognition perspective would encourage a broader language around psychopathologies as disorders of the “system,” whether the symptoms are perceived as mental or physical. This will encourage the patient to focus on the holistic nature of their symptoms during treatment, as opposed to the idea that some treatments are behavioral/bodily and others are mind/cognitive. This is but one example of changes which may come of reflecting on the mind–body relationship in practice.

Finally, a new perspective on the mind–body relationship will guide the identification of gaps in existing therapies and consequently promote an expansion of the range of therapies offered to the patient. For example, grounded cognition implies that one way to change cognitions is through the subjective, lived, bodily experience of the individual. Encouraging practitioners to reflect on a holistic mind–body approach may result in a wider range of therapies they can offer their patients stemming from this idea. Further development of these ideas may also result in the creation of new and innovative therapeutic methods to augment those already in existence.

Conclusion


Psychological science sits awkwardly between mind and body, and its application in psychotherapy inherits this awkwardness in a lack of clarity about how therapists should conceptualize their patients. By reviewing how mind and body are traditionally understood in major psychotherapies, we have attempted to underscore some of the tensions in this area. By introducing and outlining grounded cognition as a holistic psychological approach consistent with both radically subjectivist (Merleau-Ponty) and objectivist (Dewey) philosophical approaches, we hope to have proposed a new way forward for theorists and practitioners of psychotherapy. This new way forward throws light on the relationship between existing psychotherapies, the relationship between theory and practice, and highlights opportunities for new approaches to psychotherapy.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Friday, April 18, 2014

Shrink Rap Radio #399 – Trauma and The Body with Pat Ogdon PhD

book cover

This week's episode of the Shrink Rap Radio podcast features Pat Ogden, the founder behind Sensorimotor Psychotherapy. Her first, landmark book is Trauma and the Body: A Sensorimotor Approach to Psychotherapy (2006). Her second book, Sensorimotor Psychotherapy: Interventions for Trauma and Attachment, is due out in spring, 2014

Shrink Rap Radio #399 – Trauma and The Body with Pat Ogdon PhD

Posted on April 17, 2014
A psychology podcast by David Van Nuys, Ph.D.



Pat Ogden, Ph.D. is a pioneer in somatic psychology and the Founder and Educational Director of the Sensorimotor Psychotherapy® Institute, an internationally recognized school specializing in somatic–cognitive approaches for the treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder and attachment disturbances. She is co-founder of the Hakomi Institute, a clinician, consultant, international lecturer and trainer, and first author of Trauma and the Body: A Sensorimotor Approach to Psychotherapy. Her second book, Sensorimotor Psychotherapy: Interventions for Trauma and Attachment, due out in spring, 2014, is a practical guide to integrate Sensorimotor Psychotherapy® interventions into the treatment of trauma and attachment issues. Dr. Ogden is currently developing Sensorimotor Psychotherapy® for children, adolescents and families with colleagues.

Check out the following Psychology CE Courses based on listening to Shrink Rap Radio interviews:
copyright 2014: David Van Nuys, Ph.D.

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Tuesday, April 15, 2014

Laurence Heller, PhD - The NeuroAffective Relational Model™

 

As I finish reading Healing Developmental Trauma: How Early Trauma Affects Self-Regulation, Self-Image, and the Capacity for Relationship, by Laurence Heller, PhD, I find myself trying to find a way to do a more in-depth training in the The NeuroAffective Relational Model™ for working with developmental trauma, which is something I see in about 75% (or more) of my clients.

Here are some resources online - a nearly 2-hour video introduction to the model, a written introduction from his personal page, and then an interview he did with Dr. David Nuys on Shrink Rap Radio last December.

Enjoy!

Here is a video talk by Dr, Laurence Heller giving an introduction to the NeuroAffective Relational Model™ of healing development trauma:


Here is the introduction to NARM from Dr. Heller's website:

The NeuroAffective Relational Model™
[NARM]
Mindful Self-Regulation in Clinical Practice


In recent years the role of self-regulation has become an important part of psychological thinking.
The NeuroAffective Relational Model™ (NARM) brings the current understanding of self-regulation into clinical practice. This resource-oriented, non-regressive model emphasizes helping clients establish connection to the parts of self that are organized, coherent and functional. It helps bring into awareness and organization the parts of self that are disorganized and dysfunctional without making the regressed, dysfunctional elements the primary theme of the therapy.

Core Principles
The NeuroAffective Relational Model™ focuses on the fundamental tasks and functional unity of biological and psychological development. The NARM model:

• Integrates both a nervous system based and a relational orientation.
• Brings developmentally-informed clinical interventions that use somatic mindfulness and an orientation to resources to anchor self-regulation in the nervous system.
• Works clinically with the link between psychological issues and the body by helping access the body’s self-regulatory capacities and by supporting nervous system re-regulation.
• Uses mindful inquiry into the deeper identifications and counter-identifications that we take to be our identity.
In the NARM approach, we work simultaneously with the physiology and the psychology of individuals who have experienced developmental trauma, and focus on the interplay between issues of identity and the capacity for connection and regulation.

NARM uses four primary organizing principles:

• Supporting connection and organization
• Exploring identity
• Working in present time
• Regulating the nervous system
Five Organizing Developmental Themes
There are five developmental life themes and associated core resources that are essential to our capacity for self-regulation and affect our ability to be present to self and others in the here-and-now:

• Connection. We feel that we belong in the world. We are in touch with our body and our emotions and capable of consistent connection with others.
• Attunement. Our ability to know what we need and to recognize, reach out for, and take in the abundance that life offers.
• Trust. We have an inherent trust in ourselves and others. We feel safe enough to allow a healthy interdependence with others.
• Autonomy. We are able to say no and set limits with others. We speak our mind without guilt or fear.
• Love-Sexuality. Our heart is open and we are able to integrate a loving relationship with a vital sexuality.
To the degree that these five basic needs are met, we experience regulation and connection. We feel safe and trusting of our environment, fluid and connected to ourselves and others. We experience a sense of regulation and expansion. To the degree that these basic needs are not met, we develop survival styles to try to manage the disconnection and dysregulation. 


A Fundamental Shift
Whereas much of psychodynamic psychotherapy has been oriented toward identifying pathology and focusing on problems, NARM is a model for therapy and growth that emphasizes working with strengths as well as with symptoms. It orients towards resources, both internal and external, in order to support the development of an increased capacity for self regulation.

At the heart of what may seem like a wide range of physical and emotional symptoms, most psychological and many of physiological problems can be traced to a disturbance in one or more of the five organizing developmental themes related to the survival styles.

Initially, survival styles are adaptive, representing success, not pathology. However, because the brain uses the past to predict the future, these survival patterns remain fixed in our nervous system and create an adaptive but false identity. It is the persistence of survival styles appropriate to the past that distorts present experience and creates symptoms. These survival patterns, having outlived their usefulness, create ongoing disconnection from our authentic self and from others.

In NARM the focus is less on why a person is the way they are and more on how their survival style distorts what they are experiencing in the present moment. Understanding how patterns began can be helpful to the client but is primarily useful to the degree that these patterns have become survival styles that influence present experience.

The Metaprocess
Each therapeutic tradition has an implicit metaprocess. The metaprocess teaches clients to pay attention to certain elements of their experience and to ignore others. When therapies focus on deficiency, pain, and dysfunction, clients become skilled at orienting toward deficiency, pain, and dysfunction. Focusing on the difficulties of the past does not sufficiently reduce dysfunction nor support self-regulation.

The metaprocess for the NARM model is the mindful awareness of self in the present moment. The client is invited into a fundamental process of inquiry:

“What are the patterns that are preventing me from being present to myself and others at this moment and in my life?”
We explore this question on the following levels of experience: cognitive, emotional, felt sense, and physiological. NARM explores personal history to the degree that patterns from the past interfere with being present and in contact with self and others in the here-and-now. It brings an active process of inquiry to clients’ relational and survival styles, building on their strengths and helping them to experience a sense of agency in the difficulties of their current life.

The NARM metaprocess involves two aspects of mindfulness:

• Somatic mindfulness
• Mindful awareness of the organizing principles of one’s adaptive survival styles
Using a dual awareness that is anchored in the present moment, a person becomes mindful of cognitive, emotional, and physiological patterns that began in the past while not falling into the trap of making the past more important than the present. Working with the NARM approach progressively reinforces the connection to self in the present moment. Tracking the process of connection/disconnection, regulation/dysregulation in present time helps clients connect with their sense of agency and feel less like victims of their childhood.

Using resource-oriented techniques that work with subtle shifts in the nervous system adds significant effectiveness. Working with the nervous system is fundamental in disrupting the predictive tendencies of the brain. It is connection to our body and to other people that brings healing re-regulation. Using techniques that support increased connection with self and others is instrumental in supporting effective re-regulation.

Bottom-Up and Top-Down
There are continual loops of information going in both directions from the body to the brain and from the brain to the body. There are similar loops within the lower and higher structures of the brain, that is between the brain stem, limbic system, and cortex.
NARM uses both top-down and bottom-up approaches. Top-down approaches emphasize cognitions and emotions as the primary focus. Bottom-up approaches, on the other hand, focus on the body, the felt sense and the instinctive responses as they are mediated through the brain stem toward higher levels of brain organization. Using both bottom-up and top-down orientations greatly expands therapeutic options.

Working with the Life Force
The spontaneous movement in all of us is toward connection and health. No matter how withdrawn and isolating we have become, or how serious the trauma we have experienced, on the deepest level, just as a plant spontaneously moves towards the sun, there is in each of us an impulse moving toward connection. This organismic impulse is the fuel of The NeuroAffective Relational Model™.

~ Copyright 2009-2012, Laurence Heller
Dr. Heller was a guest on Dr. David Van Nuys' Shrink Rap Radio back in December of 2013 - I am pretty sure I posted that talk here already, but here is the link again, as well as a link to the transcript if you'd rather read the interview.