Yolles & Fink: Personality, Pathology and Mindsets (3 Parts)

I've only read the first part of this three-part series, but it seems interesting and somewhat aligned with some of my own views. There is little I can say about it that you can't read in the abstract and in the Introduction (included below).

Personality, Pathology and Mindsets: Part 1 – Agency, Personality and Mindscapes

Personality, Pathology and Mindsets: Part 2 – Cultural Traits and Enantiomers

Personality, Pathology and Mindsets: Part 3 – Pathologies and Corruption

• Maurice Yolles - John Moores University - Centre for the Creation of Coherent Change and Knowledge (C4K)
• Gerhard Fink - IACCM International Association for Cross Cultural Competence and Management

Kybernetes; 43(1): 92-112; 2014

Abstract:

Purpose – This paper aims to develop a new socio-cognitive theory of the normative personality of a plural agency like, for instance, an organisation or a political system. This cybernetic agency theory is connected to Bandura’s theory of psychosocial function. The agency is adaptive and has a normative personality that operates through three formative personality traits, the function of which is control. The cybernetic agency theory is presented as a meta-model, which comes from cybernetic "living systems" theory.

Design/methodology/approach – First, in this paper, the authors discuss the virtues of a normative cybernetic agency model in the light of issues related to normal states and pathologies of systems. Formative traits could be derived from Maruyama’s mindscape theory or Harvey’s typology.

However, Boje has noted that with four mindscape types Maruyama’s typology is constrained. Consequently, he projected the Maruyama mindscapes into a space with the three Foucault- imensions: knowledge, ethics and power.

Findings – The suggested cybernetic agency model with the three formative personality traits can provide a framing for a structural model that has the potential to distinguish between normal and abnormal personalities in the same framework.

Research limitations/implications – The constraints of the Maruyama mindscape space, as identified by Boje, are suggesting that further research is needed to identify a formative three-trait- ystem which is theory based, was empirically applied, and is permitting to create a typology with eight extreme types, yet to be identified.

Originality/value – The paper draws on earlier work undertaken in the last few years by the same authors, who in a new way are pursuing new directions and extensions of that earlier research.

Here is the Introduction to Part One of this article.

Introduction

Our interest in this paper lies in coherent adaptable agencies having personalities that drive their behaviour, and the nature and consequences of the pathologies that they experience. These agencies may be individuals or social collectives, the distinction between them being that the latter operates through normative attributes that are created by the social collective of individuals, and are self-regulated and cohesive through their adhesion to the norms of a given culture. Yolles (2009) has examined the social collective in terms of its “collective mind”, thereby relating more closely psychology and social psychology. As such he has explored the social collective in relation to its ability to behave as a singular cognitive entity, and just like an individual person has collective social psychological conditions that are equivalent to, but will have additional mechanisms from, the psychology of individuals. Both are agents of behaviour with cognitive processes, the former being composed of a collection of individuals that operates as a coherent unit through norms, and the latter a unitary person.

Having related the individual with the social, our focus centres on more complex but more or less transparent plural agencies, i.e. social collectives (e.g. organisations and nations). They are durable and develop behaviour by virtue of their cognitive and existential attributes. In such an agency individuals and their empirical psychology create collective cognitive and existential processes, and as such there is a broad relationship between the social psychology of collectives and the psychology of the individual. Agencies also can respond to their environments and adapt, and are able to survive despite the fact they are likely to have pathologies that impact on their operative capabilities. Agency pathologies are conditions of organisational ill-health that:

• may be constituted as faults in the interconnection between the parts of the organisation;
• are inhibiters of organisational coherence; and
• can prevent the parts from autonomously regulating their collective existence.

They limit an agency from operating in a way that enables it to:

• be effective;
• implement its wants and needs; and
• behave effectively.

Pathology can create lacks in an ability to perform properly through poor: (a) management; (b) procedures; (g) communications; and (d) the development of aspirations and motivation. Pathologies can more easily arise in an authoritarian management style in which there is:

• a high degree of central control;
• little communication;
• single voice (mono-vocal) top-down management;
• limited scope for individual initiative with an orientation towards obedience and the provision of orders;
• centralised decision-making process that tend to be repetitive;
• reluctance to start innovative processes;
• high degrees of conformity; and
• high level of resistance to change.

Pathologies occur when individuals and groups in a social agency are prevented from autonomously regulating their collective existence in a way that opposes their capacity to operate successfully and adapt. The pathologies may be considered to cause varying degrees of dysfunction, the degree determining the intensity or density of the pathologies being experienced. Such dysfunctions affect not only and agency’s orientation, but the way in which it operates as a whole. So pathology can be important in the provision of an understanding of why particular types of behaviour are manifested, and how they may be dealt with where they represent important degrees of ill-health or unfitness or dysfunction. Following Yolles (2009), two orientations of pathology can be identified: internal directed or endogenous and externally directed or exogenous. Endogenous pathologies can cause social abnormalities like neuroses and dysfunctions (Kets de Vries, 1991) that can interfere with the way the agency performs its tasks, while exogenous pathologies, i.e. those directed towards the environment, can result in sociopathic behaviour. Having appropriate agency models can improve our ability to understand the nature of the social psychology and can provide an entry into how its pathologies may be “treated”. One of our interests in this paper is therefore to develop a modelling approach for the collective agency that can lead to explanations of how the pathologies of an organisation can be harmful not only to the collective itself, but also potentially to the social environments in which they exist.

Normative personalities are seen to be social psychological entities. They are embedded within an agency that can be connected with an intensity or density of pathologies. Ordered personalities have a low density of pathologies, and very disordered personalities have a high density, the latter traditionally being seen as the result of an unbalanced personality (Sane, 2012). Janowsky et al. (1998) have studied individuals with personality disorders – that is, personalities with a relatively high density of pathologies. They have used at least two approaches to model these. They adopted the atheoretic pathology oriented Minnesota multiphasic personality inventory (MMPI) to identify psychopathology and personality structure, an approach according to Eisenman (2006) that is inadequate for use with “normal” people since it is designed to highlight pathologies and personality disorder. Janowsky et al. (2002) also used the Myers-Briggs type indicator (MBTI) (Myers Briggs, 2000), normally referred to as MBTI, to profile the personalities of in-patient alcoholics/substance-use disorder patients in two classes: those with a concurrent affective disorder diagnosis as well as those not so diagnosed. They found that there were correlations between some disorders and the type classes used in MBTI to distinguish individual differences in personalities of introversion, sensing and feeling preference. This suggests that it might be possible, given appropriate theory, to associate different personalities with pathology densities, a proposition that we are theoretically interested in here. In line with this interest, Markon et al. (2005) note that there is increasing evidence that normal and abnormal personality can be treated within a single structural framework, and according to O’Connor and Dyce (2001) that abnormal personality can be modelled as extremes of normal personality variation. For Markon et al. (2005) a proposed framework has remained elusive, and instead they discuss personality disorder in terms of a hierarchical trait structure which they relate to the personality taxonomy of the Big Five (Schroeder et al., 1992; John and Srivastava, 1991). The situation is even worse than this according to Mayer (2005), who argues that current theory in personality promotes a fragmented view of the person, seen through such competing theories as the psychodynamic, trait, and humanistic. As an alternative, he promotes a systems framework for personality that centres on its identification, its parts, its organization, and its development. As such, Mayer (2005) may be considered to lay the foundations for the systemic approach adopted here.

In the same way that there is a need for a single structural framework for the personality of the individual, the social collective also has a need for one, and due to the relationship between them they would be expected to be broadly similar. So, in this paper our primary interest lies in modelling pathology densities of social agencies having normative personalities. To do this we shall take the following steps. We shall adopt a cybernetic agency model that is reflective of Bandura’s (2006) ideas on the adaptive agency, and which arises from “living system” theory (Yolles, 2006). That personality can be represented as a system is not new (Pervin, 1990), but representing it as a living system is. Such an approach can respond to the needs of complexity and uncertainty, and embed features of adaptation and autonomous self-control. In the modelling approach that we shall take, personality controls derive from formative traits. It is a cybernetic personality theory which has a frame of reference that related to Maruyama’s mindscape theory, which unlike the classificational MBTI, is relational in nature (Maruyama, 2001). The relationship between classificational and relational within the context of personality has been considered by various authors (Baldwin, 1992; Mayer, 1995). For Baldwin (1992), relational schemas can be usefully used to explore cognitive structures and their regularities in patterns of interpersonal relatedness. For Mayer (1995), the power of relational approaches is partly exhibited through their ability to pose questions otherwise inaccessible through classificational approaches with respect to the development of personality and the connections between its components. Living system modelling approaches allow not only the classification of systems through their traits, but also the ability to make investigations through system dynamics by investigating the importance assigned to feed-forward and feed-back processes and the relations (and correlations) between processes. Myer also notes that relational approaches offers a meaning-structure for thinking about personality and its components, and that they also offer the possibility of the synthesis of a century’s work on personality components into a single representation of personality that is both multifaceted and whole.

While mindscape theory is essentially superior to classificational approaches, in Maruyama’s mindscape theory the development of personality types is even less transparent than are the types of MBTI. Nor do pathologies play a part in mindscape theory, a particular interest in this paper. Since both transparency and pathology will be requirements for an understanding of normative personality, we shall propose a new formative trait basis for mindscape theory. This will come from a study by Sagiv and Schwartz (2007) capable of explaining social agency behaviour, and which will result in a class of Sagiv-Schwartz mindscape theory that will be called mindset theory. We shall then in brief explore the spectrum of pathology densities, relating them to social contexts, and differentiating, for instance, between ethical and sociopathic organisations. This approach allows us to redefine the “mindscape concept” in slightly different broader terms than adopted by Maruyama. Adopting the idea of epistemological structures, Maruyama’s theory of mindscapes is cognitive in that it refers to the way in which people interpret and process information. Mindscapes exist as a set of distinct epistemological orthogonal typologies, and which can be constituted through a set of culturally connected dimensions that include cognitive uncorrelated bi-polar traits. Such a typology can be theoretically founded in a different way from that developed by Maruyama, by adopting bi-polar traits that can be derived from a coherent “living system” meta-model of a social agency having a “personality system”. We integrate empirical constructs from social psychology and social values research into the meta-model and transpose it into a mindscape framework. This allows one to visualize the set of personality types that can emerge, and further allows one to discuss typology formation from a coherent platform that can integrate different mindscape concepts. Such a meta-model will be useful for understanding the nested levels of investigations from top down (society, organizations, teams, individuals) and bottom-up (from individual personalities, through normative organisational personality, to socio- and economic-political personality at society level).

An Introduction to Mindset Agency Theory

In this paper, Yolles and Fink assemble a mindset theory not at all related to that of Carol Dweck's popular model. Rather, these authors build off of the work of personality modelling approaches which were broadly described as classificational, relational, or dynamic/causational.

Jung’s, Bandura’s and Piaget’s theories are all causational; MBTI and FFM are classificational; and Maruyma’s Mindscape theory is relational. Because of its epistemological and relational basis, we found that Maruyama’s Mindscape theory has a better potential capacity to explore cognitive patterns of personality than MBTI and FFM. However, Maruyama’s Mindscape theory does not have the generative transparency of MBTI. To improve on the generative transparency of Mindscape theory, Boje’s had introduced three “real traits”. However, Boje’s approach remained qualitative without the immediate possibility of empirical support, and is thereby not improving the potential for broader use of Mindscape theory.

The result is an interesting values frame and a multi-perspectival model of mindsets.

An Introduction to Mindset Theory

• Maurice Yolles: John Moores University - Centre for the Creation of Coherent Change and Knowledge (C4K)
• Gerhard Fink: IACCM International Association for Cross Cultural Competence and Management

November 1, 2013

Abstract:

The plural agency is a self-referential, self-regulating, self-organizing, adaptive, pro-active and culturally stable collective, having a normative personality belonging to a psychosocial framework of the "collective mind." The agency can be characterized by Mindset types, a derivative of Maruyama’s Mindscape meta-theory -- a little known but powerful epistemic approach that can anticipate an agency’s patterns of behavior and demands. A Mindscape is a construct from which coherent sets of behavioral mind-sets can emerge. However, Mindscape theory lacks generative transparency, and the Mindset theory we develop changes this. Mindset Theory is based on the Sagiv-Schwartz (2007) cultural values study from which eight Mindset types are generated that individually or in combination can characterize personality and anticipate behavior.

Introduction

This paper is interested in two aspects of personality: a theory of personality that indicates its nature, how it functions, and an identification of variables that might represent its major characteristics, and personality assessment through an ability to identify and evaluate these variables. Our purpose in this paper covers both of these attributes. In respect of the first, we aim at creating a dynamic socio-cognitive theory of human agency having as its core a normative personality.

When we refer to normative personality, we do not mean this within the context of the ambient normative social influences that exist during the formation of personalities and that mould them (Mroczek & Little, 2006). Rather, the term is being used to refer to the norms in a collective that may together coalesce into a unitary cognitive structure such that a collective mind can be inferred, and from which an emergent normative personality arises. To explain this further, consider that a potentially durable collective develops a dominant culture within which shared beliefs arise in relation to its capacity to produce desired operative outcomes. Cultural anchors arise which enable the development of formal and informal norms to which patterns of behaviour, modes of conduct and expression, forms of thought, attitudes, and values are more or less adhered to by those that compose the plural agency. When the norms refer to formal behaviours, then where the members of the collective contravene them, they are deemed to be engaging in illegitimate behaviour which, if discovered, may result in formal retribution - the severity of which is determined from the agency’s ideological and ethical positioning. This occurs with the rise of collective cognitive processes that start with information inputs and through communication and decision processes result in orientation towards action; and it does this with a sense of the collective mind and self. It is a short step to recognise that the collective mind has associated with it a normative personality. Where a normative personality is deemed to exist, it does not necessarily mean that individual members of the collective will all conform to all aspects of the normative processes: they may only do so “more or less.” According to Yolles (2009), as long as a plural agency has a durable culture to which participants more or less conform through its norms, a “collective mind” is implied that operates through meaningful dialogue and agreement. As such the plural agency may appear to behave more or less like a singular cognitive agency. While the plural agency is ultimately composed of singular agencies, they are similar, can suffer from related pathologies that include: dysfunctions, neuroses, feelings of guilt, adopt and maintain collective psychological defences that reduce pain through denial and cover-up, and operate through processes of power that might be unproductive (Kets de Vries, 1991).

In the same way that singular agencies learn, so do plural agencies. We represent this capacity of the normative personality through cognitive learning theory (e.g., Miller & Dollard, 1941; Miller et al., 1960; Piaget, 1950; Vygotsky, 1978; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Bandura, 1991; Nobre, 2003; Argote & Todorova, 2007), where “learning is seen in terms of the acquisition or reorganization of the cognitive structures through which agencies process and store information” (Good and Brophy, 1990, pp. 187). Set within cognitive information process theory, the collective mind is seen as an information system that operates through a set of logical mental rules, and strategies (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Bowlby, 1980; Novak, 1993; Wang, 2007).

In this paper we adopt a theoretical approach intended to represent the personality through a set of traits, and we develop Mindset theory as a means by which normative personalities can be assessed. Mindset theory is a derivative of Mindscape theory, a little known approach for reasons that likely include its lack of generative transparency. In order to correct this we will create Mindset theory by adopting the cybernetic trait model of Yolles, Fink & Dauber (2011). Then, to facilitate assessment we connect this with the extensive empirical study by Shalom Schwartz (e.g., Sagiv-Schwarz, 2007) on epistemic cultural values. In particular we shall show that normative personalities can take Mindscape types which can be transparently generated from combinations of bi-polar traits that arise from Sagiv-Schwartz theory.

Having referred to traits, it is useful to consider something more about them. A trait is usually seen as a distinguishing feature, characteristic or quality of a personality style. It creates a predisposition for a personality to respond in a particular way to a broad range of situations (Allport, 1961). Traits are also described as enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of social and personal contexts. They constitute habitual patterns of thought, emotion and stable clusters of behaviour. They are therefore better seen as constructs that reflect different sets of values and attitudes. There may be a variety of traits, but we can also identify super-traits (Bandura, 1999) or global traits (Van Egeren, 2009) which play a formative role in the development of personality. These formative traits are constituted as self-regulatory propensities or styles that affect how individuals characteristically pursue their goals (Van Egeren, 2009). In this paper when we refer to traits, we shall mean formative traits. These operate as continuous variables that together are indicative of personality, and are subject to small degrees of continuous variation. Traits may take scalar values that for Eysenck (1957) determine personality type. As an illustration, the Five Factor Method (FFM1 or the Big Five) is an empirically based classificatory trait approach where the traits take on single pole and bi-polar values (Cattel, 1945; Goldberg, 1993; Costa & McCrae 1992).

Normally, type theory is useful in personality assessment since they represent conditions of a personality that can be associated with a set of characteristics or properties that establish a penchant towards certain patterns of behaviour. There are schemas (models that may or may not be developed into or be connected with full theories) that explore types, though sometimes as in the MBTI (Myers, 2000) schema the traits are inferred as existing virtually, and unspecified. While explicitly defined traits take on identifiable personality control functions, virtual traits also take on control functions, but in this case they would be implicit and unidentified (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).

While traits constitute useful variables for the characterisation of personality, there is some confusion in the literature in the way that types are defined. Some authors (e.g. Eysenck, 1957) find that simple distinguishing marks may qualify single traits as types, while Myers-Briggs when referring to types means meta-types, i.e. a determinable collection of types (Myers, 2000). Following Eysenck, types can be defined through a trait that can characterize a system. If more than a single trait is needed to characterize a system, then types may occur as some composite of several traits with certain distinguishing marks. Thus for instance consider the case of the extreme poles of bi-polar traits. The number of types (z) to be generated from bi-polar traits depends on the number of traits (n) that constitute a system: z = 2ⁿ. In a case where three states of a trait (e.g., the extremes and a range in the middle) constitute a system, then z = 3ⁿ. We have already referred to MBTI as a “personality type” approach with virtual traits, and which operates as a classificatory system that was created from Jung’s (1923) bi-polar temperament personality theory. From 4 bi-polar virtual traits, a system of 16 personality types was created by Myers-Briggs (Myers & McCaulley, 1985; Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 1998).

While personality traits create a potential for the generation of descriptive clusters of behaviour, many consider them to represent the ultimate causes of patterns of behaviour. However, if such a view is to be sustainable, then additional theory is needed that ties trait schemas that simply classify personalities to one type or another, to dynamic schemas that involve causative processes and allow for personality shifts, as for instance through: (a) Piaget’s (1950) concepts of child development and Bandura’s (2006) psychology of the human agency that would allow traits to take a role that is significantly beyond their use as classification systems; and (b) Piaget’s ideas of intelligent behaviour and Bandura’s interest in efficacy and performance that establish ideas of change in behaviour through learning that existing trait theories are unable to currently represent. It may be possible for trait theory to embrace such concepts by seeing them as enduring patterns of cognitive schemas that arise from such phenomena as perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself, i.e., they condition decision making processes in some way. Action then emerges from the major processes of cognition, motivation, affect, effectiveness recognition, and selection of available patterns of behaviour.

Moving on from the Introduction, I wanted to share a pretty large section of this paper because I believe it offers an unique and useful model for making sense of values frames in both individual and cultures.

In contrast to MBTI, Maruyama developed his socio-cognitive personality type theory through a schema of epistemological meta-types, which he called Mindscape theory. This schema permits personal determinants to operate dynamically within causal structures. Meta-types are combinations of epistemic values (which we call enantiomers) which are constituted as elements of human culture, material objects, or human practice (Maruyama, 1988). Mindscape analysis, Maruyama claims, is particularly suitable for complex and multifaceted environments, and can be used to explore the interrelations among seemingly unrelated aspects of human activities. While Mindscape theory is represented as an epistemological typology, its purpose and use lie in interrelating seemingly separate aspects of human activities (Maruyama, 1988, p.311). While Mindscape modes are numerous and vary from individual to individual, they cumulate into at least four common and stable types that may be partly innate and partly learned.

Social collectives have a normative collective cognitive ability (Thompson, Leigh and Gary Alan Fine, 1999), and as such they also have what we shall call a normative personality - a principle also supported by, for instance, Bridges (1992), Kets de Vries (1991) and Yolles (2006), and already implicitly embedded in Mindscape theory and MBTI. Hence, Mindscape theory can apply to social personality and individual personality contexts. Within the context of the social personality "one of the [personality] types becomes powerful for historical or political reasons, and utilizes, ignores or suppresses individuals of other types" (Maruyama, 2002, p167; cited by Boje, 2004). Following Maruyama (1988; 2001; 2008) and Boje (2004), four types of Mindscapes always exist in any culture, though their percentage distribution varies across cultures3. Available data on cross-cultural migrants indicate that some aspects of Mindscapes are formative in childhood and become irreversible at the age of around ten, approximately corresponding to the child’s formative years. An agency with one Mindscape mode may "learn" to "understand" by some intellectual process a figurative structure that is conceptualized in other Mindscapes, but the results of such attempts are likely to be highly distorted or psychologically artificial. This becomes clearer, for example, when an agency is a human activity group that holds a particular paradigm in science (Kuhn, 1970).

Gammack (2002), in his discussion of Mindscape theory, noted Maruyama’s rejection of the common simple-minded typologies in favour of a “relationology” that goes further than temperamental classifications of individual qualities. Rather it specifies an epistemological basis from which communicative and behavioural styles result. Cultures are seen to be epistemologically heterogeneous, and a number of canonical Mindscape modes exist that are each represented within them in some proportion. These epistemological modes are seen to be prior to, and transcendent of, nationality and culture (Maruyama, 1988; 2001). Indeed, as indicated by Maruyama (1974) these epistemological types are directly related to personality characteristics and cultural backgrounds. An epistemic description of each of these Mindscapes has been proposed by Dockens (2004) (adapted from Maruyama, 1980) as shown in Table 2. Here the epistemic categories cover, for Dockens, a typology of knowledge that constitutes the basis of the Mindscape types. The names given to each of the mindscape types while having there origin in Maruyama (1974), arise from Boje (2004).

Mindscape types were perceived by Maruyama (1988) to be quite different from the Jungian psychological typologies. They provide a link between seemingly separate activities such as decision process, criteria of beauty, and choice of science theories. They do not line up on a single scale, nor do they fit in a two-by-two table. Rather, Maruyama considered, they are more like the four corners of a tetrahedron. Mindscape theory is not a classificational typology (like that of Myers, 2000) since its purpose and use “lie in interrelating seemingly separate aspects of human activities such as organizational structure, policy formulation, decision process, architectural design, criteria of beauty, choice of theories, cosmology, etc.” (Maruyama, 1988:2). Maruyama assumed that it has a relational basis.

Maruyama’s (2002, p167) argument has already been noted that a social system develops an affinity for one personality meta-type over another for historical or political reasons, and ignores or suppresses individuals of other types. This perception is in contrast to Jung (1923), Schwartz (1990) and to Tamis-LeMonda et al (2007). Maruyama settles on the ‘opposing view’ perception of alternate poles.

Using Mindscape theory provides a broad and potentially dynamic capacity to describe agencies, and thereby can generate explanations about situations in which they were involved, or expectations about their potential behaviour in anticipated situations.

Creating Eight Mindset Types from the Sagiv-Schwartz Trait Basis

Following an interest in characterising societal culture, Schwartz (1999, 2004) undertook an extensive study (60,000 respondents) to explore the dimensionality of cultural orientations. It derived cultural orientations from a priori theorizing (unlike previous approaches such as: Hofstede, 1980, 2001; House, Javidan, & Dorfman, 2001; Inglehart & Baker, 2000) rather than post hoc examination of data. The measuring instrument Schwartz used a designated set of a priori value items to serve as markers for each orientation. These items were tested for cross-cultural equivalence of meaning. The items were demonstrated to cover the range of values recognized cross-culturally. In addition, it specified how the cultural orientations are organized into a coherent system of related dimensions and verified this organization, rather than assuming that orthogonal dimensions best capture cultural reality. Finally, it brought empirical evidence that the order of national cultures on each of the orientations is robust across different types of samples from many countries around the world.
Sagiv and Schwartz (2007) identified three bipolar dimensions of culture that represent alternate resolutions to each of three challenges that confront all societies. In the context of the agency, these bipolar dimensions constitute enantiomer pairs that (like Boje’s (2004) conceptions where he formulated a set of Foucaultian based traits to create a Mindscape space) can be assigned to some originating trait, the names of which have been influenced by Piaget’s (1950) theory of human commonalities. These traits with paired enantiomers are: cognitive (embeddedness, autonomy), figurative (hierarchy, egalitarianism) and operative (mastery, harmony). These are explained briefly in Table 3.

(1) Cognitive Trait Enantiomers

Embedded cultures are consistent with a collectivistic view, where meaning in life can be found largely through social relationships, identifying with the group, participating in a shared way of life, and the adoption of shared goals. Values like social order, respect for tradition, security, and wisdom are important. There tends to be a conservative attitude in that support is provided for the status quo and restraining actions against inclinations towards the possible disruption of in-group solidarity or the traditional order.

Autonomy cultures are consistent with an individualistic view, where meaning is found in the uniqueness of the individual that is encouraged to express internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings, motives). Two classes of cultural autonomy arise: Intellectual and Affective Autonomy. Intellectual autonomy presumes that individuals are encouraged to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently (important values: curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity), while in affective autonomy individuals are encouraged to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. The values are: exciting life, enjoying live, varied life, pleasure, and self-indulgence. At this point it is important to note that there are notable reasons why Shalom Schwartz has kept affective autonomy separately from intellectual autonomy. Affective autonomy is also positively correlated with Mastery, and it is granting that those who achieve high efficacy through mastery also can enjoy the benefits of their efforts. These two facets of the enantiomer constitute an important element of individualism and are in contrast to harmony.

(2) Figurative Trait Enantiomers 

Mastery promotes the view that active self-assertion is needed in order to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment to attain group or personal goals (values: ambition, success, daring, competence). Mastery organizations tend to be dynamic, competitive, and oriented to achievement and success, and are likely to develop and use technology to manipulate and change the environment to achieve goals.

Harmony promotes the view that the world should be accepted as it is, with attempts to understand and appreciate rather than to change, direct, or exploit. There is an emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment (values: unity with nature, protecting the environment, world at peace). In harmony organisations, there is an expectation that they will fit into the surrounding social and natural world. Leaders that adopt this type try to understand the social and environmental implications of organizational actions, and seek non-exploitative ways to work toward their goals.

(3) Operative Trait Enantiomers

Hierarchy supports the ascription of roles for individuals to ensure responsible, productive behavior. Unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources are seen to be legitimate (values: social power, authority, humility, wealth). The hierarchical distribution of roles is taken for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles.

Egalitarianism promotes the view that people recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests. There is an internalisation of a commitment towards cooperation, and to feelings of concern for everyone's welfare. There is an expectation that people will act for the benefit of others as a matter of choice (values: equality, social justice, responsibility, honesty).

These traits and their enantiomer characteristics are summarised in Table 3 together with a listing of keywords that are relevant to the types. Setting the cultural-level Sagiv-Schwartz enantiomers into a trait space thereby enables the generation of what we call a set of Sagiv-Schwartz Mindset Types (Table 5). As explained earlier, while they come from a similar frame of reference to that of Maruyama, their epistemology arises differently.

For the formation of Sagiv-Schwartz Mindset Types we use the Schwartz (1994) set of values and formation of value dimensions (Table 3). Using the same epistemic mapping technique as adopted by Maruyama to compare his Mindscapes with Harvey, we compared the Maruyama constructs with those derived from Sagiv and Schwartz (2007). For Sagiv-Schwartz Mindset Types, we have found better comparability with the Maruyama Mindscape types when, from the Schwartz value inventory, we closely relate ‘affective autonomy’ to ‘mastery’ and form a composite epistemic bi-polar trait (Mastery & Affective Autonomy vs. Harmony).

When comparing the values and attitudes of the Maruyama Mindscape types with the Sagiv & Schwartz value dimensions in an epistemological mapping, we easily find values/items of the Schwartz universe which fit part of the respective Maruyama Mindscape types as shown below.

The H type contains numerous items which are similar or can be related to notions of embeddedness and hierarchy of the Schwartz system: hierarchical, homogenist (conventionalist), classification (neat categories), universalist, sequential, competitive, one truth, eternal, unity by similarity, ethics to dominate the weak, ingroup, self-stereotyping, group bounded, prone to collectivism.

The I type contains numerous items which are similar or can be related to notions of intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy and mastery of the Schwartz system: independent, heterogenistic, unconventionalist, individualistic, uniqueness, separation, caprice, subjectivity, isolationist, temporary, no order, identity, specialization, indifference, poverty self-inflicted, prone to individualism.

As a reflection of the ‘mutualists Mindscape types’ mentioned previously and arising from Maruyama (1974), we find similarities to the notions egalitarianism and harmony of the Schwartz system: heterogenistic, interactive, mutualizing, relating, simultaneous, positive-sum, poly-ocularity, absorption, contextual, non-hierarchical. The consequent differentiation between the G type and the S type apparently is influenced by a slightly stronger orientation towards intellectual autonomy of the G type and towards embeddedness of the S type. Considering the Schwartz value universe (Figure 1) which was produced with the Co-Plot [4] technique of Raveh (2000), we find that Maruyama intuitively discovered that neighbouring ‘value fields’, i.e. combinations of positively correlated values, form the basis of emergent behavioural types. In terms of the Schwartz value universe: ‘hierarchists’ have a preference for hierarchy and embeddeness, ‘indivudualists’ have a preference for autonomy and mastery, and ‘mutualists’ have a preference for egalitarianism and harmony.

Now, we can note that the route suggested by Boje (2004) can be further pursued with a more differentiated system of 8 types derived from Sagiv-Schwartz (2007) traits. To do this we initially formulate a labelling code as shown in Table 4. These arise from epistemic cross-comparison deriving from the traits poles (the enantiomers), and permit choices to be made for labels from the options available.

As a result we can formulate the Mindset types against the enantiomers and their epistemic values as shown in Table 5. The type numbers do not imply trait importance, but simply are counting the number of types.

Graphically, the relations between the eight Mindset cognitive types shown in the Mindset Space of Figure 2 are extreme types. Four pairs of Mindset types can be seen that are in diametric contrast. However, the 8 types can be multiplied since balances between the types can also develop, which is something that we shall return to in due course. Four of these eight Mindset Types correspond to the four Maryuama Mindscape Types. With this it is possible to fill a gap indicated by Boje (2004) and identify four additional Mindset Types.

For further analysis beyond contrasting Mindset types, where all three alternate enantiomer poles are different, we may also take a look at variation, where two enantiomers are the same and only one is varied. In the Sagiv-Schwartz value universe six options arise, which are presented in Table 7. We begin with Harmony and move clockwise around the Schwartz value universe (Figure 1). We present variations, where two central pairs of constructs are kept constant. In the Sagiv-Schwartz universe these pairs are located next to each other, because these constructs are correlated to each other.

Now, one remaining open issue is whether the number of types is appropriate to characterize variety within and between social systems? Apparently, any number of types could be created from any number of traits. Once, in an interview Geert Hofstede said to one of the authors: “Values - you can have as many as you want. The issue is, whether you have a sufficiently large number, for differentiation, and a sufficiently small number to be remembered by the audience.” The number of traits quickly increases when several states of a trait are considered to be type forming. In Figure 2 we illustrate 8 types which emerge from the alternate poles of 3 traits: 8=2³. In a case where three states of a trait (e.g. the extremes and a range in the middle) constitute a system, then z=3ⁿ. E.g. one could assume that the upper and lower third of a trait represent the two poles of a trait, and the middle third represents a balanced attitude. In that case we would end up with 27 possible types: 27=3³.

Brain Research at Stanford

Stanford University has posted this multiple-part video series of lectures featuring faculty talking about their current research work in the area of brain research - cool stuff. Aside from the last one, I probably got the order wrong on these, since they are not numbered.

Brain Research at Stanford: Nurture & Nature

October 21, 2011 - As a member of the President's Welcome discussion and panel on brain research, Carla Shatz discusses how the brain makes you who you are. As a storage for memories, thoughts, and experiences, the brain functions to create individuality among people and is always changing as we live and learn.




Brain Research at Stanford: Surprise!

Professor Jonathan Berger continues the discussion on brain research at Stanford and pushes the topic in a different direction by looking at how music affects and interacts with the brain. His research looks to determine the role and possible importance that music has played in evolution.




Brain Research at Stanford: Mindsets

Carol Dweck, the Lewis and Virginia Eaton Professor of Psychology, continues the discussion on brain research at Stanford by taking a closer look at how the brain controls the psyche and how deeply intertwined it is with the field of psychology.




Brain Research at Stanford: Decision Making

Professor Baba Shiv continues the discussion on brain research at Stanford, but takes the topic in a different direction. He focuses on the role that the brain plays in the decision making process that is so fundamental to our existence. He looks at how emotion is interpreted by the brain and ultimately affects the final decision making process.




Brain Research at Stanford: The Law

Professor Hank Greely continues the discussion of brain research, looking at how the groundbreaking research interacts with the law and legislation. With legal issues arising every day the efficiency of legal procedures with regards to brain research must be very high.




Brain Research at Stanford: Q & A

The speakers who spent time discussing different aspects of the brain research that is taking place at Stanford sit down and field questions from the audience. They take time to address the questions that arise and collectively answer them the best they can.