Philosophy of Dreaming - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy recently posted a new (or newly updated) entry on the philosophy of dreams. It's an interesting read so I thought I'd share . . . but only the introduction and contents listing. The article itself is pretty long, which is fitting since this could be the topic for a book (and likely is).

Philosophy of Dreaming

According to Owen Flanagan (2000), there are four major philosophical questions about dreaming:

1. How can I be sure I am not always dreaming?
2. Can I be immoral in dreams?
3. Are dreams conscious experiences that occur during sleep?
4. Does dreaming have an evolutionary function?

These interrelated questions cover philosophical domains as diverse as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, scientific methodology, and the philosophy of biology, mind and language. This article covers the four questions and also looks at some newly emerging philosophical questions about dreams:

5.  Is dreaming an ideal scientific model for consciousness research?
6.  Is dreaming an instance of hallucinating or imagining?

Section 1 introduces the traditional philosophical question that Descartes asked himself, a question which has championed scepticism about the external world. How can I be sure I am not always dreaming, or dreaming right now? Philosophers have typically looked for features that distinguish dreams from waking life and one key debate centres on whether it is possible to feel pain in a dream.

Section 2 surveys the ethics of dreaming. The classical view of Augustine is contrasted with more abstract ethical positions, namely, those of the Deontologist, the Consequentialist and the Virtue Ethicist. The notion of lucid dreaming is examined here in light of the question of responsibility during dreaming and how we treat other dream characters.

Sections 3 covers the various different positions, objections and replies to question 3: the debate about whether dreaming is, or is not, a conscious state. The challenges from Malcolm and Dennett are covered. These challenges question the authority of the common-sense view of dreaming as a consciously experienced state. Malcolm argues that the concept of dreaming is incoherent, while Dennett puts forward a theory of dreaming without appealing to consciousness.

Section 4 covers the evolutionary debate, where empirical work ultimately leaves us uncertain of the extent to which natural selection has shaped dreaming, if at all. Early approaches by Freud and Jung are reviewed, followed by approaches by Flanagan and Revonsuo. Though Freud, Jung and Revonsuo have argued that dreaming is functional, Flanagan represents a view shared by many neuroscientists that dreaming has no function at all.

Section 5 looks at questions 5 and 6. Question 5 is about the cutting edge issue of precisely how dreaming should be integrated into the research program of consciousness. Should dreaming be taken as a scientific model of consciousness? Might dreaming play another role such as a contrast analysis with other mental states? Question 6, which raises a question of the exact qualitative nature of dreaming, has a longer history, though it is also receiving contemporary attention. The section outlines reasons favouring the orthodox view of psychology, that dream imagery is perceptual (hallucinatory), and reasons favouring the philosophical challenge to that orthodoxy, that dreams are ultimately imaginative in nature.

Table of Contents

1. Dreaming in Epistemology
   1. Descartes’ Dream Argument
   2. Objections and Replies
2. The Ethics of Dreaming
   1. Saint Augustine on the Morality of Dreaming
   2. Consequentialist vs. Deontological Positions on Dreaming
   3. Virtue Ethics of Dreaming
3. Are Dreams Consciously Experienced?
   1. The Received View of Dreaming
   2. Malcolm’s Challenge to the Received View
      1. The Impossibility of Verifying Dream Reports
      2. The Conflicting Definitions of “Sleep” and “Dreaming”
      3. The Impossibility of Communicating or Making Judgments during Sleep
      4. Ramifications (contra Descartes)
   3. Possible Objections to Malcolm
      1. Putnam on the Conceptual Analysis of Dreaming
      2. Distinguishing “State” and “Creature” Consciousness
   4. Dennett’s Challenge to the Received View
      1. A New Model of Dreaming: Uploading Unconscious Content
      2. Accounting for New Data on Dreams: “Precognitive” Dreams
   5. Possible Objections to Dennett
      1. Lucid Dreaming
      2. Alternative Explanations for “Precognitive” Dreams
4. The Function of Dreaming
   1. Early Approaches
      1. Freud: Psychoanalysis
      2. Jung: Analytic Psychology
   2. Contemporary Approaches
      1. Pluralism
      2. Adaptationism
5. Dreaming in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness
   1. Should Dreaming Be a Scientific Model?
      1. Dreaming as a Model of Consciousness
      2. Dreaming as a Contrast Case for Waking Consciousness
   2. Is Dreaming an Instance of Images or Percepts?
      1. Dreaming as Hallucination
      2. Dreaming as Imagination
6. References and Further Reading