Marta Jorba - Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?

Interesting article from THEORIA: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, Vol 25, No 2 (2010). Philosophers (and most neuroscientists) have such a problem with qualia (subjective experience = the feeling of thinking) - but I enjoy watching them struggle to grasp that which we all take for granted.

Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?

Marta Jorba

Abstract

In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.

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Tags: Marta Jorba, Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?, qualia, subjective experiences, Husserl, theory of intentionality, Logical Investigations, Theoria, An International Journal for Theory, History, Foundations of Science, Philosophy, mind, awareness, Psychology, subjectivity