I found this interesting philosophy article by accident. Quodlibet Journal seems to be quite Christian in its approach, but still interesting:
Quodlibet Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy is published quarterly, in January, April, July, October, by the Society of Online Christian Theology and Philosophy (SOCTP). Annual subscription and access to all published articles is free.This article looks at religious belief within the context of epistemology.
Quodlibet Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy is designed primarily for articles which address theological and philosophical issues from a Christian perspective, and for articles from any perspective which deal critically with the theological and philosophical credentials of the Christian faith. The journal welcomes submissions in all areas of theology and philosophy, from those who do as well as those who do not share its Christian commitment.
On the Epistemological Status of Belief
prologue
This paper aims at setting forth a perspective on religious epistemology. As will hopefully become clear through the course of this essay, I understand accurate discussion of issues pertaining to religious epistemology, or more specifically of an epistemology of belief, as necessarily grounded in general epistemology. Thus this essay will begin with a discussion of general epistemology in order to set a foundation for its discussion of belief.
It may be the case that the need for such a dependency is obvious and uninsightful. Highlighting this relation between belief ideas and knowledge ideas does, however, set an initial boundary as to the scope of this paper by suggesting a central argument (namely, that beliefs are grounded in knowledge) which itself will require the support of careful discussions of general and religious epistemologies. It will also become evident that based on the epistemology outlined here, certain theories of general and religious epistemology are precluded. By the conclusion of this essay I hope to have laid out a very specific position on these matters which is both consistent and arguably plausible.
existential and abstract ideas
One should probably begin this discussion of epistemology with an explanation of what is meant in the use of the term "idea". When such an explanation is attempted, however, an immediate need for a distinction presents itself, a distinction between what we will call "ideation" and the idea itself. By ideation I mean the process through which the particular idea is derived. I will turn to ideation in more detail shortly. For purposes of this discussion, by idea I mean to emphasize the notion of content, that cognitive representation of what exists outside the mind. This narrow definition of ideas as those representations of things existing outside the mind would seem to neglect entire categories of "ideas" which we realize do not correspond to reality or at least to actual states of affairs. Such categories would include the fantastic (ideas of unicorns and centaurs, for example), the hypothetical, remembrances, and possible others. However, this narrow definition of idea, as we will see, will provide a very adequate means of accounting for these secondary categories.
More precisely, I would like to distinguish between what we may call existential and abstract ideas. Existential ideas are those which occur (through ideation) from encounters with actual particulars, things which exist, and thus such ideas are consistent with the narrow definition suggested above. Historically, this category of ideas has gone by the names simple (John Locke), intuitive (William Occam), atomistic (Wittgenstein), and others. I prefer the name existential to these others since it provides at least initial reference to what the idea (representationally) consists of and from what it is derived, namely, existents. The existential idea, in addition to containing the collection of perceptions of the existent's various attributes, also carries with it the indelible conviction that 'this exists'. Whether such existence belongs properly to the existent's attributes I will not here discuss. It would seem, however, that one's conviction of the existence of an object does not take place in the same manner one's conviction, for example, that the object is red, since we have no perceptual organ specifically designed to perceive existence. While it could be argued based on this difference that one's notion of the object's existence might more properly fall within the category of abstract ideas (for reasons which will become clear), and thus the term 'existential idea' used in the manner I intend is from the offset problematic, at present I maintain my preference for the term for its explanatory value.
One inevitably encounters numerous existential ideas throughout the course of each day, as a myriad of objects are confronted and perceived. Each subject, then, has a wealth of such existential ideas through his or her life experience. These core ideas serve as the basis for rationation wherein the rational capacity of the subject is able to manipulate or further investigate the content of the existential ideas. Those subsequent ideas resulting from such rationation I designate abstract ideas. This designation points to the fact that the content of such ideas ground in abstractions of the more basic existential ideas. Abstraction itself is not a single process, but is possible through several operations of the mind. John Locke (Essay, I.x-xi) lists the following faculties of the mind: retention, memory, discerning, distinguishing (as to clarity and determinateness), comparing, compounding, naming, and abstraction ("whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives for all of the same kind"). All of these functions of rationation involve a manipulation of or extrapolation from existential or simple ideas.
Such abstraction results in the more commonly recognized variety of ideas alluded to earlier. Using Locke's terms, we see that ideas of unicorns, centaurs, and other fantastic things result from the compounding or combination of existential ideas. Remembrances or memories result from the mind' ability to retain and recall such existential ideas. And, as we will see, hypothetical ideas are possible through our comparison of existential ideas and experiences.
I have categorized ideas into two broad categories, existential and abstract. Existential ideas derive through encounter with existents and serve as the foundation for all other types of ideas. The abstract category contains these other types of ideas, all of which share the characteristic of deriving from a form of rationation of existential ideas. This categorization has left some important questions unanswered, many of which we cannot address in this paper. For example, how existential ideas actually emerge from such encounters is one such question. Here one's stance on empiricism, a priori ideas, and universals would become quite clear. A related question is how one might be sure his or her existential ideas actually correspond to actual states of affairs. In answering this second question a precise definition of knowledge would emerge and the problem of skepticism would be dealt with. Other questions which will be addressed involve notions my system apparently precludes or would seem to given fuller exposition, notions such as a priori knowledge or truths of reason. Before such answers are attempted, though, we must briefly turn to the topic of belief.
Go read the rest of this lengthy article.
It is extremely interesting for me to read the article. Thanx for it. I like such themes and anything that is connected to them. I would like to read a bit more on that blog soon.
ReplyDeleteSincerely yours