Tuesday, May 13, 2014

Induction of Self-Awareness in Dreams Through Frontal Low-Current Stimulation of Gamma Activity

New research released on Sunday suggests that lucid dreaming may be triggered by a non-invasive neural stimulation method called transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS), which targets low-intensity electricity through the frontal and temporal lobes of the dreamer.

I can see this rapidly becoming a DIY product for the spiritual and self-enhancement markets. But there is also potential (especially in PTSD) to give those suffering nightmares a way to "reframe" the dreamscape.

Pretty cool.

As usual, the full article is safely ensconced behind a paywall to keep the riffraff from having access, so here is the abstract, followed by a summary from IEEE Spectrum.

Full Citation:
Voss, U, Holzmann, R, Hobson, A, Paulus, W, Koppehele-Gossel, J, Klimke, A & Nitsche, MA. (2014, May 11). Induction of self awareness in dreams through frontal low current stimulation of gamma activity. Nature Neuroscience; doi:10.1038/nn.3719

Induction of self awareness in dreams through frontal low current stimulation of gamma activity

Ursula Voss, Romain Holzmann, Allan Hobson, Walter Paulus, Judith Koppehele-Gossel, Ansgar Klimke & Michael A Nitsche

Abstract

Recent findings link fronto-temporal gamma electroencephalographic (EEG) activity to conscious awareness in dreams, but a causal relationship has not yet been established. We found that current stimulation in the lower gamma band during REM sleep influences ongoing brain activity and induces self-reflective awareness in dreams. Other stimulation frequencies were not effective, suggesting that higher order consciousness is indeed related to synchronous oscillations around 25 and 40 Hz.
Here is the summary of the research from IEEE Spectrum:

Zapping Sleepers' Brains Causes Lucid Dreaming

By Eliza Strickland
Posted 12 May 2014

Illustration: Randi Klett

Lucid dreams offer us the heady chance to shape our own fates in a fantasy world. In these dreams, sleepers realize they're dreaming and can sometimes take over their dreams' plots, allowing them to turn the tables on their enemies, soar into the sky, or embrace that special someone. Now, researchers in Germany have demonstrated that they can trigger lucid dreams by zapping sleeping people's brains with electricity.

The researchers used a non-invasive neural stimulation method called transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) to send low-intensity electricity through the frontal and temporal lobes of 27 sleepers' brains. These portions of the cerebral cortex are associated with higher order cognitive functions, the researchers write, such as self-reflective awareness, abstract thinking, volition, and metacognition (thinking about thinking). Prior studies have shown that these brain regions are dormant during typical REM sleep, when dreams occur, yet are active during lucid dreams.

The tACS stimulation doesn't cause any noise or sensation, so it could be applied to the sleepers without waking them up. The researchers waited until their monitors showed that the subjects were in REM sleep, turned on the current, then woke them up and asked them about the dreams they were having. The test subjects, none of who had experience with lucid dreaming, rated their dreams on factors like insight into the fact that they were dreaming, control of the dream plot, and dissociation, as if they were watching the dream from a third-person perspective.

Not every jolt of electricity produced a lucid dream report. Crucially, the researchers discovered that the effect depended on the frequency of the stimulation. Using the frequency of 40 Hz, researchers found that 77 percent of the reported dreams were rated lucid. At the frequency of 25 Hz, 58 percent of dreams met the criteria, while other frequencies (2, 6, 12, 70, and 100 Hz) produced a much smaller effect or no effect at all. This makes sense, the researchers say, because prior studies that have recorded the activity of the fronto-temporal lobes during lucid dreams have detected neural oscillations (patterns of neural activity) at the gamma frequency band, centered around 40 Hz. It seems stimulation at that frequency mimicked the brain mechanism that can naturally cause lucid dreams.

But enough with the science, let's hear about those test subjects' dreams. Here are two reports from the paper:
Example of lucid dream report following 40-Hz stimulation: I was dreaming about lemon cake. It looked translucent, but then again, it didn’t. It was a bit like in an animated movie, like The Simpsons. And then I started falling and the scenery changed and I was talking to Matthias Schweighöfer (a German actor) and two foreign exchange students. And I was wondering about the actor and they told me “yes, you met him before,” so then I realized “oops, you are dreaming.” I mean, while I was dreaming! So strange!

Example of a non-lucid dream report (6 Hz): I am driving in my car, for a long time. Then I arrive at this place where I haven’t been before. And there are a lot of people there. I think maybe I know some of them but they are all in a bad mood so I go to a separate room, all by myself.
Neural stimulation is all the rage these days. A DIY community has sprung up around transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), a method similar to that used by the German researchers. Brain hackers are experimenting with using tDCS to tweak their cognition in various ways, such as improving memory and speeding up learning. In labs around the world, researchers are also investigating whether tDCS can be used to treat a wide variety of disorders, including depression, ADHD, and chronic pain. The age of brain zapping is upon us!

The Psychopath Within - All in the Mind

 
When James Fallon's The Psychopath Inside: A Neuroscientist's Personal Journey into the Dark Side of the Brain (2013) was published, he and the book received a lot of attention, mostly good (The Smithsonian, NPR's Science Friday, The Atlantic), but also some strong criticisms from people in the neuroscience community and elsewhere.

Even Publisher's Weekly was not impressed: "Fallon’s memoir of realizations is emotionally flat (which is perhaps unfair criteria to judge a psychopath by), lazily assembled, and amounts to little more than a confessional booth’s enumeration of sins."

Neurocritic wonders if he completed the Psychopathy Checklist and score over 30? Otherwise, are we to believe that he made this diagnosis from a simple pet scan of his brain?


the fallacy of reverse inference, confusing correlation with causation, and the confirmation bias.

Finally, Jordan Smoller, in the Los Angeles Review of Books, says, "If most psychopaths have a Y chromosome (that is, they are men), and I have a Y chromosome, then I’m likely to be a psychopath inside. If I told you this, you would easily see the error of my logic. But, surprisingly, the neuroscientist James Fallon bases his new book on just this kind of premise."

Be that as it may (criticism is often ignored when it attempts to make popular science conform to the rigors of "real" science), the book has legs. In last week's All in the Mind from Australia's Radio National, Fallon was the guest, along with Mark Dadds.

The Psychopath Within

Sunday 4 May 2014 | Lynne Malcolm
 

When neuroscientist James Fallon was studying the brain scans of serial killers he noticed that his own scan looked remarkably like one of his psychopathic subjects. When you hear about some of his character traits, and his seemy family background – it begins to make sense. Plus, can we prevent so-called 'callous and unemotional' kids from becoming psychopathic adults?

Guests 
  • Professor James Fallon, Professor of psychiatry , neuroscience, human behaviour & neurobiology at the University of California, Irvine
  • Professor Mark Dadds, Professor of Clinical Child Psychology at the University of N.S.W, Director of the Child Behaviour Research Clinic at the University of N.S.W.
Publications

The Psychopath Inside: A Neuroscientist's Personal Journey into the Dark Side of the Brain, by James Fallon

Further Information

In Depression, No, It’s Not the Neurotransmitters


Dr. Robert Berezin is a psychiatrist and author of Psychotherapy of Character: The Play of Consciousness in the Theater of the Brain (2013). Here are a few paragraphs of the "about" section at his site:
For many years I have been troubled by the rapid and tragic degeneration of my field. Contemporary psychiatry has fallen under the sway of biological psychiatry, where patients no longer receive proper care. Today’s commonly held and misguided belief is that human suffering is a brain problem. And the cure for human pain has been reduced to a pill, as if pharmaceuticals address the agency of human suffering. Human struggle is not now, nor ever has been a brain problem. It is a human problem, pure and simple. Psychotherapy has become a lost practice.
Recently, there has been a growing number of critiques about pharmaceutical psychiatry’s corrupt and destructive practices. I address these issues with a constructive presentation of an alternative understanding and practice, which I put into book form, The Psychotherapy of Character, The Play of Consciousness in the Theater of the Brain, written as a narrative. It tells the story of my patient Eddie from his conception through his adulthood culminating with the story of his psychotherapy. It presents a new paradigm, a unified field theory of human consciousness, that encompasses psychiatry, neuroscience, dreams, myths, religion, and art, all elements of the same thing. The central paradigm is that consciousness is organized as a living drama in the theater of the brain. The ‘play’ is an entire representational world which consists of a cast of characters, who relate together by feeling, as well as plots, set designs, and landscape. Eddie’s unique play is shown to be written by his brain, as his ‘nurture’—responsiveness, deprivation, and abuse—was digested by his ‘nature’—his genetic temperament. This paradigm is as relevant to the neuroscience and biology of consciousness and the brain as it is to my own field. It orients neuroscience understanding to its proper place, as the creator of the play in the service of our biological thriving, surviving, and propagation.

The ‘play’, in consciousness, encompasses the ineffable human mysteries—birth, death, and the disparity between our ordinary sense of self and our intimation of a deeper authenticity. It includes, as well, the dark side of our nature. It derives from and is consonant with our child rearing and culture. And finally, it holds the key to the nature of ‘beliefs’ in general. Human consciousness and human nature are one and the same. The psychotherapy of character is shown to be at one with the play of consciousness, and is the real avenue to deal with human suffering.
Sounds like an excellent book, so I just ordered it.

Here is a recent article from his The Theater of the Brain at Psychology Today. In the article he totally and completely rejects the biological model of depression: "The theory that depression is a biological disease, caused by an imbalance of serotonin and the other neurotransmitters is invalid." He reveals here something a friend of mine (a PhD pharmacologist who consults with drug companies and insurance companies of getting new medications covered) told me several years ago: Big Pharma twists the statistics so that "if  antidepressants work 40% of the time and placebos work 30% of the time, it is deemed to be an effective drug. This means that the antidepressants apparently work 10% of the time."  Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Hallelujah!

No, It’s not the Neurotransmitters

Depression is not a biological disease caused by an imbalance of serotonin.

Published on May 10, 2014 by Robert Berezin, M.D. in The Theater of the Brain




The theory that depression is a biological disease, caused by an imbalance of serotonin and the other neurotransmitters is invalid. It is a house of cards promoted by Big Pharma and its influence peddling in academic psychiatry. It has been completely accepted by the American Psychiatric Association with its DSM-5 and the culture at large. And the treatment for ‘clinical depression’ is promoted to be antidepressants. Beyond recognizing that this theory is untrue, it is incumbent to present a valid understanding of depression, the brain, and consciousness and the appropriate treatment.

The pharmaceutical industry has been exposed having been engaged in study suppression, falsification, strategic marketing, and financial incentives. Sales of antidepressants in 2011 was 11 billion dollars. Ben Goldacre is his illuminating Ted lecture, “What doctors don't know about the drugs they prescribe” addressed the issue of study suppression. A fifteen year review of antidepressant studies showed that 50% of the 76 studies were positive and 50% were negative. All of the positive studies were published and all but three of the negative studies were suppressed and not published. In 2004 approximately half of all studies that weren’t already suppressed by the pharmaceutical industry concluded that antidepressants are not significantly more effective than placebo alone. And two thirds of studies for children given antidepressants show the same. Even the standard for the positive studies by which effectiveness is scientifically accepted is that if antidepressants work 40% of the time and Placebos work 30% of the time, it is deemed to be an effective drug. This means that the antidepressants apparently work 10% of the time. So much for this evidence based theory. In real science, the exception proves the rule.For a theory to be correct it has to be correct 100% of the time. I will not go into the negative effects of these drugs here – in addition to not being efficacious there are considerable side effects, habituation, drug tolerance and addiction.

[See the download “Do No Harm”, the Appendix of my book.]

The real cause of depression, and all the rest of psychiatric symptoms, follows from the way one’s unique consciousness is formed in the brain all through development from embryonic life to age twenty. Our developmental experience is mapped in the limbic-cortex as incredibly complex circuits of neuronal maps that reflect the impacts of love, respect, deprivation, and abuse as digested by one’s unique temperament. These brain maps generate human consciousness - which is organized in as a drama in the theater of the brain with a cast of personas, feeling relationships between them, scenarios, plots, set designs and landscapes. The internal play is the consummate creation of the human genome. Once established, beginning at age three, the representational play operates via top down cortical processing, and is the invisible prism through which we live our lives.

Serotonin and the other neurotransmitters operate in the synapses of our limbic cortical maps connecting the trillions of neurons that create the mappings that form our plays. Serotonin has no life of its own. It is merely a brain mechanism that serves the neuronal organization of consciousness, the play itself. The way the limbic-cortical brain maps our experience reflects the actuality of our experience. If our character play is too damaged by deprivation and abuse, it generates an invisible sadomasochistic play that is filled with attack and humiliation, endless war. Consequently the activated internal play is one of continuous internal fighting between personas. As such it feeds on the serotonin supply on an ongoing basis. It is inevitable that the supply will be overtaxed. This is not the result of a serotonin problem. It is built in from a damaged characterological play. It is not a question of ‘if’, but only ‘when’ serotonin will be overused and depression will appear.

Depression is the signal that there are problematic fault lines in one’s characterological play. It does not mean there is a neurotransmitter problem. It means there is an internal play problem. If one feeds more serotonin into the system, one actually feeds and builds the internal war which only worsens the situation. In fact, the antidepressants actually harden people and makes them unconflicted about selfishness, which can be experienced as feeling better. But the real problem is the damaging problematic play. This is what needs to addressed and healed rather than fueled.

The treatment is the psychotherapy of character. Psychotherapy operates in exactly the same way as our plays were created in the first place. In therapy, one mourns one’s problematic experience within the boundaries and emotional holding relationship with the therapist. A patient digests and relinquishes his old play, and then writes a new play that is not sadomasochistic. Symptoms disappear all by themselves as the old play, where serotonin was being over consumed, is no longer activated. In its place, a new play, grounded in authenticity and love is established and activated. The brain is dynamic and responds to psychotherapy in its characteristic way. Studies have repeatedly shown than that the brain changes from psychotherapy. How can that be if symptoms are a serotonin disease?

For a theory to be valid, it has to conform to the actual brain-body in its development and organization. It has to correspond to the actualities of the human genome as it orchestrates morphogenesis into the mature adult brain-body. Likewise, in order for an understanding of the operations of the brain-body to be meaningful, it has to be consonant with actualities of human life and struggle. There has never been any evidence for the neurotransmitter disease model. On the other hand, I propose a model that is consonant to the realities of human life and development. It is a unified field theory that encompasses dreams, myths, art, human character, religion, and beliefs.

Robert A. Berezin, MD is the author of Psychotherapy of Character: The Play of Consciousness in the Theater of the Brain

Dr. Berezin's personal web page

Monday, May 12, 2014

George Williams - Psi and the Problem of Consciousness


I am not convinced of anything we might call psi, and even if I was convinced I doubt it could solve the problem of consciousness. Despite my reservations and cynicism, this is an interesting paper from the Journal of Mind and Behavior.

Full Citation:
Psi and the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior; 34(3-4):259-284. 

Psi and the Problem of Consciousness

George Williams
Journal of Mind and Behavior 34:259-284 (2013)

Abstract

In this paper, I consider what the growing evidence in parapsychology can tell us about the nature of consciousness. Parapsychology remains controversial because it implies deviations from the understanding that many scientists and philosophers hold about the nature of reality. However, given the difficulties in explaining consciousness, a growing number of philosophers have called for new, possibly radical explanations, which include versions of dualism or panpsychism. In this spirit, I briefly review the evidence on psi to see what explanation of consciousness might best be supported. After a brief survey of the evidence, I conclude that the best explanation would probably be neutral monism. I then explore a framework for neutral monism, using well-known features of quantum mechanics, to develop a ground or bridge between consciousness and matter. This framework, which I believe helps explain the psi evidence, suggests that a non-local proto-conscious field of potential or seed stuff underlies both matter and consciousness.

Introduction

As many theorists have noted, consciousness, while both familiar and intimate, remains deeply mysterious. The problem of explaining consciousness persists despite all attempts from the pre-Socratic Greeks to modern day philosophers at illuminating this perplexing subject. Throughout history many great thinkers supported the notion that consciousness or some sort of spiritual reality is distinct from matter, and indeed might be the fundamental source of all reality. However, the dominant view in the twentieth century settled on a more materialistic argument: consciousness most likely emerges from complex biological processes, which in turn are based ultimately on complex interactions between subatomic particles.

This view remains unsatisfactory for some philosophers of mind. While advances in neuroscience have led to improvements in our understanding of how processes within the brain work, we still are no closer to understanding experience at the most basic level. This is what Chalmers (1995) has termed the “hard problem” of consciousness. According to Chalmers, materialistic explanations of consciousness would be consistent with a world populated by zombies acting like people in the world, yet devoid of interior experience. Tackling the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers argues, likely requires abandoning a purely materialistic view of consciousness.

The various theories of consciousness can arguably be grouped into five categories: materialism, dualism, panpsychism, neutral monism, and idealism. As noted above, the current mainstream view looks for materialistic explanations. This typically takes the form of arguing that consciousness must be a higher level activity that has emerged from lower level processes, such as complex biological processes. Another view, associated with Dennett (1991), is that explanations toward the “what is it like” aspect of consciousness are inherently misguided; hence, emergence explanations are unnecessary. Critics of this view insist that qualia and inherently subjective experiences are necessary data that require explanation.

Dualism has historically been the most important alternative to materialism, at least since Descartes. Material dualism holds that matter and consciousness are two substances that differ fundamentally in a number of ways.[1] This and other differences lead to the perhaps unsolvable problem of how such fundamentally different substances can interact. Historically, support for dualism fits well with such religious notions as the soul or supernatural agency. Dualism has attracted fewer adherents, however, as philosophy gravitated toward more naturalistic explanations.

Two closely related alternatives are panpsychism and neutral monism. Panpsychism holds that matter and mind are joined as one. The usual view of panpsychism holds that all matter, even electrons, has some aspect of mind, albeit at a rudimentary level. While panpsychism has relatively few adherents today, this class of explanations has had a long history in philosophy, being a close relative to animism that was common in early cultures (Skrbina, 2007). Neutral monism holds that matter and consciousness are aspects of some more neutral and fundamental reality. The two primary objections for these two categories of explanations are (1) the unappealing implication that non-biological objects such as rocks possess some level of “what it is like to be” and (2) the perplexing question of how small units of consciousness might combine to create richer, unified conscious experiences.

One last alternative is idealism, which holds that the physical universe is composed of mind. The Berkeleyan version of idealism is that the foundation of physical reality requires an observing agent. The existence of galaxies far beyond our perception would require something like a god. Theist philosophers or ancient believers in a pantheon were drawn to some version of idealism. Of all the alternatives, idealism is viewed as the least compatible with naturalistic explanations and hence has few proponents today.

While a majority of scientists and philosophers currently favor materialism, most who study this problem acknowledge the great difficulty in attempting to understand how non-conscious particles of matter can somehow lead to subjective experience. Searle (1992) provides a critical review of various versions of materialism which evolved over the course of the twentieth century. These include logical behaviorism, type identity theory, token identity theory, functionalism, strong AI, and eliminative materialism. Searle (1992, p. 53) argues that none of these explanations has anything to say about the subjective experience of mind. He argues in favor of a theory of biological naturalism, where consciousness is a natural product of complex biological processes. While he admits that we do not know how consciousness could have emerged this way, he argues that such an explanation must exist and we must therefore persevere until we have it.

While many probably share Searle’s view, his metaphysical assumption that consciousness must be based solely from biological processes is not sufficient given the profound depth of the explanatory gap. Chalmers (1995) has argued that a naturalistic version of substance dualism is a possible candidate for making progress on the hard problem. McGinn (1991) presents a more pessimistic argument that the human mind is likely to be innately unable to understand the origins of its own subjective experience. Griffin (1998), Strawson (2006), and Nagel (2012) have argued that the emergence explanations will not succeed, given the inherent differences between matter and consciousness, and therefore more radical explanations are required.[2]

Nevertheless, most scientists and philosophers are understandably reluctant to give up on materialistic explanations, given its overall success throughout the physical sciences. Further, technologies and empirical methods are continuing to advance in neuroscience, which should provide important revelations for our understanding of consciousness. Indeed, the history of philosophy and science has been unequivocal on one central point: the crucial role that empirical methods must play in advancing our understanding of the world. However, there is one especially relevant category of empirical investigation that has played virtually no role in mainstream debate on consciousness: psi phenomena.

It is curious that those debating the nature of consciousness rarely consider the evidence on psi. Such evidence is surely relevant on the question of whether reality is best described by materialism, dualism, or something else. Of course, evidence on the existence of psi remains controversial, especially among academic psychologists. Despite the substantial empirical studies investigating psychic phenomena, serious discussion of parapsychology remains taboo among many circles of philosophers, scientists, and psychologists. Although the reasons are not clear, perhaps it’s likely that many critics of psi are strong believers in a materialistic worldview and tend to believe that research findings consistent with psi must therefore be invalid (Alcock 2010; Hyman 2010). Many of the most hostile critics are firm believers in a materialistic worldview and understandably expend great effort to undermine, if not ridicule, those who advocate that psi is real.

However, those who are genuinely interested in comparing the arguments for different views on consciousness and are not too invested in materialistic explanations may wish to consider the evidence for psi and what this evidence might imply for the discussion on the nature of consciousness. If we accept the difficulty of the problem at hand, we could conceivably benefit from research that does not more or less assume from the outset that physical particles and processes must account for all reality. I will provide a summary of some of the psi evidence below. This is followed by a discussion of the current debate on the nature of consciousness. I then consider what light might be shed from this evidence.

NOTES
1. Property dualism is another form of dualism, where mind and matter are two distinct categories of a single underlying substance of the physical type. Thus property dualism can be considered another version of materialism.
2. Griffin (1998) and Strawson (2006) both favor panpsychic explanations. Nagel (2012) argues in favor of neutral monism.

Sándor Ferenczi - Confusion of the Tongues Between the Adults and the Child—(The Language of Tenderness and of Passion)

Sándor Ferenczi (7 July 1873 – 22 May 1933) was a Hungarian psychoanalyst, a key theorist of the psychoanalytic school and a close associate of Sigmund Freud. Ferenczi was one of the many close associates of Freud who eventually broke with his rigid approach to psychoanalysis.

File:Hall Freud Jung in front of Clark 1909.jpg
Group photo 1909 in front of Clark University. Front row: Sigmund Freud, G. Stanley Hall, Carl Jung; back row: Abraham A. Brill, Ernest Jones, Sandor Ferenczi.

Most importantly, and as outlined in this article, he came to believe that his patients' accounts of sexual abuse as children were truthful, having verified those accounts through other patients in the same family. This was a major reason for his eventual disputes with Sigmund Freud who had rejected the trauma model of Pierre Janet, which Freud termed the seduction theory, in favor of his own drive and fantasy theories.

Ferenczi was notable as a psychoanalyst for working with the most difficult of patients (where Freud had deemed these patients untreatable) and for developing a theory of more active intervention than is usual for psychoanalytic practice. During the early 1920s, criticizing Freud's "classical" method of neutral interpretation, Ferenczi collaborated with Otto Rank to create a "here-and-now" psychotherapy that, through Rank's personal influence, led the American Carl Rogers to conceptualize person-centered therapy (Kramer 1995) [1].

Relational analysts read Ferenczi as anticipating their own clinical emphasis on mutuality (intimacy), intersubjectivity, and the importance of the analyst's countertransference. Ferenczi's work has strongly influenced theory and praxis of the interpersonal-relational theory of American psychoanalysis, as typified by psychoanalysts at the William Alanson White Institute.

This paper was not published for many years after the original talk was given, and for 16 years following his death in 1933. In it he postulates a trauma theory based in relational failures, not in unconscious drives and fantasies. Many of the ideas in current relational theories of trauma can be found in this paper in crude form, but present nonetheless.

  1. Kramer, Robert (1995). The Birth of Client-Centered Therapy: Carl Rogers, Otto Rank, and 'The Beyond,' an article in Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 35(4), pp. 54–110.

Article Citation
Ferenczi, S. (1949). Confusion of the Tongues Between the Adults and the Child—(The Language of Tenderness and of Passion). International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 30:225-230.

Translated by Michael Balint. Paper read at the Twelfth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Wiesbaden, September, 1932. The original title of the paper as announced was 'The Passions of Adults and their Influence on the Sexual and Character Development of Children.' Published in Int. Z. f. Psa. (1933), 19, 5–15 and subsequently in Bausteine Zur Psychoanalyse, Vol. III. Berne, 1939.

Confusion of the Tongues Between the Adults and the Child—(The Language of Tenderness and of Passion)[1]

by Sándor Ferenczi

It was a mistake to try to confine the all too wide theme of the exogenous origin of character formations and neuroses within a Congress paper [2]. I shall, therefore, content myself with a short extract from what I would have had to say on that subject. Perhaps it will be best if I start by telling you how I have come to the problem expressed in the title of this paper. In the address given to the Viennese Psycho-Analytic Society on the occasion of Professor Freud's seventy-fifth birthday, I reported on a regression in technique (and partly also in the theory) of the neuroses to which I was forced by certain bad or incomplete results with my patients. By that I mean the recent, more emphatic stress on the traumatic factors in the pathogenesis of the neuroses which had been unjustly neglected in recent years. Insufficiently deep exploration of the exogenous factor leads to the danger of resorting prematurely to explanations—often too facile explanations—in terms of 'disposition' and 'constitution'.

The—I should like to say imposing—phenomena, the almost hallucinatory repetitions of traumatic experiences which began to accumulate in my daily practice, seemed to justify the hope that by this abreaction large quantities of repressed affects might obtain acceptance by the conscious mind and that the formation of new symptoms, especially when the superstructure of the affects had been sufficiently loosened by the analytic work, might be ended. This hope, unfortunately, was only very imperfectly fulfilled and some of my patients caused me a great deal of worry and embarrassment. The repetition, encouraged by the analysis, turned out to be too good. It is true that there was a marked improvement in some of the symptoms; on the other hand, however, these patients began to suffer from nocturnal attacks of anxiety, even from severe nightmares, and the analytic session degenerated time and again into an attack of anxiety hysteria. Although we were able to analyse conscientiously the threatening symptoms of such an attack, which seemed to convince and reassure the patient, the expected permanent success failed to materialize and the next morning brought the same complaints about the dreadful night, while in the analytic session, repetition of the trauma occurred. In this embarrassing position I tried to console myself in the usual way—that the patient had a much too forceful resistance or that he suffered from such severe repressions that abreaction and emergence into consciousness could only occur piecemeal. However, as the state of the patient, even after a considerable time, did not change in essentials, I had to give free rein to self-criticism. I started to listen to my patients when, in their attacks, they called me insensitive, cold, even hard and cruel, when they reproached me with being selfish, heartless, conceited, when they shouted at me: 'Help! Quick! Don't let me perish helplessly!' Then I began to test my conscience in order to discover whether, despite all my conscious good intentions, there might after all be some truth in these accusations. I wish to add that such periods of anger and hatred occurred only exceptionally; very often the sessions ended with a striking, almost helpless compliance and willingness to accept my interpretations. This, however, was so transitory that I came to realize that even these apparently willing patients felt hatred and rage, and I began to encourage them not to spare me in any way. This encouragement, too, failed to achieve much, for most of my patients energetically refused to accept such an interpretative demand although it was well supported by analytic material.

Gradually, then, I came to the conclusion that the patients have an exceedingly refined sensitivity for the wishes, tendencies, whims, sympathies and antipathies of their analyst, even if the analyst is completely unaware of this sensitivity. Instead of contradicting the analyst or accusing him of errors and blindness, the patients identify themselves with him; only in rare moments of an hysteroid excitement, i.e. in an almost unconscious state, can they pluck up enough courage to make a protest; normally they do not allow themselves to criticize us, such a criticism does not even become conscious in them unless we give them special permission or even encouragement to be so bold. That means that we must discern not only the painful events of their past from their associations, but also—and much more often than hitherto supposed—their repressed or suppressed criticism of us.

Here, however, we meet with considerable resistances, this time resistances in ourselves as well as in our patients. Above all, we ourselves must have been really well analysed, right down to 'rock bottom'. We must have learnt to recognize all our unpleasant external and internal character traits in order that we may be really prepared to face all those forms of hidden hatred and contempt that can be so cunningly disguised in our patients' associations.

This leads to the side issue—the analysis of the analyst—which is becoming more and more important. Do not let us forget that the deep-reaching analysis of a neurosis needs many years, while the average training analysis lasts only a few months, or at most, one to one and a half years [3]. This may lead to an impossible situation, namely, that our patients gradually become better analysed than we ourselves are, which means that although they may show signs of such superiority, they are unable to express it in words; indeed, they deteriorate into an extreme submissiveness obviously because of this inability or because of a fear of occasioning displeasure in us by their criticism.

A great part of the repressed criticism felt by our patients is directed towards what might be called professional hypocrisy. We greet the patient with politeness when he enters our room, ask him to start with his associations and promise him faithfully that we will listen attentively to him, give our undivided interest to his well-being and to the work needed for it. In reality, however, it may happen that we can only with difficulty tolerate certain external or internal features of the patient, or perhaps we feel unpleasantly disturbed in some professional or personal affair by the analytic session. Here, too, I cannot see any other way out than to make the source of the disturbance in us fully conscious and to discuss it with the patient, admitting it perhaps not only as a possibility but as a fact.

It is remarkable that such renunciation of the 'professional hypocrisy'—a hypocrisy hitherto regarded as unavoidable —instead of hurting the patient, led to a marked easing off in his condition. The traumatic-hysterical attack, even if it recurred, became considerably milder, tragic events of the past could be reproduced in thoughts without creating again a loss of mental balance; in fact the level of the patient's personality seemed to have been considerably raised.

Now what brought about this state of affairs? Something had been left unsaid in the relation between physician and patient, something insincere, and its frank discussion freed, so to speak, the tongue-tied patient; the admission of the analyst's error produced confidence in his patient. It would almost seem to be of advantage occasionally to commit blunders in order to admit afterwards the fault to the patient. This advice is, however, quite superfluous; we commit blunders often enough and one highly intelligent patient became justifiably indignant, saying: 'It would have been much better if you could have avoided blunders altogether. Your vanity, doctor, would like to make profit even out of your errors.'

The discovery and the solution of this purely technical problem revealed some previously hidden or scarcely noticed material. The analytical situation—i.e. the restrained coolness, the professional hypocrisy and—hidden behind it but never revealed—a dislike of the patient which, nevertheless, he felt in all his being—such a situation was not essentially different from that which in his childhood had led to the illness. When, in addition to the strain caused by this analytical situation, we imposed on the patient the further burden of reproducing the original trauma, we created a situation that was indeed unbearable. Small wonder that our effort produced no better results than the original trauma. The setting free of his critical feelings, the willingness on our part to admit our mistakes and the honest endeavour to avoid them in future, all these go to create in the patient a confidence in the analyst. It is this confidence that establishes the contrast between the present and the unbearable traumatogenic past, the contrast which is absolutely necessary for the patient in order to enable him to re-experience the past no longer as hallucinatory reproduction but as an objective memory. Suppressed criticisms felt by my patients, e.g. the discovery with uncanny clairvoyance, of the aggressive features of my 'active therapy', of the professional hypocrisy in the forcing of relaxation, taught me to recognize and to control the exaggerations in both directions. I am no less grateful to those of my patients who taught me that we are more than willing to adhere rigidly to certain theoretical constructions and to leave unnoticed facts on one side that would injure our complacency and authority. In any case, I learnt the cause of my inability to influence the hysterical explosions and this discovery eventually made success possible. It happened to me as it did to that wise woman whose friend could not be wakened from her narcoleptic sleep by any amount of shaking and shouting, to whom there came, suddenly, the idea of shouting 'Rock-a-bye baby'. After that the patient started to do everything she was asked to do. We talk a good deal in analysis of regressions into the infantile,but we do not really believe to what great extent we are right; we talk a lot about the splitting of the personality, but do not seem sufficiently to appreciate the depth of these splits. If we keep up our cool, educational attitude even vis-à-vis an opisthotonic patient, we tear to shreds the last thread that connects him to us. The patient gone off into his trance is a child indeed who no longer reacts to intellectual explanations, only perhaps to maternal friendliness; without it he feels lonely andabandoned in his greatest need, i.e. in the same unbearable situation which at one time led to a splitting of his mind and eventually to his illness; thus it is no wonder that the patient cannot but repeat now the symptom-formation exactly as he did at the time when his illness started.

I may remind you that patients do not react to theatrical phrases, but only to real sincere sympathy. Whether they recognize the truth by the intonation or colour of our voice or by the words we use or in some other way, I cannot tell. In any case, they show a remarkable, almost clairvoyant knowledge about the thoughts and emotions that go on in their analyst's mind. To deceive a patient in this respect seems to be hardly possible and if one tries to do so, it leads only to bad consequences.

Now allow me to report on some new ideas which this more intimate relation to my patients helped me to reach.

I obtained above all new corroborative evidence for my supposition that the trauma, especially the sexual trauma, as the pathogenic factor cannot be valued highly enough. Even children of very respectable, sincerely puritanical families, fall victim to real violence or rape much more often than one had dared to suppose. Either it is the parents who try to find a substitute gratification in this pathological way for their frustration, or it is people thought to be trustworthy such as relatives (uncles, aunts, grandparents), governesses or servants, who misuse the ignorance and the innocence of the child. The immediate explanation—that these are only sexual phantasies of the child, a kind of hysterical lying—is unfortunately made invalid by the number of such confessions, e.g. of assaults upon children, committed by patients actually in analysis. That iswhy I was not surprised when recently a philanthropically-minded teacher told me, despairingly, that in a short time he had discovered that in five upper class families the governesses were living a regular sexual life with boys of nine to eleven years old.

A typical way in which incestuous seductions may occur is this: an adult and a child love each other, the child nursing the playful phantasy of taking the rôle of mother to the adult. This play may assume erotic forms but remains, nevertheless, on the level of tenderness. It is not so, however, with pathological adults, especially if they have been disturbed in their balance and self-control by some misfortune or by the use of intoxicating drugs. They mistake the play of children for the desires of a sexually mature person or even allow themselves—irrespective of any consequences—to be carried away. The real rape of girls who have hardly grown out of the age of infants, similar sexual acts of mature women with boys, and also enforced homosexual acts, are more frequent occurrences than has hitherto been assumed.

It is difficult to imagine the behaviour and the emotions of children after such violence. One would expect the first impulse to be that of rejection, hatred, disgust and energetic refusal. 'No, no, I do not want it, it is much too violent for me, it hurts, leave me alone', this or something similar would be the immediate reaction if it would not be paralyzed by enormous anxiety. These children feel physically and morally helpless, their personalities are not sufficiently consolidated in order to be able to protest, even if only in thought, for the overpowering force and authority of the adult makes them dumb and can rob them of their senses. The same anxiety, however, if it reaches a certain maximum, compels them to subordinate themselves like automata to the will of the aggressor, to divine each one of his desires and to gratify these; completely oblivious of themselves they identify themselves with the aggressor. Through the identification, or let us say, introjection of the aggressor, he disappears as part of the external reality, and becomes intra- instead of extra-psychic; the intra-psychic is then subjected, in a dream-like state as is the traumatic trance, to the primary process, i.e. according to the pleasure principle it can be modified or changed by the use of positive or negative hallucinations. In any case the attack as a rigid external reality ceases to exist and in the traumatic trance the child succeeds in maintaining the previous situation of tenderness.

The most important change, produced in the mind of the child by the anxiety-fear-ridden identification with the adult partner, is the introjection of the guilt feelings of the adult which makes hitherto harmless play appear as a punishable offence.

When the child recovers from such an attack, he feels enormously confused, in fact, split—innocent and culpable at the same time—and his confidence in the testimony of his own senses is broken. Moreover, the harsh behaviour of the adult partner tormented and made angry by his remorse renders the child still more conscious of his own guilt and still more ashamed. Almost always the perpetrator behaves as though nothing had happened, and consoles himself with the thought: 'Oh, it is only a child, he does not know anything, he will forget it all.' Not infrequently after such events, the seducer
becomes over-moralistic or religious and endeavours to save the soul of the child by severity.

Usually the relation to a second adult—in the case quoted above, the mother—is not intimate enough for the child to find help there, timid attempts towards this end are refused by her as nonsensical. The misused child changes into a mechanical, obedient automaton or becomes defiant, but is unable to account for the reasons of his defiance. His sexual life remains undeveloped or assumes perverted forms. There is no need for me to enter into the details of neuroses and psychoses which may follow such events. For our theory this assumption, however, is highly important—namely, that the weak and undeveloped personality reacts to sudden unpleasure not by defence, but by anxiety-ridden identification and by introjection of the menacing person or aggressor. Only with the help of this hypothesis can I understand why my patients refused so obstinately to follow my advice to react to unjust or unkind treatment with pain or with hatred and defence. One part of their personalities, possibly the nucleus, got stuck in its development at a level where it was unable to use the alloplastic way of reaction but could only react in an autoplastic way by a kind of mimicry. Thus we arrive at the assumption of a mind which consists only of the Id and Super-Ego, and which therefore lacks the ability to maintain itself with stability in face of unpleasure—in the same way as the immature find it unbearable to be left alone, without maternal care and without a considerable amount of tenderness. Here we have to revert to some of the ideas developed by Freud a long time ago according to which the capacity for object-love must be preceded by a stage of identification.

I should like to call this the stage of passive object-love or of tenderness. Vestiges of object-love are already apparent here but only in a playful way in phantasies. Thus almost without exception we find the hidden play of taking the place of the parent of the same sex in order to be married to the other parent, but it must be stressed that this is merely phantasy; in reality the children would not want to, in fact they cannot do without tenderness, especially that which comes from the mother. If more love or love of a different kind from that which they need, is forced upon the children in the stage of tenderness, it may lead to pathological consequences in the same way as the frustration or withdrawal of love quoted elsewhere in this connection. It would lead us too far from our immediate subject to go into details of the neuroses and the character maldevelopments which may follow the precocious super-imposition of love, passionate and guilt loaded on an immature guiltless child. The consequence must needs be that of confusion of tongues, which is emphasized in the title of this address. Parents and adults, in the same way as we analysts, ought to learn to be constantly aware that behind the submissiveness or even the adoration, just as behind the transference of love, of our children, patients and pupils, there lies hidden an ardent desire to get rid of this oppressive love. If we can help the child, the patient or the pupil to give up the reaction of identification, and to ward off the over-burdening transference, then we may be said to have reached the goal of raising the personality to a higher level.

I should like to point briefly to a further extension of our knowledge made possible by these observations. We have long held that not only superimposed love but also unbearable punishments lead to fixations. The solution of this apparent paradox may perhaps now be possible. The playful trespasses of the child are raised to serious reality only by the passionate, often infuriated, punitive sanctions and lead to depressive states in the child who, until then, felt blissfully guiltless.

Detailed examination of the phenomena during an analytic trance teaches us that there is neither shock nor fright without some trace of splitting of personality. It will not surprise any analyst that part of the person regresses into the state of happiness that existed prior to the trauma—a trauma which it endeavours to annul. It is more remarkable that in the identification the working of a second mechanism can be observed, a mechanism the existence of which I, for one, have had but little knowledge. I mean the sudden, surprising rise of new faculties after a trauma, like a miracle that occurs upon the wave of a magic wand, or like that of the fakirs who are said to raise from a tiny seed, before our very eyes, a plant, leaves and flowers. Great need, and more especially mortal anxiety, seem to possess the power to waken up suddenly and to put into operation latent dispositions which, un-cathected, waited in deepest quietude for their development.

When subjected to a sexual attack, under the pressure of such traumatic urgency, the child can develop instantaneously all the emotions of mature adult and all the potential qualities dormant in him that normally belong to marriage, maternity and fatherhood. One is justified—in contradistinction to the familiar regression—to speak of a traumatic progression, of a precocious maturity. It is natural to compare this with the precocious maturity of the fruit that was injured by a bird or insect. Not only emotionally, but also intellectually, can the trauma bring to maturity a part of the person. I wish to remind you of the typical 'dream of the wise baby' described by me several years ago in which a newly-born child or an infant begins to talk, in fact teaches wisdom to the entire family. The fear of the uninhibited, almost mad adult changes the child, so to speak, into a psychiatrist and, in order to become one and to defend himself against dangers coming from people without self-control, he must know how to identify himself completely with them. Indeed it is unbelievable how much we can still learn from our wise children, the neurotics.

If the shocks increase in number during the development of the child, the number and the various kinds of splits in the personality increase too, and soon it becomes extremely difficult to maintain contact without confusion with all the fragments each of which behaves as a separate personality yet does not know of even the existence of the others. Eventually it may arrive at a state which—continuing the picture of fragmentation—one would be justified in calling atomization. One must possess a good deal of optimism not to lose courage when facing such a state, though I hope even here to be able to find threads that can link up the various parts.

In addition to passionate love and passionate punishment there is a third method of helplessly binding a child to an adult. This is the terrorism of suffering. Children have the compulsion to put to rights all disorder in the family, to burden, so to speak, their own tender shoulders with the load of all the others; of course this is not only out of pure altruism, but is in order to be able to enjoy again the lost rest and the care and attention accompanying it. A mother complaining of her constant miseries can create a nurse for life out of her child, i.e. a real mother substitute, neglecting the true interests of the
child.

I am certain—if all this proves true—that we shall have to revise certain chapters of the theory of sexuality and genitality. The perversions, for instance, are perhaps only infantile as far as they remain on the level of tenderness;if they become passionate and loaded with guilt, they are perhaps already the result of exogenous stimulation, of secondary, neurotic exaggeration. Also my theory of genitality neglected this difference between the phases of tenderness and of passion. How much of the sado-masochism in the sexuality of our time is due to civilization (i.e. originates only from introjected feelings of guilt) and how much develops autochtonously and spontaneously as a proper phase of organization, must be left for further research.

I shall be pleased if you would take the trouble to examine in thought and in your practice what I said to-day and especially if you would follow my advice to pay attention more than hitherto to the much veiled, yet very critical way of thinking and speaking to your children, patients and pupils and to loosen, as it were, their tongues. I am sure you will gain agood deal of instructive material.

APPENDIX


This train of thought points only descriptively to the tenderness of the infantile eroticism and to the passionate in the sexuality of the adult. It leaves open the problem of the real nature of this difference. Psycho-analysis willingly agrees with the Cartesian idea that passions are brought about by suffering, but perhaps will have to find an answer to the question of what it is that introduces the element of suffering, and with it sado-masochism, into the playful gratifications at the level of tenderness. The argument described above suggests that among others it is the guilt feelings that make the love-object in the erotic life of the adult an object of both loving and hating, i.e. of ambivalent emotions, while the infantile tenderness lacks as yet this schism. It is hatred that traumatically surprises and frightens the child while being loved by an adult, that changes him from a spontaneously and innocently playing being into a guilty love-automaton imitating the adult anxiously, self-effacingly. Their own guilt feelings and the hatred felt towards the seductive child partner fashion the love relation of the adults into a frightening struggle (primal scene) for the child. For the adult, this ends in the moment of orgasm, while infantile sexuality—in the absence of the 'struggle of the sexes'—remains at the level of forepleasure and knows only gratifications in the sense of 'saturation' and not the feelings of annihilation of orgasm. The 'Theory of Genitality' [4] that tries to found the 'struggle of the sexes' on phylogenesis will have to make clear this difference between the infantile-erotic gratifications and the hate-impregnated love of adult mating.

—————————————

1. Paper read at the Twelfth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Wiesbaden, September, 1932.
2. The original title of the paper as announced was 'The Passions of Adults and their Influence on the Sexual and Character Development of Children.' Published in Int. Z. f. Psa. (1933), 19, 5–15 and subsequently in Bausteine Zur Psychoanalyse, Vol. III. Berne, 1939.
3. Written 1932.
4. Thalassa, 1938, New York. The Psycho-Analytic Quarterly Inc. (German original published in 1924.)

Steven Kotler - "The Rise of Superman: Decoding the Science of Ultimate Human Performance"


From Talks at Google, Steven Kotler stopped by recently to discuss his new book, The Rise of Superman: Decoding the Science of Ultimate Human Performance (2014). Essentially, this is a book on applied flow states.

Here is the publisher's ad copy for the book:
In this groundbreaking book, New York Times–bestselling author Steven Kotler decodes the mystery of ultimate human performance. Drawing on over a decade of research and first-hand reporting with dozens of top action and adventure sports athletes like big wave legend Laird Hamilton, big mountain snowboarder Jeremy Jones, and skateboarding pioneer Danny Way, Kotler explores the frontier science of “flow,” an optimal state of consciousness in which we perform and feel our best.

Building a bridge between the extreme and the mainstream, The Rise of Superman explains how these athletes are using flow to do the impossible and how we can use this information to radically accelerate performance in our own lives.

At its core, this is a book about profound possibility; about what is actually possible for our species; about where—if anywhere—our limits lie.
 Interesting stuff.

Steven Kotler, "The Rise of Superman: Decoding the Science of Ultimate Human Performance"

Published on May 5, 2014


As the author of The Rise of Superman: Decoding the Science of Ultimate Human Performance and co-founder of the Flow Genome Project, Steven Kotler is one of the world's leading experts on ultimate human performance. In this riveting talk, he provides a stunning tour of current research, primarily focusing on "flow states"—an optimal state of consciousness where we both feel our best and perform our best. Researchers now know that flow sits at the heart of almost every athletic championship; underpins most major scientific breakthroughs; and accounts for significant progress in the arts. In business, its impact has been substantial. Coders in flow built the internet; video game designers in flow built the video game industry. "Flow state percentage"—which is the amount of time employees spend in flow—has been called the most important management metric for building great innovation teams. As a result of all of this, an increasing number of companies have put the cultivation of flow at the heart of their philosophies. So what is this mysterious state? How does it work its magic? And—if this really is the secret to ultimate human performance—how can we get more of it in our personal and professional lives?

Sunday, May 11, 2014

Are Phobias Passed Down Through Generations in DNA?


It seems that some "memories," and here it is phobias, can be passed down genetically from one generation to the next. It appears that the DNA undergoes chemical changes known as epigenetic methylation.

Interesting stuff.

Full Citation:
Dias, BG & Ressler, KJ. (2014). Parental olfactory experience influences behavior and neural structure in subsequent generations. Nature Neuroscience 17: 89–96. doi:10.1038/nn.3594 

Phobias may be memories passed down in genes from ancestors

Memories may be passed down through generations in DNA in a process that may be the underlying cause of phobias


New research has shown that it is possible for some information to be inherited biologically through chemical changes that occur in DNA Photo: ALAMY


By Richard Gray, Science Correspondent
Dec 2013

Memories can be passed down to later generations through genetic switches that allow offspring to inherit the experience of their ancestors, according to new research that may explain how phobias can develop.

Scientists have long assumed that memories and learned experiences built up during a lifetime must be passed on by teaching later generations or through personal experience.

However, new research has shown that it is possible for some information to be inherited biologically through chemical changes that occur in DNA.

Researchers at the Emory University School of Medicine, in Atlanta, found that mice can pass on learned information about traumatic or stressful experiences – in this case a fear of the smell of cherry blossom – to subsequent generations.

The results may help to explain why people suffer from seemingly irrational phobias – it may be based on the inherited experiences of their ancestors.

So a fear of spiders may in fact be an inherited defence mechanism laid down in a families genes by an ancestors' frightening encounter with an arachnid.

Dr Brian Dias, from the department of psychiatry at Emory University, said: "We have begun to explore an underappreciated influence on adult behaviour – ancestral experience before conception.

"From a translational perspective, our results allow us to appreciate how the experiences of a parent, before even conceiving offspring, markedly influence both structure and function in the nervous system of subsequent generations.

"Such a phenomenon may contribute to the etiology and potential intergenerational transmission of risk for neuropsychiatric disorders such as phobias, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder."

In the study, which is published in the journal of Nature Neuroscience, the researchers trained mice to fear the smell of cherry blossom using electric shocks before allowing them to breed.

The offspring produced showed fearful responses to the odour of cherry blossom compared to a neutral odour, despite never having encountered them before.

The following generation also showed the same behaviour. This effect continued even if the mice had been fathered through artificial insemination.

The researchers found the brains of the trained mice and their offspring showed structural changes in areas used to detect the odour.

The DNA of the animals also carried chemical changes, known as epigenetic methylation, on the gene responsible for detecting the odour.

This suggests that experiences are somehow transferred from the brain into the genome, allowing them to be passed on to later generations.

The researchers now hope to carry out further work to understand how the information comes to be stored on the DNA in the first place.

They also want to explore whether similar effects can be seen in the genes of humans.

Professor Marcus Pembrey, a paediatric geneticist at University College London, said the work provided "compelling evidence" for the biological transmission of memory.

He added: "It addresses constitutional fearfulness that is highly relevant to phobias, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorders, plus the controversial subject of transmission of the ‘memory’ of ancestral experience down the generations.

"It is high time public health researchers took human transgenerational responses seriously.

"I suspect we will not understand the rise in neuropsychiatric disorders or obesity, diabetes and metabolic disruptions generally without taking a multigenerational approach.”

Professor Wolf Reik, head of epigenetics at the Babraham Institute in Cambridge, said, however, further work was needed before such results could be applied to humans.

He said: "These types of results are encouraging as they suggest that transgenerational inheritance exists and is mediated by epigenetics, but more careful mechanistic study of animal models is needed before extrapolating such findings to humans.”

It comes as another study in mice has shown that their ability to remember can be effected by the presence of immune system factors in their mother's milk

Dr Miklos Toth, from Weill Cornell Medical College, found that chemokines carried in a mother's milk caused changes in the brains of their offspring, affecting their memory in later life.
* * * * *

Here is the abstract to the original article, but the whole article is, of course, behind a paywall.

Parental olfactory experience influences behavior and neural structure in subsequent generations

Brian G Dias & Kerry J Ressler

Nature Neuroscience
17: 89–96 (2014). doi:10.1038/nn.3594



Abstract


Using olfactory molecular specificity, we examined the inheritance of parental traumatic exposure, a phenomenon that has been frequently observed, but not understood. We subjected F0 mice to odor fear conditioning before conception and found that subsequently conceived F1 and F2 generations had an increased behavioral sensitivity to the F0-conditioned odor, but not to other odors. When an odor (acetophenone) that activates a known odorant receptor (Olfr151) was used to condition F0 mice, the behavioral sensitivity of the F1 and F2 generations to acetophenone was complemented by an enhanced neuroanatomical representation of the Olfr151 pathway. Bisulfite sequencing of sperm DNA from conditioned F0 males and F1 naive offspring revealed CpG hypomethylation in the Olfr151 gene. In addition, in vitro fertilization, F2 inheritance and cross-fostering revealed that these transgenerational effects are inherited via parental gametes. Our findings provide a framework for addressing how environmental information may be inherited transgenerationally at behavioral, neuroanatomical and epigenetic levels.

Paul Fusella - Dynamic Systems Theory in Cognitive Science: Major Elements, Applications, and Debates Surrounding a Revolutionary Meta-Theory


Last week I posted an article that summarized some of the progress in dynamic systems theory and cognitive science over the last 20 years. This article takes up that same topic but examines some of the theoretical debates around the use and validity of dynamic systems theory (a good overview of DNS can be found here).

I am only posting the "Introduction" below, so follow the links to read the whole article (pdf).

Full Citation:
Fusella, PV. (2013). Dynamic Systems Theory in Cognitive Science: Major Elements, Applications, and Debates Surrounding a Revolutionary Meta-Theory. Dynamical Psychology. dynapsyc.org

Dynamic Systems Theory in Cognitive Science: Major Elements, Applications, and Debates Surrounding a Revolutionary Meta-Theory


Paul V. Fusella
January 15, 2013

Introduction


It is the theory that decides what we can observe.” -Albert Einstein

Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) is a broad theoretical framework imported from the physical sciences and used in psychology and cognitive science in the past several decades that provides an alternative to the computational and information-processing approach that has governed main stream cognitive science since the dawn of the cognitive revolution in the mid-twentieth century (Beer, 2000; van Gelder & Port, 1995; van Gelder, 1998; Spivey, 2007). DST views all psychological processes and capacities as dynamic systems which are best described as complex, non-linear, self-organizing and emergent and whereby cognition develops over the life course and occurs over real-time as a probable description of many possible alternatives instead of linear-assembly-of-symbolic-processes (Spivey, 2007; van Gelder & Port, 1995). Psychological capacities are viewed as emerging as more complex unique forms from prior simpler states, moving from chaotic to more stable trajectories in a theoretical state-space that culminate in the manifestation of a specific thought in real-time or a developmental phenomenon over ontogenesis (Spivey, 2006, Thelen & Smith, 1994; van Geert, 1998). There is a sensitivity to initial conditions and a determination by multiple causality, whereby psychological phenomena, be it a developmental capacity or cognition more generally, are softly-assembled (Thelen & Smith, 2003).

This overarching and revolutionary view for cognitive science has been in the works for quite some time perhaps since the cybernetics movement in the mid-20th century but has become more popular in recent years and has been referred to by a number of different and related labels reflecting related ideas and ranging from chaos theory to complexity theory to nonlinear dynamical systems theory. These titles all refer to similar ideas but have subtle and nuanced differences. I choose to use the term dynamic systems theory because this is the term used by most cognitive scientists who subscribe to this viewpoint and who refer to their movement as the dynamical view in cognitive science and refer to themselves as dynamicists so I will continue with that tradition although the lexicon and conceptual hallmarks used are shared by all these related viewpoints.

Specifically, what I mean by the DST approach in cognitive science (and later to what I refer to as the Complexity Theory (CT) approach) is something also related to work in theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence and empirical and theoretical work done there that applies to some distinct intelligent systems but particularly what it can say about the human mind as an intelligent system. Siegelmann (1997, 2003), Bringsford (2004), Kempis (1991), and Penrose (1990) have described the quintessential hallmark of the DST approach of this particular form of intelligent system as being trans-Turing (or super-Turing) and which possesses hyper-computational capabilities; that is brains and other certain forms of intelligent systems perform processes that go above and beyond the Turing-limit with it’s symbolic-serial processing of the traditional digital computer metaphor that has hallmarked much of the work done in cognitive science and which has been motivated by the information-processing (or computational) perspective. By computationalism I am referring to what has been the dominate theoretical framework in cognitive science since its inception, which has been motivated by the development of the digital computer and principally the work of Alan Turing and the Turing machine, and which uses as a metaphor for the mind, a symbolic-algorithmic-serial-processing digital-computer that computes at or below the Turing-limit.

The argument made by most dynamicists is that DST is a more suitable theoretical framework for situating psychological phenomena because it has achieved success in accounting for other phenomena in the natural world as diverse as meteorological phenomena to kinematics of the human body. The brain and mind are part of the natural world so logically they too can be accounted for by the dynamical view and perhaps more completely and accurately than the traditional computational and information-processing approach with its use of the digital computer as the metaphor for mind. The mind is an abstraction for the neurological underpinnings in the brain and these are not machines they are biological organs made up of cells and organic molecules and they are part of the natural world and could arguably be better accounted for by a meta-theory that has been successful in capturing the diverse natural phenomena that dynamic systems theory has been able to do. I am echoing the argument made by the dynamicists and arguing for a paradigm shift in the sense that Kuhn (1962) described, specifically in cognitive science, as a move away-from the computational, toward a dynamical theoretical framework and paradigm with an recognition that the computations made by the human mind are trans-Turing (or super-Turing) and go above and beyond the Turing-limit of the traditional information-processing approach.

Adopting DST reconciles a lot of the debates in cognitive science surrounding the phenomena that is investigated from monism vs. dualism, nativism vs. empiricism, and subjectivity vs. objectivity, not to mention the various anomalies discovered as a result of adopting a computational viewpoint. DST reorganizes the way that phenomena are studied and conceptualized; where some such as Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) have argued for first person methods in the study of consciousness utilizing methods from traditional Buddhist psychology and which reflects a post-positivist view of how science is conducted. However, others including Spivey (2007), Beer (2000), Thelen and Smith (1994), van Gelder and Port (1995), and Schoner (2008) continue to work empirically with a positivist empirical framework in studying various psychological capacities from a DST perspective and these are the mainstream in the field. Thus, be it the manner in which phenomena are empirically investigated or the manner in which theories are constructed, DST is beginning to be accepted as a viable alternative to the 20th century traditions of computationalism and positivism. DST provides an account of cognitive phenomena that is dynamical, embodied, completely situated and ecologically-grounded and the ways that cognitive scientists go about conducting research and theory building is likely to be influenced by these fundamental aspects to this meta-theory.

In this paper, I will set out to provide an overview of the dynamical approach in cognitive science reviewing the more important work that has been done in recent decades and especially at the turn of the 21rst century. I will focus on a review of two recent debates that were published recently: one in 1998 in the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences and the other in 2012 in TopiCS in Cognitive Science where contributing scientists debate the legitimacy of the dynamical view. During the review of these debates I will touch on the different facets of DST including work done in embodied cognition and ecologically grounded cognitive phenomena and also work that has been done in applying DST to experiments in psycholinguistics wherein the role of the body, the context, and the environment are united in one framework that is guided by DST.

During this review of the work in the application of DST in cognitive science and reviewing the various formal debates that showed up in peer reviewed journals and discussing them critically, I will echo what others have proclaimed in the past and make the argument that DST is ultimately a more suitable theoretical framework for guiding empirical research and theory building in cognitive science and should at some point in the not so distant future, but especially for moving the field forward in this new century, replace the outdated computational and information-processing approach which appears to have run its course. DST has much promise in providing an overarching and unifying theoretical framework for the cognitive sciences but like anything new it is met with staunch criticisms and rejection. However, the more people that join this movement the more the basic principles embodied in the DST approach will become grounded in empirical evidence. I will begin to conclude the review with a recap of the major controversies that adopting DST provokes from its criticizers and will finish with my modest vision for the future role DST can play in reorganizing the way that science is conducted in the cognitive sciences building off the work that has been done in dynamical cognition from the beginning and reacting against and incorporating within it the good that came from the traditional approaches in cognitive science into the future of what this revolutionary meta-theory means for cognitive science.
Read the whole article (pdf).

Integrative Genomics in Neuropsychiatric Disorders

 

Unless you are really into genomics and how they play out in mental illness, this may be something to skip. On the other hand, it's really interesting stuff. Integrative genomics may offer new and innovative approaches to working with neuropsychiatric disorders.

Integrative Genomics in Neuropsychiatric Disorders

Air date: Monday, May 05, 2014
Runtime: 01:09:44


Description: Neuroscience Seminar Series
Dr. Geschwind laboratory is working to improve our understanding of human neuropsychiatric diseases, such as autism and neurodegenerative diseases, and their relationship to the range of normal human higher cognitive function. They use a combination of genetic, functional genomic, and neurobiological methods in our work--frequently in collaboration with other laboratories or disciplines. Their methodological focus involves the application of network analyses and systems biology, which offer the promise of integration of multiple levels of data, connecting molecular pathways to nervous system function in health and disease.

Author: Daniel Geschwind, M.D., Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles

Download: To download this event, select one of the available bitrates:
[64k] [150k] [240k] [440k] [740k] [1040k] [1240k] [1440k] [1840k] How to download a Videocast
Caption Text: Download Caption File
Permanent link