Showing posts with label responsibility. Show all posts
Showing posts with label responsibility. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

Michael Unger - Stop Bubble-Wrapping Your Kids! How Overprotection Leads to Psychological Damage

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Michael Ungar, PhD, is a family therapist and a professor of social work at Dalhousie University, where he codirects the Resilience Research Centre. He’s the author of Too Safe for Their Own Good: How Risk and Responsibility Help Teens Thrive.

This article was published originally in Psychotherapy Networker magazine and re-posted at Alternet.

This style of parenting seems to weird to me. Granted, I grew up in the 1970s, in a quiet suburb of Los Angeles, but I had an incredible amount of freedom compared to today's kids. As a seven or eight year old (maybe younger), I was allowed to walk nearly a mile to the 7-11 to buy baseball cards with my allowance on a Saturday morning. At eight or nine, I could ride my bicycle several miles with a friend or two to go to Magic Mountain, which included crossing several major intersections. As a nine-year-old in southern Oregon, I was allowed to be out all day, fishing my way with a friend down Williams Creek.

I grew up with the freedom to make mistakes, get stuffed in a garbage can (I was six, and we were riding our bikes in the junior high school down the street), and to explore the world in which I grew up. Those experiences are part of who I am today.

Psychologist: Stop Bubble-Wrapping Your Kids! How Overprotection Leads to Psychological Damage

If overprotection can disadvantage children, why do so many parents continue to bubble-wrap their kids?


Psychotherapy Networker / By Michael Ungar

September 17, 2014  |  I’m sure Shyam wasn’t thinking about the harm she was causing her 8-year-old daughter, Marian, when she demanded her daughter’s school put an extra crossing guard closer to their home. Nor did she doubt herself when she insisted that children be barred from bringing oranges to school because Marian developed a minor rash every time she ate one. At home, Marian was closely monitored and never allowed to take risks: no sleepovers, no playing on the trampoline with friends, no walking to the corner store (less than a block away) by herself.

Shyam might sound extreme in her parenting, but among the families that come to therapy these days, she’s far from an outlier. While not all overprotective parents are as extreme in their behaviors as Shyam (indeed, few experience themselves as being obsessive at all), many middle-class families are struggling to decide how much protection is the right amount, even when their children are showing signs of anxiety and rebellion as a result. Whether these families are my clients or my neighbors, overprotective parenting appears to have become the rule, rather than the exception, in today’s world.

I’ll be the first to admit that I found it difficult not to roll my eyes and tell Shyam to lighten up. I wanted to share stories about my own upbringing, which included healthy doses of benign neglect by a mother who told me to go outside and play and not come back until I was hungry, or badly injured.

Or I could’ve explained to Shyam that there’s now consensus among social scientists that children across the United States, Canada, Australia, England, and other high-income countries have never been safer. Even the respected epidemiologists at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta recently published a report that showed that the real risks to our children aren’t abductions by strangers or being murdered, but much more commonplace problems like bullying and obesity. Believe it or not, physical fighting, cigarette use, and even sexual activity among teens are all decreasing. And the police chiefs of Canada, much like police chiefs in other countries, tell us that crime in our communities is down, and that the person most likely to assault a child sexually is still, by far, a member of the child’s own family.

In my experience, however, no amount of statistical reporting gets parents to stop hovering over their children. Regardless of whether the parent is seeing me clinically or we’re sharing a burger on my back deck, statistics do not change behavior. The patterns are too enmeshed—and worse, reinforced by neighbors (who criticize parents for letting 8-year-olds walk to school alone), educators (who’ve forbidden failure in the classrooms and sanitized playgrounds), and Fox News anchors (who sensationalize every child abduction, no matter where it’s taken place). Shyam is symptomatic of a new normal, which is causing real harm to children’s psychosocial development.

This new normal is a growing pattern of overprotection that I’ve seen emerging as one of the thorniest clinical issues for therapists because it can look so reasonable. If we therapists have children too (I have two older teens), we may find ourselves empathizing and afraid to admit that we’re just as crazy when it comes to our own kids. Statistics be damned! We’re not going to let anything bad happen to our child.

Where Shyam is a little different from other parents is that, as a consequence of her relentless efforts to protect her daughter and ensure her success at every activity, Marian began to experience severe anxiety before school each day and show the early signs of anorexia. Indeed, the growing number of young adults who aren’t allowed responsibilities in life and who are presenting with anxiety disorders is a warning sign that many parents have lost their way. As a consultant to Shyam’s case, I knew that her fears needed to be challenged, albeit gently, and that Marian needed much more control over the decisions that affected her. The question was how could we, as the family’s clinical team, help Shyam and Marian find a new normal.

The Risk-Taker’s Advantage

Over years of working with parents to help undo the bubble wrap around their children, I’ve found four questions to be useful. Rather than insisting that parents change their behavior and supervise their children less, or trying to persuade them that the world really is a safer place today, I focus on how they can give their kids opportunities to experience the manageable amounts of risk and responsibility needed for success. I ask them:
1. When you were growing up and were about the same age as your child, what risks did you take and what responsibilities did you have?
2. What did you learn from those experiences?
3. Later in life, how helpful were those lessons?
4. How will your child learn the same life lessons?
These questions, especially the fourth one, shift the focus of the clinical work from trying to get parents to stop overprotecting to doing what’s positive for their children, which is providing them with opportunities to experience what I call the risk-taker’s advantage.

That advantage comes when children are given the chance to experience just enough stress to demand their full attention, but not so much that it overwhelms them. These manageable experiences can come in two forms—taking risks and assuming responsibility—which often go hand in hand. For example, giving a child her first pocket knife at, say, age 9 not only gives her the advantage of experiencing a little risky play with a sharp object: it signals that she’s responsible for keeping herself and others safe. Of course, few families find it difficult to argue against giving a child her own pocketknife, but ask those same parents to let their 9-year-old ride her bike to school alone, use the stove to help cook dinner, or go into a fast-food restaurant and order her meal by herself, and suddenly you’ll see them unsure about whether their child is competent enough to keep herself safe or responsible enough to make good decisions.

When we bubble-wrap children, we deny them opportunities to experience what evolutionary psychologists have described as antiphobic play. “Free-range children,” a term coined by New York City journalist Lenore Skenazy, are likelier to experience the exhilaration of overcoming situations that they’re biologically hardwired to fear until they have the physical and psychological maturity to cope with them. Riding the subway at age 9 alone and climbing high up into a tree both offer children the same opportunity to experience enough risk to scare themselves a bit while feeling responsible for the consequences that can follow recklessness. Adventurous play and progressively larger responsibilities are important building blocks for psychological well-being.

Shyam may have given Marian the protection an 8-year-old sometimes requires, but she was neglecting her daughter’s need to encounter risk, like going to the playground with her friends and attending sleepovers at someone else’s house, where bedtimes and expectations may differ from those at home. Such experiences bring with them advantages we can’t provide our kids without help from others.

When I met with Shyam alone, I used the four questions to tease apart her beliefs about her role as a parent and what Marian needed psychologically. When I asked Shyam what risks she’d taken growing up, she told me about her strict upbringing, in which she’d made few, if any, decisions on her own. She was expected to share responsibilities for housework and looking after her younger siblings. She was rarely outside her parents’ supervision—at least until college, when she went through a period of rebellion, tried drinking, and even had a boyfriend, though she refused to be sexually active until she married her husband, whom she met shortly after graduation.

Shyam’s early years had made her feel secure at home, but she’d learned little about taking chances outside it. She didn’t, at first, want to acknowledge that this pattern could be a problem for Marian. Her daughter would, she insisted, be a success, someone her whole family (including the grandparents) would admire. Nothing could put that success at risk.

I next asked Shyam whether she’d learned anything from having so many responsibilities as a child, or if taking those risks in college had taught her anything that was useful later in life. She admitted she was a little bitter about the responsibilities she’d been given, but happy that her childhood had taught her how to look after others. Her behavior at college, however, was unforgivable, she said, insisting nothing good had come of any of it.

“So let me see if I’m understanding,” I said to Shyam. “All those responsibilities you had while younger were good, even though you didn’t always like them?”

“What I liked was that I felt a lot older, ready to have my own children,” she responded.

“I sometimes hear from children who take risks that they feel much the same afterward. Both experiences—of taking risks and having responsibilities—make us feel older,” I said, “or in control of our lives. So I’m wondering, if you became a responsible adult by having responsibility for others, how is Marian going to find that same feeling of being all grown up?”

“I don’t want her to have to give up her childhood like I did,” Shyam protested.

“Yes, I understand,” I said. “But then, if she has no responsibilities for herself or others, and she’s not taking many risks, how will she learn the life lessons she needs to get ready to be away at college when she’s older?”

Though Shyam hesitated to admit it, I had the sense that my questions were making her worry that Marian would be less prepared for adulthood than even she had been. “I don’t know what else to do. She’s just a child, and our community is so dangerous,” she argued.

I knew Shyam was stuck, unsure of what else she should do. Pulling out the “our community is so dangerous” card was a last-ditch effort to defend herself and keep doing more of what she felt comfortable doing. For better or worse, though, Marian’s anxiety was increasing, and Shyam realized she couldn’t stop it by accompanying Marian to school each morning and sitting beside her for the first hour. Exasperated, Shyam finally began to look cautiously for opportunities to give Marian more risks and responsibilities appropriate to her age. She began by leaving Marian alone at her gymnastics lesson and letting her coach decide what amount of safety equipment was necessary. As Shyam explained, justifying her decision to us both, “She’s a professional coach and former national champion. I think she can assess the danger to Marian better than me, right? But I can’t watch. I have to go and come back or else I just get in the way.”

It was a helpful first step that let Marian experience both a measure of well-managed risk and a period of responsibility for herself. When I asked Marian about the change, she was enthusiastic about the independence she was experiencing. Gymnastics lessons without her mother may have seemed to me like just a normal kid activity—but to Marian, it may as well have been a solo flight over Antarctica.

Unfortunately, however, even when parents try to stop hovering over their child, the social gaze of their extended families and communities can thwart their efforts. One mother I met was surprised when her neighbor knocked on her door holding the mother’s 5-year-old son by the hand. “I saw him playing at the bottom of your driveway and thought you should know he was near the road,” she said.
“Thank you,” the mother replied and explained that she’d taught her son not to go off the driveway. Besides, even if he had, she’d reasoned, the traffic on their quiet suburban street was so light, it was unlikely the boy would have been hurt.

“Oh, he hadn’t gone in the road at all,” said the neighbor. “But it just looked to me like he could be in some danger.”

All this emphasis on safety and monitoring our children is missing the point of parenting. While children are young enough to pay attention to the advice of their caregivers, they should be encouraged to experience enough risk and responsibility to learn from the small mistakes they’re bound to make.

Kids Need Responsibility

When 13-year-old Tricia came to see me she was doing everything she could to distance herself from a world of zero risk and predictable success. Just months before I met her, she’d been the preppy kid with the big smile and enthusiasm for fundraising. Then puberty whooshed in like a thunderstorm and she began asking for more risk and more responsibility, like being able to stay out later with her friends. It was normal kid stuff, which a generation or two ago would never have triggered a referral to therapy. However, Tricia’s parents, like most other parents in their community, were suddenly becoming overprotective. Instead of realizing their daughter was growing up and looking for the rites of passage that mark a transition to adulthood, they’d begun to worry that she was in too much danger beyond their front door.

Like any high-spirited youth, Tricia rebelled. She turned Goth, dyed her hair black, and began disappearing after school. Her rebelliousness led to arguments at home and groundings. These only made matters worse. By the time I caught up with Tricia and her parents, Tricia had fully committed herself to doing everything in her power to show them that she could look after herself. Unfortunately, that had meant experimenting with soft drugs and alcohol and finding a boyfriend a couple years older than her. It might sound extreme, but in my experience such behaviors have become common among the middle-class kids from secure homes with caregivers who put too much effort into monitoring them. Tricia didn’t want to be “bad,” but what other choice did she have if she was going to experience enough risk and responsibility to feel grown up?

Over several weekly meetings, I invited Tricia’s parents to talk about their lives growing up, with their daughter present. Those conversations became the basis for renegotiations of the house rules and discussions about how to assign Tricia meaningful responsibilities at home. In other words, we stopped the arguments over making her bed and instead insisted she help shop for the weekly groceries and cook once a week. We also worked on getting Tricia’s parents to stop saying no and instead find ways to say yes to the developmental things Tricia wanted to take on. That meant allowing her to have a boyfriend, but insisting she sit down with their family doctor to discuss sexual health and safety. Tricia’s father summarized our work together this way: “I guess if she’s old enough to mess up, she’s old enough to take some responsibility to do things right.”

It was interesting that as Tricia was given more opportunities to experience manageable amounts of risk and responsibility for herself and others, she began to appreciate the structure her parents were providing. She came home for dinner more often, didn’t mind being reminded to go to bed when it was getting late on a school night, and even agreed to go on a family camping trip. She was, after all, still a child, with a child’s need for attachment to her caregivers, but she was also an adolescent, who required experiences beyond those that her family could provide her.

A Solution to Overprotection

I recently spoke to an audience of 500 teachers and caregivers about the potential consequences of overprotective parenting. If the questions afterward indicated anything, it’s that as a group, we’re split on what makes for good parenting at a time when we perceive our children threatened by everything from pedophiles to peanuts.

One mother wanted to know if it would be appropriate for her 7-year-old son to walk to school on his own (she’d been letting him do it, but worried that other parents considered her irresponsible). Rather than answering yes or no, I suggested she consider whether there were major highways to cross or gangs of violent youth waiting to rob her son. I asked her about her child’s ability to find his way alone. And then I asked her how she’d gotten to school when she’d been 7. As she considered each question, I could see her reaching the same conclusion I’d have reached: that if her community is as safe as most middle-class neighborhoods, then yes, her child should walk to school.

The next parent asked how to handle his 12-year-old daughter, who wanted to get a tattoo. He wished she’d wait, but wondered if he was just being overprotective. The issue had become an ongoing struggle, and the girl was threatening to run away if her parents didn’t let her do what she wanted. Before answering, I had to take a deep breath, anxious that the audience understand that not being overprotective wasn’t the same as being too permissive.

“I’m not sure a 12-year-old can make a well-informed decision about a tattoo,” I said. “That seems to be something we as parents should exercise some control over. If she were my daughter, I’d tell her to wait, at least until she likes wearing the same style of clothing for more than a year.” The audience laughed. “Could you give her a clothing allowance instead and let her choose what she wears for a few years, and then promise to revisit tattoos when, say, she’s 16?”

The audience’s questions highlighted the problem we face as parents. We’ve become so focused on keeping children safe that many of us don’t seem to know what’s normal anymore. It’s as if we look at children as a species of underevolved pets, whom we adults must take care of. Excessive protection, however, goes against what we know about the positive role that risk and responsibility play in children’s development.

Being pushed to the point of failure at tasks that, with effort, we can manage is necessary to develop a sense of personal efficacy. Research on children’s behavior in sports shows that children who have incremental opportunities to push themselves to the limits of their ability are likelier to handle genuinely daunting physical challenges, like a double black-diamond ski run, with aplomb because of the confidence they gain by facing and surmounting challenges. Untested children are likelier to be anxious, tense, afraid of the hill, and therefore the odds-on favorites to wind up in a cast.

I’ve found in my clinical work that the solution to the problem of overprotection can begin with two tasks. First, parents need to make a realistic survey of the risks their children face at home and beyond their front door. Second, they need to assess their children’s capacity to solve their own problems given the risks they face. If we remember that resilience is nurtured when children have the support they need to develop competencies and self-efficacy, then our role as caregivers (and therapists) becomes that of crossing guards, rather than jailors. We can ease children’s successful—if sometimes challenging—transition through danger, rather than sparing them from danger altogether.

Enabling Change

A great deal of neurological evidence shows that facilitated engagement with a mildly stressful environment may be beneficial to a child’s development. Bruce Ellis at the University of Arizona and W. Thomas Boyce at the University of British Columbia have worked together to show that a highly emotionally reactive child (made that way by genetic predisposition or obsessive parenting) can function just fine in a low-stress and well-supported household, but wilts when put into new surroundings. Of course, that doesn’t mean we want to force children to endure rocky lives just to develop a hardy disposition. The best environments for children foster growth, but they don’t overwhelm them with so much shelter that children lack opportunities to develop the skills they’ll need to survive when bad things happen.

I hate blaming parents for messing up their kids, but the truth is that many parents today aren’t doing what they should be doing to ensure their children’s optimal development. We’re seeing an explosion of cases in which love and protection are trumping common sense and science. For example, the therapist of an overly anxious 7-year-old consulted with me because he knew the boy’s anxiety was being triggered by his mother, who constantly reminded him of how dangerous school can be and of his own fragility. Germs are everywhere, the mother told him, so he should always carry a bottle of hand sanitizer and never play in the sandbox. Playground equipment can break bones, so he should never play on the swings or, heaven forbid, the teeter-totter. Strangers are lurking to steal the child in every grocery store, so he must never be out of eye contact with her. As if all that wasn’t bad enough, the boy was expected to succeed at every task, from playing nicely with his friends to reading three grade levels beyond his age. Unsurprisingly, he became insecure and shy whenever his mother left him. He refused to go outside at recess unless an adult accompanied him. In class, if he couldn’t solve a math problem or his drawing wasn’t beautiful enough, he’d throw a tantrum.

We tried asking the boy’s mother to focus less on germs and more on encouraging her son to become healthy and strong by spending time outside. We asked her about her favorite sports growing up (she couldn’t recall any), and we asked her to research the real risks to her child from germs. Despite repeated efforts to have her reconsider what she said to her son, there was little measurable change after several months. It was as if we couldn’t find a way to help her without making her more defensive.

Eventually, we reached out to the boy’s school and his paternal grandfather for whatever help they could offer. The school agreed to give the boy some responsibility, encouraging him to help teach the younger children to read. His grandfather agreed to take the boy out once a week for an adventure: a waterpark, four-wheeling at a nearby farm, or just staying out late enough to watch the fireworks on the Fourth of July. It was difficult to get the mother to agree to these interventions, as small as they were, but since they were being offered by trusted sources of support, they were easier to sell. Finally, we spoke with the boy about his experience of the world and whether he found it dangerous. The more opportunities he had for interesting excursions and assisting the teacher, the more he began to like being with other people. He began making new friends and even stopped refusing to go out at recess.

Since the boy’s mother never really changed, we enlisted the help of external partners to do what she couldn’t bring herself to do: expose her son to risk and responsibility. As a systemic therapist, I sometimes feel strange benching parents to give their children what they need developmentally. But in many cases when anxiety or delinquency reflects overly enmeshed and overly protective parenting, I’ve found that the solutions need to be more ecological. In other words, it’s a matter of changing the environment—which can mean giving kids chances to use an ax when camping, or ride a snowmobile. Even the most vulnerable kids will grow if the environment is rich in opportunities.

The Problems of the Privileged

The pattern of overmonitoring children’s every move and emotional experience shows up in dozens of ways, small and large. Think, for example, of parents who sit and watch their 5-year-old at a soccer practice, the team swarming the ball as it moves from one end of the field to the other. It does a child no good when every time she touches the ball, her parents shout, “Way to go!” and clap enthusiastically. The child has done nothing to merit such praise and, in my experience, can grow up expecting to be the darling of everyone’s attention all the time. That’s not the perfect formula for the kind of individual who can form an equal and loving relationship with another person. According to these kids’ parents, though, nothing should threaten their children’s self-esteem. While these parents mean well, the world of hand sanitizers, net nannies, and oversupervision isn’t giving children the risk-taker’s advantage.

As a therapist, I encounter children when overprotection has led to psychopathology. My role is to remind parents, gently but firmly, that their children need a variety of experiences for normal development, including opportunities to screw up and fix their problems themselves. The work can be exhausting, if only because this always seems like it’s a problem we don’t need to be having. I understand better the need for intervention with children coping with exposure to war, racism, and bullying. But being overprotected in safe communities, with lots of advantages in life? It makes no sense, but it’s a problem of the privileged that doesn’t appear to be going away anytime soon.

Sometimes I succeed in helping families reconsider their obsession with their child’s success and safety; sometimes not so much. What I do know is that often when I’m successful as a therapist, parents who were once overprotective zealots, doing what they’d been told by risk-averse communities, become allies in the battle to change their children’s schools and neighborhoods. They’re the ones pushing for zip lines on the playground, permission for children to throw snowballs during recess, and organizing bike-to-school days.

If overprotection can disadvantage children, why do so many parents continue to bubble-wrap their kids? Should we blame a culture of risk aversion, or the news media’s obsession with sexual assaults on children? Do some parents like to keep their children endlessly dependent? Or do they have such fragile egos that they need their children to be safe and successful so they can feel whole? Individual families offer many reasons for patterns of overprotection that may pose challenges in therapy. What’s clear to me is that parents, whatever their motives, don’t give up patterns of overprotection just because the statistics tell them their communities are safe. Most parents, however, will change when they’re persuaded that they’re disadvantaging their child. After all, they’re fundamentally motivated to see their child succeed. Once they recognize that a mix of a little failure, a lot of responsibility, and some risk can help their child become healthier and happier, they begin to see their children and their role as parents with new eyes. Suddenly, being a good parent no longer seems irreconcilable with learning to lighten up.

Michael Ungar, PhD, is a family therapist and a professor of social work at Dalhousie University, where he codirects the Resilience Research Centre. He’s the author of the bestseller Too Safe for Their Own Good: How Risk and Responsibility Help Teens Thrive.

Wednesday, May 21, 2014

Daniel Dennett - Is Free Will an Illusion? What Can Cognitive Science Tell Us?


Daniel Dennett recently spoke on free and cognitive science at the Santa Fe Institute. He has argued against Sam Harris's rejection of free will, but he does not reject determinism, making him a compatibilist. 
Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.[1] Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.
Here is a summary of his position from his Wikipedia page:

Free will

While he is a confirmed compatibilist on free will, in "On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want"—Chapter 15 of his 1978 book Brainstorms,[17] Dennett articulated the case for a two-stage model of decision making in contrast to libertarian views.
The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision.[18]
While other philosophers have developed two-stage models, including William James, Henri Poincaré, Arthur Holly Compton, and Henry Margenau, Dennett defends this model for the following reasons:
  1. First ... The intelligent selection, rejection, and weighing of the considerations that do occur to the subject is a matter of intelligence making the difference.
  2. Second, I think it installs indeterminism in the right place for the libertarian, if there is a right place at all.
  3. Third ... from the point of view of biological engineering, it is just more efficient and in the end more rational that decision making should occur in this way.
  4. A fourth observation in favor of the model is that it permits moral education to make a difference, without making all of the difference.
  5. Fifth—and I think this is perhaps the most important thing to be said in favor of this model—it provides some account of our important intuition that we are the authors of our moral decisions.
  6. Finally, the model I propose points to the multiplicity of decisions that encircle our moral decisions and suggests that in many cases our ultimate decision as to which way to act is less important phenomenologically as a contributor to our sense of free will than the prior decisions affecting our deliberation process itself: the decision, for instance, not to consider any further, to terminate deliberation; or the decision to ignore certain lines of inquiry.
These prior and subsidiary decisions contribute, I think, to our sense of ourselves as responsible free agents, roughly in the following way: I am faced with an important decision to make, and after a certain amount of deliberation, I say to myself: "That's enough. I've considered this matter enough and now I'm going to act," in the full knowledge that I could have considered further, in the full knowledge that the eventualities may prove that I decided in error, but with the acceptance of responsibility in any case.[19]
Leading libertarian philosophers such as Robert Kane have rejected Dennett's model, specifically that random chance is directly involved in a decision, on the basis that they believe this eliminates the agent's motives and reasons, character and values, and feelings and desires. They claim that, if chance is the primary cause of decisions, then agents cannot be liable for resultant actions. Kane says:
[As Dennett admits,] a causal indeterminist view of this deliberative kind does not give us everything libertarians have wanted from free will. For [the agent] does not have complete control over what chance images and other thoughts enter his mind or influence his deliberation. They simply come as they please. [The agent] does have some control after the chance considerations have occurred.
But then there is no more chance involved. What happens from then on, how he reacts, is determined by desires and beliefs he already has. So it appears that he does not have control in the libertarian sense of what happens after the chance considerations occur as well. Libertarians require more than this for full responsibility and free will.[20]
I do not buy the determinist argument and I tend to support conditional free will (perhaps limited is a better word).

Daniel C. Dennett is the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, and Co-Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. He is the author of Intuition Pumps And Other Tools for Thinking (2013), Breaking the Spell (2006), Freedom Evolves (2003), Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), Consciousness Explained (1992), and many other books. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. His latest book, written with Linda LaScola, Caught in the Pulpit: Leaving Belief Behind (2013).

Is Free Will an Illusion? What Can Cognitive Science Tell Us?

Published on May 17, 2014


Daniel Dennett
May 14, 2014

Serious thinkers contend that free will cannot exist in a deterministic universe -- one in which events are the singular outcomes of the conditions in which they occur. The alternative view, that free will is prerequisite for personal responsibility and morality, is the basis of our legal and religious institutions. Philosopher Daniel Dennett unravels this conundrum and asks whether we must jettison one of these notions, or whether they can co-exist. He then asks: if free will is an illusion, as many scientists say, should we conclude that we don't need real free will to be responsible for our actions?

Saturday, February 15, 2014

Free Will - Sam Harris vs. Dan Dennett

Back in 2012, Sam Harris published a monograph on free will, a complete rejection of the notion of free will based on out-dated research that has been broadly misinterpreted. Free Will was popular among those who associate notions of free will with religious doctrine, but many other people - including some leading neuroscientists - reject the absolutist position Harris presents.

Here is a brief synopsis of the book from its Amazon page:
A BELIEF IN FREE WILL touches nearly everything that human beings value. It is difficult to think about law, politics, religion, public policy, intimate relationships, morality—as well as feelings of remorse or personal achievement—without first imagining that every person is the true source of his or her thoughts and actions. And yet the facts tell us that free will is an illusion.

In this enlightening book, Sam Harris argues that this truth about the human mind does not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom, but it can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.
Among those who reject this position is Michael Gazziniga, author of Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain (2011). Here is the synopsis of his book:
The father of cognitive neuroscience and author of Human offers a provocative argument against the common belief that our lives are wholly determined by physical processes and we are therefore not responsible for our actions.

A powerful orthodoxy in the study of the brain has taken hold in recent years: Since physical laws govern the physical world and our own brains are part of that world, physical laws therefore govern our behavior and even our conscious selves. Free will is meaningless, goes the mantra; we live in a “determined” world. 

Not so, argues the renowned neuroscientist Michael S. Gazzaniga in this thoughtful, provocative book based on his Gifford Lectures——one of the foremost lecture series in the world dealing with religion, science, and philosophy. Who’s in Charge? proposes that the mind, which is somehow generated by the physical processes of the brain, “constrains” the brain just as cars are constrained by the traffic they create. Writing with what Steven Pinker has called “his trademark wit and lack of pretension,” Gazzaniga shows how determinism immeasurably weakens our views of human responsibility; it allows a murderer to argue, in effect, “It wasn’t me who did it——it was my brain.” Gazzaniga convincingly argues that even given the latest insights into the physical mechanisms of the mind, there is an undeniable human reality: We are responsible agents who should be held accountable for our actions, because responsibility is found in how people interact, not in brains.
 
An extraordinary book that ranges across neuroscience, psychology, ethics, and the law with a light touch but profound implications, Who’s in Charge? is a lasting contribution from one of the leading thinkers of our time. 
Two more recent arguments in favor of free will, however limited said free will might be, come from Thomas Metzinger ("The myth of cognitive agency: Subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy," 2013; Frontiers in Psychology: Perception Science) and Gregory Bonn ("Re-conceptualizing free will for the 21st century: Acting independently with a limited role for consciousness," 2013; Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology). There was also a recent article at The Emotion Machine blog in support of free will.

Okay, so that is some of the background supporting an idea Harris rejects completely and which philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett rejects mostly.

In fact, one of the critics on Harris's books was his fellow atheist (and horseman), Dennett. Here is the beginning of Dennett's LONG reply to Harris's book, followed by the beginning of Harris's reply to Dennett. For the record, I also think Dennett is wrong (again, see the article by Metzinger).

Reflections on FREE WILL

A Review by Daniel C. Dennett


(Photo via Steven Kersting)

Sam Harris’s Free Will (2012) is a remarkable little book, engagingly written and jargon-free, appealing to reason, not authority, and written with passion and moral seriousness. This is not an ivory tower technical inquiry; it is in effect a political tract, designed to persuade us all to abandon what he considers to be a morally pernicious idea: the idea of free will. If you are one of the many who have been brainwashed into believing that you have—or rather, are—an (immortal, immaterial) soul who makes all your decisions independently of the causes impinging on your material body and especially your brain, then this is the book for you. Or, if you have dismissed dualism but think that what you are is a conscious (but material) ego, a witness that inhabits a nook in your brain and chooses, independently of external causation, all your voluntary acts, again, this book is for you. It is a fine “antidote,” as Paul Bloom says, to this incoherent and socially malignant illusion. The incoherence of the illusion has been demonstrated time and again in rather technical work by philosophers (in spite of still finding supporters in the profession), but Harris does a fine job of making this apparently unpalatable fact accessible to lay people. Its malignance is due to its fostering the idea of Absolute Responsibility, with its attendant implications of what we might call Guilt-in-the-eyes-of-God for the unfortunate sinners amongst us and, for the fortunate, the arrogant and self-deluded idea of Ultimate Authorship of the good we do. We take too much blame, and too much credit, Harris argues. We, and the rest of the world, would be a lot better off if we took ourselves—our selves—less seriously. We don’t have the kind of free will that would ground such Absolute Responsibility for either the harm or the good we cause in our lives.

All this is laudable and right, and vividly presented, and Harris does a particularly good job getting readers to introspect on their own decision-making and notice that it just does not conform to the fantasies of this all too traditional understanding of how we think and act. But some of us have long recognized these points and gone on to adopt more reasonable, more empirically sound, models of decision and thought, and we think we can articulate and defend a more sophisticated model of free will that is not only consistent with neuroscience and introspection but also grounds a (modified, toned-down, non-Absolute) variety of responsibility that justifies both praise and blame, reward and punishment. We don’t think this variety of free will is an illusion at all, but rather a robust feature of our psychology and a reliable part of the foundations of morality, law and society. Harris, we think, is throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

He is not alone among scientists in coming to the conclusion that the ancient idea of free will is not just confused but also a major obstacle to social reform. His brief essay is, however, the most sustained attempt to develop this theme, which can also be found in remarks and essays by such heavyweight scientists as the neuroscientists Wolf Singer and Chris Frith, the psychologists Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom, the physicists Stephen Hawking and Albert Einstein, and the evolutionary biologists Jerry Coyne and (when he’s not thinking carefully) Richard Dawkins.

The book is, thus, valuable as a compact and compelling expression of an opinion widely shared by eminent scientists these days. It is also valuable, as I will show, as a veritable museum of mistakes, none of them new and all of them seductive—alluring enough to lull the critical faculties of this host of brilliant thinkers who do not make a profession of thinking about free will. And, to be sure, these mistakes have also been made, sometimes for centuries, by philosophers themselves. But I think we have made some progress in philosophy of late, and Harris and others need to do their homework if they want to engage with the best thought on the topic.

I am not being disingenuous when I say this museum of mistakes is valuable; I am grateful to Harris for saying, so boldly and clearly, what less outgoing scientists are thinking but keeping to themselves. I have always suspected that many who hold this hard determinist view are making these mistakes, but we mustn’t put words in people’s mouths, and now Harris has done us a great service by articulating the points explicitly, and the chorus of approval he has received from scientists goes a long way to confirming that they have been making these mistakes all along. Wolfgang Pauli’s famous dismissal of another physicist’s work as “not even wrong” reminds us of the value of crystallizing an ambient cloud of hunches into something that can be shown to be wrong. Correcting widespread misunderstanding is usually the work of many hands, and Harris has made a significant contribution.

The first parting of opinion on free will is between compatibilists and incompatibilists. The latter say (with “common sense” and a tradition going back more than two millennia) that free will is incompatible with determinism, the scientific thesis that there are causes for everything that happens. Incompatibilists hold that unless there are “random swerves”[1] that disrupt the iron chains of physical causation, none of our decisions or choices can be truly free. Being caused means not being free—what could be more obvious? The compatibilists deny this; they have argued, for centuries if not millennia, that once you understand what free will really is (and must be, to sustain our sense of moral responsibility), you will see that free will can live comfortably with determinism—if determinism is what science eventually settles on.

Incompatibilists thus tend to pin their hopes on indeterminism, and hence were much cheered by the emergence of quantum indeterminism in 20th century physics. Perhaps the brain can avail itself of undetermined quantum swerves at the sub-atomic level, and thus escape the shackles of physical law! Or perhaps there is some other way our choices could be truly undetermined. Some have gone so far as to posit an otherwise unknown (and almost entirely unanalyzable) phenomenon called agent causation, in which free choices are caused somehow by an agent, but not by any event in the agent’s history. One exponent of this position, Roderick Chisholm, candidly acknowledged that on this view every free choice is “a little miracle”—which makes it clear enough why this is a school of thought endorsed primarily by deeply religious philosophers and shunned by almost everyone else. Incompatibilists who think we have free will, and therefore determinism must be false, are known as libertarians (which has nothing to do with the political view of the same name). Incompatibilists who think that all human choices are determined by prior events in their brains (which were themselves no doubt determined by chains of events arising out of the distant past) conclude from this that we can’t have free will, and, hence, are not responsible for our actions.

This concern for varieties of indeterminism is misplaced, argue the compatibilists: free will is a phenomenon that requires neither determinism nor indeterminism; the solution to the problem of free will lies in realizing this, not banking on the quantum physicists to come through with the right physics—or a miracle. Compatibilism may seem incredible on its face, or desperately contrived, some kind of a trick with words, but not to philosophers. Compatibilism is the reigning view among philosophers (just over 59%, according to the 2009 Philpapers survey) with libertarians coming second with 13% and hard determinists only 12%. It is striking, then, that all the scientists just cited have landed on the position rejected by almost nine out of ten philosophers, but not so surprising when one considers that these scientists hardly ever consider the compatibilist view or the reasons in its favor.

Harris has considered compatibilism, at least cursorily, and his opinion of it is breathtakingly dismissive: After acknowledging that it is the prevailing view among philosophers (including his friend Daniel Dennett), he asserts that “More than in any other area of academic philosophy, the result resembles theology.” This is a low blow, and worse follows: “From both a moral and a scientific perspective, this seems deliberately obtuse.” (18) I would hope that Harris would pause at this point to wonder—just wonder—whether maybe his philosophical colleagues had seen some points that had somehow escaped him in his canvassing of compatibilism. As I tell my undergraduate students, whenever they encounter in their required reading a claim or argument that seems just plain stupid, they should probably double check to make sure they are not misreading the “preposterous” passage in question. It is possible that they have uncovered a howling error that has somehow gone unnoticed by the profession for generations, but not very likely. In this instance, the chances that Harris has underestimated and misinterpreted compatibilism seem particularly good, since the points he defends later in the book agree right down the line with compatibilism; he himself is a compatibilist in everything but name!

Seriously, his main objection to compatibilism, issued several times, is that what compatibilists mean by “free will” is not what everyday folk mean by “free will.” Everyday folk mean something demonstrably preposterous, but Harris sees the effort by compatibilists to make the folks’ hopeless concept of free will presentable as somehow disingenuous, unmotivated spin-doctoring, not the project of sympathetic reconstruction the compatibilists take themselves to be engaged in. So it all comes down to who gets to decide how to use the term “free will.” Harris is a compatibilist about moral responsibility and the importance of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions, but he is not a compatibilist about free will since he thinks “free will” has to be given the incoherent sense that emerges from uncritical reflection by everyday folk. He sees quite well that compatibilism is “the only philosophically respectable way to endorse free will” (p. 16) but adds:
However, the ‘free will’ that compatibilists defend is not the free will that most people feel they have. (p. 16)
First of all, he doesn’t know this. This is a guess, and suitably expressed questionnaires might well prove him wrong. That is an empirical question, and a thoughtful pioneering attempt to answer it suggests that Harris’s guess is simply mistaken.[2] The newly emerging field of experimental philosophy (or “X-phi”) has a rather unprepossessing track record to date, but these are early days, and some of the work has yielded interesting results that certainly defy complacent assumptions common among philosophers. The study by Nahmias et al. 2005 found substantial majorities (between 60 and 80%) in agreement with propositions that are compatibilist in outlook, not incompatibilist.

Harris’s claim that the folk are mostly incompatibilists is thus dubious on its face, and even if it is true, maybe all this shows is that most people are suffering from a sort of illusion that could be replaced by wisdom. After all, most people used to believe the sun went around the earth. They were wrong, and it took some heavy lifting to convince them of this. Maybe this factoid is a reflection on how much work science and philosophy still have to do to give everyday laypeople a sound concept of free will. We’ve not yet succeeded in getting them to see the difference between weight and mass, and Einsteinian relativity still eludes most people. When we found out that the sun does not revolve around the earth, we didn’t then insist that there is no such thing as the sun (because what the folk mean by “sun” is “that bright thing that goes around the earth”). Now that we understand what sunsets are, we don’t call them illusions. They are real phenomena that can mislead the naive.

To see the context in which Harris’s criticism plays out, consider a parallel. The folk concept of mind is a shambles, for sure: dualistic, scientifically misinformed and replete with miraculous features—even before we get to ESP and psychokinesis and poltergeists. So when social scientists talk about beliefs or desires and cognitive neuroscientists talk about attention and memory they are deliberately using cleaned-up, demystified substitutes for the folk concepts. Is this theology, is this deliberately obtuse, countenancing the use of concepts with such disreputable ancestors? I think not, but the case can be made (there are mad dog reductionist neuroscientists and philosophers who insist that minds are illusions, pains are illusions, dreams are illusions, ideas are illusions—all there is is just neurons and glia and the like). The same could be said about color, for example. What everyday folk think colors are—if you pushed them beyond their everyday contexts in the paint store and picking out their clothes—is hugely deluded; that doesn’t mean that colors are an illusion. They are real in spite of the fact that, for instance, atoms aren’t colored.
Read more . . . .

And then here is the reply by Harris to Dennett's schooling of him on philosophy and free will (and it really does feel like a "master" painstaking trying to get through to a stubborn "student" who refuses to see beyond his own theory).

The Marionette’s Lament

A Response to Daniel Dennett



(Photo via Max Boschini)

Dear Dan—

I’d like to begin by thanking you for taking the time to review Free Will at such length. Publicly engaging me on this topic is certainly preferable to grumbling in private. Your writing is admirably clear, as always, which worries me in this case, because we appear to disagree about a great many things, including the very nature of our disagreement.

I want to begin by reminding our readers—and myself—that exchanges like this aren’t necessarily pointless. Perhaps you need no encouragement on that front, but I’m afraid I do. In recent years, I have spent so much time debating scientists, philosophers, and other scholars that I’ve begun to doubt whether any smart person retains the ability to change his mind. This is one of the great scandals of intellectual life: The virtues of rational discourse are everywhere espoused, and yet witnessing someone relinquish a cherished opinion in real time is about as common as seeing a supernova explode overhead. The perpetual stalemate one encounters in public debates is annoying because it is so clearly the product of motivated reasoning, self-deception, and other failures of rationality—and yet we’ve grown to expect it on every topic, no matter how intelligent and well-intentioned the participants. I hope you and I don’t give our readers further cause for cynicism on this front.

Unfortunately, your review of my book doesn’t offer many reasons for optimism. It is a strange document—avuncular in places, but more generally sneering. I think it fair to say that one could watch an entire season of Downton Abbey on Ritalin and not detect a finer note of condescension than you manage for twenty pages running.
I am not being disingenuous when I say this museum of mistakes is valuable; I am grateful to Harris for saying, so boldly and clearly, what less outgoing scientists are thinking but keeping to themselves. I have always suspected that many who hold this hard determinist view are making these mistakes, but we mustn’t put words in people’s mouths, and now Harris has done us a great service by articulating the points explicitly, and the chorus of approval he has received from scientists goes a long way to confirming that they have been making these mistakes all along. Wolfgang Pauli’s famous dismissal of another physicist’s work as “not even wrong” reminds us of the value of crystallizing an ambient cloud of hunches into something that can be shown to be wrong. Correcting widespread misunderstanding is usually the work of many hands, and Harris has made a significant contribution.
I hope you will recognize that your beloved Rapoport’s rules have failed you here. If you have decided, according to the rule, to first mention something positive about the target of your criticism, it will not do to say that you admire him for the enormity of his errors and the folly with which he clings to them despite the sterling example you’ve set in your own work. Yes, you may assert, “I am not being disingenuous when I say this museum of mistakes is valuable,” but you are, in truth, being disingenuous. If that isn’t clear, permit me to spell it out just this once: You are asking the word “valuable” to pass as a token of praise, however faint. But according to you, my book is “valuable” for reasons that I should find embarrassing. If I valued it as you do, I should rue the day I wrote it (as you would, had you brought such “value” into the world). And it would be disingenuous of me not to notice how your prickliness and preening appears: You write as one protecting his academic turf. Behind and between almost every word of your essay—like some toxic background radiation—one detects an explosion of professorial vanity.

And yet many readers, along with several of our friends and colleagues, have praised us for airing our differences in so civil a fashion—the implication being that religious demagogues would have declared mutual fatwas and shed each other’s blood. Well, that is a pretty low bar, and I don’t think we should be congratulated for having cleared it. The truth is that you and I could have done a much better job—and produced something well worth reading—had we explored the topic of free will in a proper conversation. Whether we called it a “conversation” or a “debate” would have been immaterial. And, as you know, I urged you to engage me that way on multiple occasions and up to the eleventh hour. But you insisted upon writing your review. Perhaps you thought that I was hoping to spare myself a proper defenestration. Not so. I was hoping to spare our readers a feeling of boredom that surpasseth all understanding.

As I expected, our exchange will now be far less interesting or useful than a conversation/debate would have been. Trading 10,000-word essays is simply not the best way to get to the bottom of things. If I attempt to correct every faulty inference and misrepresentation in your review, the result will be deadly to read. Nor will you be able to correct my missteps, as you could have if we were exchanging 500-word volleys. I could heap misconception upon irrelevancy for pages—as you have done—and there would be no way to stop me. In the end, our readers will be left to reconcile a book-length catalogue of discrepancies.

Let me give you an example, just to illustrate how tedious it is to untie these knots. You quote me as saying:
If determinism is true, the future is set—and this includes all our future states of mind and our subsequent behavior. And to the extent that the law of cause and effect is subject to indeterminism—quantum or otherwise—we can take no credit for what happens. There is no combination of these truths that seems compatible with the popular notion of free will.
You then announce that “the sentence about indeterminism is false”—a point you seek to prove by recourse to an old thought experiment involving a “space pirate” and a machine that amplifies quantum indeterminacy. After which, you lovingly inscribe the following epitaph onto my gravestone:
These are not new ideas. For instance I have defended them explicitly in 1978, 1984, and 2003. I wish Harris had noticed that he contradicts them here, and I’m curious to learn how he proposes to counter my arguments.
You see, dear reader, Harris hasn’t done his homework. What a pity…. But you have simply misread me, Dan—and that entire page in your review was a useless digression. I am not saying that the mere addition of indeterminism to the clockwork makes responsibility impossible. I am saying, as you have always conceded, that seeking to ground free will in indeterminism is hopeless, because truly random processes are precisely those for which we can take no responsibility. Yes, we might still express our beliefs and opinions while being gently buffeted by random events (as you show in your thought experiment), but if our beliefs and opinions were themselves randomly generated, this would offer no basis for human responsibility (much less free will). Bored yet?

You do this again and again in your review. And when you are not misreading me, you construct bad analogies—to sunsets, color vision, automobiles—none of which accomplish their intended purpose. Some are simply faulty (that is, they don’t run through); others make my point for me, demonstrating that you have missed my point (or, somehow, your own).
Read more . . . .

Friday, January 03, 2014

The 5 Big Questions in Brain Science - Prediction, Mind Reading, Responsibility, Treatment, and Enhancement

National Geographic asked bioethicist Hank Greely, bioethics and genetics expert at Stanford University's Law School, what he sees as the five big questions in neuroscience. He offered five interesting insights: Prediction, Mind Reading, Responsibility, Treatment, and Enhancement.



This brief article comes from National Geographic News.


Q&A: The 5 Big Questions in Brain Science

A bioethicist suggests that neuroscience challenges how we view ourselves.

Dan Vergano
National Geographic
Published December 18, 2013


What moral dilemmas will arise from our newfound abilities to peer into the workings of the human mind? | Photograph by Pasieka, Science Photo Library/Corbis

Advances in our understanding of the brain have turned neuroscience into one of the hottest frontiers in research, and in ethics. (See "Beyond the Brain.")


On Wednesday, the U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues met to discuss the moral implications of brain science. The bioethics experts met at the request of President Barack Obama, who earlier this year called for the start of a $100 million federal Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative.

Obama asked the bioethics council to look into what sort of moral dilemmas might arise from the newfound abilities to peer into the workings of the human mind promised by his brain-mapping proposal, and by neuroscience overall.

What are the big questions? We asked Hank Greely, a bioethics and genetics expert at Stanford University's Law School, what he sees as being the five big questions in neuroscience. Here are his insights:

1. Prediction: using neuroscience to predict peoples' fate or actions.

We are spending a lot of research dollars on the question of whether Dad, or I, will get Alzheimer's. What is going to happen when we can really predict that? There will be tremendous implications for families and the medical system, in terms of intervention or treatment.

Another question is crime. What about when we can tell whose brains indicate they are more likely to commit or recommit a crime when people are released from jail? Who is going to recommend or deny a brain scan for every criminal case?

Most likely, these brain results will just be added to other evidence in criminal cases. But if neuroscience adds yet another predictive element to when releases [from prison occur] or sentences end, it will have big effects on preventive retention or preventive therapy for the incarcerated.

2. Mind reading: using neuroscience as a lie detector or to see emotional states.

When I first started saying "mind reading," I thought a lot of my neuroscientist friends would object. But many of them say, yes, that is right, it is like that. A study involving MIT undergraduates was able to tell when they were visualizing a face or a place with 85 percent accuracy, for example. That's pretty good.

Where this will really make a difference is in contacting quadriplegics with the most severe paralysis—"locked in" individuals. We will be able to put people thought to have been in a persistent vegetative state in a [brain] scanner and try to talk to them.

Lie detection raises a host of legal, ethical, and social questions. Only one company is left doing this—NoLieMRI. They are seen as problematic because they don't publish their methods or results. But there is a lot of interest in the technology from the Defense Department, which wants to move away from the polygraph to other ways to do lie detection.

In court, where you will probably first see mind reading is with disability claims—whether people are really feeling pain for Social Security disability claims for lower back pain. Hundreds of thousands of people are making these claims. Some perhaps aren't really in pain. We don't have a good way to tell the difference, but if we did, that would matter.

3. Responsibility: using neuroscience to determine whether people have free will.

I have some neuroscientists who think the effect of their science will be to make the court system disappear. It will show that people have no real "free will" and that people are not truly responsible for their actions. "My brain made me do it" … I don't know any lawyers who believe this will happen.

But there is one particular case, which took place in Charlottesville, Virginia, of a 40-year-old man who suddenly became interested in pornography and moved to child pornography and then groped his 12-year-old stepdaughter. The Tuesday before his sentencing he complained of headaches, couldn't read, he blacked out. And they took him to the emergency room.

They found a tumor the size of a chicken egg on a part of his brain called the left frontal lobe [implicated in studies as being involved with judgment and cognition]. They removed the tumor and the impulses went away.

Ten months later he tells his probation officer that the impulses are coming back. They x-ray him and find that the tumor has returned. They remove the tumor again and he hasn't been rearrested in the last two to three years.

Ironically, we may see a lot of court cases involving brain abnormalities where people claim their lawyer was ineffective. "I should have had a brain scan," they will tell the jury.

4. Treatment: using neuroscience in medical care.

We are not giving billions of dollars to neuroscientists to study whatever interests them, but for treatments for diseases such as Parkinson's. That is what is driving the funding for neuroscience.

We have to ask careful questions, however, about claims of treatment to avert or cure diseases such as opiate addiction. Could a judge order someone to get treatment based on a brain scan, or is the brain sacred? To what extent can parents force children to get treatments based on neuroscience?

As our basic medical knowledge improves, we will see dual uses spread away from cures for Alzheimer's and Parkinson's as we learn more about how to fundamentally change others.

5. Enhancement: using neuroscience to juice our capabilities.

You most often think about college kidsusing Adderall or Ritalin to give themselves a brain boost. There isn't a lot of evidence this helps, aside from keeping them awake.

But what if it does work? Is it fair to the kid who doesn't get a brain enhancement? Or what if it only works long enough to pass your medical exam—should that person be practicing medicine? Will we have to pee in a cup before finals?

I think that in memories is where we will see neuroscience matter. So much is being done on memory in connection with Alzheimer's, but also with age-appropriate memory loss. I would take a pill in an instant to have a memory as sharp as I recall it was when I was younger.

Last, we asked Greeley if neuroscience would result in ethics becoming more brain-based and moving away from the old moral questions.

No, I see neuroscience raising questions similar to any technology, although they will be fundamental ones because of the importance of the brain to our sense of self.

For any technology there are two questions you need to ask:

Does it work? It is easy to get carried away with the science-fiction scenarios and just assume it works, which may encourage giving too much credibility to a technology.

The other question is, if it does work, what now? There will be benefits and risks to any technology. It is really important to focus on both questions—not to focus on just one first—to give thought to both before it is too late to think about either one.

The interview has been edited and condensed.
Follow Dan Vergano on Twitter.

Friday, June 28, 2013

Brainwashed: Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience (FORA.tv)


Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience (2013) has recieved excellent reviews from a lot of major publications, including the Wall Street Journal and New York Times (from David Brooks, who moderates the discussion below).

Here are a couple of the blurbs:
The New Scientist“The intrepid outsider needs expert guidance through this rocky terrain – and there's no better place to start than Brainwashed by Sally Satel and Scott O. Lilienfeld. Satel, a practising psychiatrist, and Lilienfeld, a clinical psychologist, are terrific sherpas. They are clear-sighted, considered and forgiving of the novice's ignorance” 
Nature“Satel and Lilienfeld provide an engaging overview of the technical and conceptual factors that complicate the interpretation of brain scans obtained by functional magnetic resonance imaging and other techniques…. Brainwashed offers much to bolster popular understanding of what brain imaging can and cannot achieve.”
And here is the publisher's summary of the book:
What can’t neuroscience tell us about ourselves? Since fMRI—functional magnetic resonance imaging—was introduced in the early 1990s, brain scans have been used to help politicians understand and manipulate voters, determine guilt in court cases, and make sense of everything from musical aptitude to romantic love. But although brain scans and other neurotechnologies have provided groundbreaking insights into the workings of the human brain, the increasingly fashionable idea that they are the most important means of answering the enduring mysteries of psychology is misguided—and potentially dangerous. 
In Brainwashed, psychiatrist and AEI scholar Sally Satel and psychologist Scott O. Lilienfeld reveal how many of the real-world applications of human neuroscience gloss over its limitations and intricacies, at times obscuring—rather than clarifying—the myriad factors that shape our behavior and identities. Brain scans, Satel and Lilienfeld show, are useful but often ambiguous representations of a highly complex system. Each region of the brain participates in a host of experiences and interacts with other regions, so seeing one area light up on an fMRI in response to a stimulus doesn’t automatically indicate a particular sensation or capture the higher cognitive functions that come from those interactions. The narrow focus on the brain’s physical processes also assumes that our subjective experiences can be explained away by biology alone. As Satel and Lilienfeld explain, this “neurocentric” view of the mind risks undermining our most deeply held ideas about selfhood, free will, and personal responsibility, putting us at risk of making harmful mistakes, whether in the courtroom, interrogation room, or addiction treatment clinic.

A provocative account of our obsession with neuroscience, Brainwashed brilliantly illuminates what contemporary neuroscience and brain imaging can and cannot tell us about ourselves, providing a much-needed reminder about the many factors that make us who we are.
The fact that one of the authors of this book has been writing books for the American Enterprize Institute (a conservative policy organization), and has co-written a book with the conservative Christina Hoff Sommers, makes me a little skeptical about ulterior motives for this book.

This is why I am skeptical, from the above text about the book:
Satel and Lilienfeld explain, this “neurocentric” view of the mind risks undermining our most deeply held ideas about selfhood, free will, and personal responsibility, putting us at risk of making harmful mistakes, whether in the courtroom, interrogation room, or addiction treatment clinic.
Personal responsibility and free will are essential to the conservative agenda, especially in the legal realm. We can't have people being acquitted of crimes due to brain defects resulting from abuse, neglect, or other traumas. We can't stop putting addicts in jail simply because they had little control over their tendency toward addiction and the environmental factors that made drugs seem like a useful copiung strategy.

Hell, if we took those things into account, our prisons would be empty and the legal system . . . yadda, yadda, yadda.




Brainwashed: Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience
from American Enterprise Institute on FORA.tv


Brainwashed: Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience

Partner: American Enterprise Institute
Location: American Enterprise Institute
Washington, D.C.
Event Date: 06.17.13

Summary


"Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience" (Basic Books, June 2013), by psychiatrist and AEI scholar Sally Satel and Emory University psychologist Scott Lilienfeld, follows the migration of brain science - and brain imaging in particular - out of the lab and into the public sphere.

Join New York Times columnist David Brooks as he engages the authors in a discussion of popular neuroscience (both the mindless and the mindful), of biological explanations of human behavior and their implications, and of the centrality of the concept of the mind in an age of neuroscience. Books will be available for purchase at the event.

Speakers


David Brooks has been an op-ed columnist for The New York Times since 2003. Previously, he was an editor at The Wall Street Journal, a senior editor at The Weekly Standard, and a contributing editor at Newsweek and The Atlantic. Currently a commentator on PBS’s “The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer,” Brooks is also the author, most recently, of The Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character. His earlier books are Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There and On Paradise Drive: How We Live Now (And Always Have) in the Future Tense. He has contributed essays and articles to many publications, including The New Yorker, Forbes, The Public Interest, The New Republic, and Commentary. He is a frequent commentator on NPR, CNN’s “Late Edition,” and “The Diane Rehm Show.”

Scott Lilienfeld is a clinical psychologist and Professor of Psychology at Emory University in Atlanta. Scott earned his bachelor's degree in psychology from Cornell University and his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota. His principal areas of research are personality disorders, psychiatric classification and diagnosis, evidence-based practices in psychology, and the challenges posed by pseudo-science to clinical psychology. Scott received the 1998 David Shakow Award for Early Career Contributions to Clinical Psychology, is a Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, and is a past president of the Society for a Science of Clinical Psychology. He is the co-author of Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology and Psychology: From Inquiry to Understanding.

Sally Satel, M.D., a practicing psychiatrist and lecturer at the Yale University School of Medicine, examines mental health policy as well as political trends in medicine. Her publications include PC, M.D.: How Political Correctness Is Corrupting Medicine (Basic Books, 2001); The Health Disparities Myth (AEI Press, 2006); When Altruism Isn't Enough: The Case for Compensating Organ Donors (AEI Press, 2009); and One Nation under Therapy (St. Martin's Press, 2005), co-authored with Christina Hoff Sommers.

Thursday, November 15, 2012

Alva Noë - An American Family

Philosopher Alva Noë posted this article a couple of days ago at the NPR 13.7 Cosmos and Culture blog in response to the presidential election. He identifies a deeper issue than demographics, the economy, or most of the other talking points we hear from the pundits - a shift in our sense of community.

According to Noë [in reference to the "You didn't build that" speech that the GOP tried to twist into the message that Obama was anti-success], Obama's point was "not just that we are all in this together, the point is that the fact that we are all in this together makes us what we are."

An American Family

by Alva Noë
November 12, 2012


A sea of self-motivated individuals or a web of interdependent talents? Both, of course.

A sea of self-motivated individuals or a web of interdependent talents? Both, of course. Jewel Samad AFP/Getty Images
... we are an American family and we rise or fall together as one nation and as one people.
... our destiny is shared ...
... this country only works when we accept certain obligations to one another and to future generations. The freedom which so many Americans have fought for and died for come with responsibilities as well as rights. And among these are love and charity and duty and patriotism.
The President delivered these words last week after securing re-election. They offer, I think, a clear and an honest statement of the central value at stake in this past election, and beyond.

One of the abiding myths that shapes our understanding of ourselves is the idea that each of us is a kind of island and that we are only truly responsible for that which flows from our inner selves without any external influence.

We need to be done with this myth.

I think Star Trek: "to boldly go where no one has gone before." Yes, but not alone. We go forth as members of a ship's crew, representing a vast civilization, and dependent on a web of technology that requires the existence of uncountably many people, ideas, inventions and institutions.

In this election President Obama took clear aim at the myth:
If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help. There was a great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody helped to create this unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you've got a business — you didn't build that. Somebody else made that happen. The Internet didn't get invented on its own. Government research created the Internet so that all the companies could make money off the Internet.
The point is, is that when we succeed, we succeed because of our individual initiative, but also because we do things together.
Truer words have never been spoken.

Indeed, it was a telling failure of Romney's campaign, back in July, to have chosen just these words of the president to distort and criticize. The Romney campaign said:
Mitt Romney understands that we have to celebrate people who start enterprises and employ other people rather than devalue them. Success is not the result of government, it is the result of hard-working people who take risks, create dreams, and build lives for themselves and for their families.
The point, of course, is that Obama was not devaluing success, or denying that successful business people build their own businesses. He was calling attention to the conditions that make it possible for them to do this. That's not to attack successful people, it is to acknowledge, and then to celebrate, the fact that each of us is situated in a community and that our situation enables us to act and to achieve success, in very much the way that a race track allows a driver to test his limits.

Obama took clear aim at the myth. The point is not just that we are all in this together. The point is that the fact that we are all in this together makes us what we are.

The hand-wringing among Republicans has given rise to lots of talk about changing demographics, sensitivity to women and the like. But Romney's failure ran deeper, I think. He played on the myth, but without defending it, and certainly without offering an alternative. He failed to engage what may be the defining issue for our time.